ENGLAND AND PALESTINE

HERBERT SIDEBOTHAM



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ESSAYS TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF THE JEWISH STATE

BY

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TO

REBECCA SIEFF

AND

MIRIAM MARKS

PREFACE

THIS collection of essays has been written in the interstices of a busy year, and the excuse for its appearance must be the writer's hope that it may help to form opinion on an aspect of our war policy that has been unduly neglected. Some of the subjects chosen for the essays could only be treated justly by lifelong study and profound learning; but lack of scholarship may perhaps be forgiven to the desire to meet an immediate political need. It seemed better to risk inaccuracy and incompleteness for the chance of seeing some of the great events of our day in a better perspective.

When this book was begun a year ago its main argument seemed more uphill than it has since become. The case for Zionism has often been presented from the point of view of Jewish Nationalists, but never before as a branch of the foreign policy of the Entente Powers in this war. The conversion of the Governments to the one central idea urged in this book—namely, the need for restoring Palestine as a national home to the Jews—has moved more rapidly than the writer's pen.

On November 2, Mr. Balfour, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote the following letter to Lord Rothschild—

> " I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of his Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet—
>
> " ' His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of its object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'
>
> " I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."

This Declaration has since been confirmed by members of the Government, notably by Lord Robert Cecil, who at a great meeting of Jews in London at the beginning of December last declared the recognition of Zionism to be the first constructive effort in what he hoped would be the new settlement of the world after the war. Moreover, the victories of General Allenby and the occupation of Jerusalem by his army have brought its age-long aspirations almost within the grasp of the Jewish nation. Much history is behind the Declaration of the British Government and for the present must remain behind, though the curtain has occasionally been lifted far enough to reveal at work a group of earnest and patriotic Jews under the advice and encouragement of Dr. Weizmann, President of the

English Zionist Federation. In all its arrangements with regard to the future of Palestine the British Government, it is hardly necessary to add, has acted with the full concurrence of the French Government. No Declaration by the French Government corresponding to that made by Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild has yet been made public, but the writer is allowed to quote the following letter written by M. Jules Cambon from the French Foreign Office to Mr. Nahum Sokolov, who has acted as an ambassador of the English Zionists. The letter is dated June 4, 1917—

> "You were good enough to present the project to which you are devoting your efforts, which has for its object the development of Jewish colonization in Palestine. You consider that circumstances permitting and the independence of the Holy Places being safeguarded on the other hand, it would be a deed of justice and reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the Jewish nationality in that Land from which the people of Israel were exiled so many centuries ago.
>
> "The French Government, which entered this present war to defend a people wrongfully attacked and which continues the struggle to ensure the victory of right over might, can but feel sympathy with your cause, the triumph of which is bound up with that of the Allies.
>
> "I am happy to give you herewith such assurance."

This letter, written, it will be observed, before the British victories in Palestine, is cautiously worded,

but it leaves no room for doubt that the attitude of the French Government is in full sympathy with that of the British. One of M. Cambon's provisos —" circumstances permitting "—has already been satisfied by the British occupation of Jerusalem.

The Entente between the Allies and Jewish Nationalism is thus complete on its ideal side, and the sails of Zionism are full. But the vindication of a great ideal like this of a Jewish restoration to Palestine does not quite cover the whole subject, as it presents itself to the non-Jewish mind, or even for that matter to the mind of the English or French Jew whose devotion to his adopted country is none the less real because he has also an allegiance to another country of his dreams and of his prayers. To such Jews it would be an additional stay for their idealism if they felt that their ideal could be anchored on the hard and stony ground of modern politics; nor would the Englishman's devotion to liberty and justice for the Jews be contaminated if he were convinced that he had a common interest with them and that the cause of the Jews were also the cause of the Allies in this war. It is with these submerged facts of history that this book deals. Its object is to bring Jewish Nationalism into association with our Eastern policy, and its age-long aspirations with modern " real-politics."

In the later months of 1916 there was formed in Manchester a British Palestine Society whose main object was to establish this community of ideals and interests between Zionism and British policy. Of that Committee the writer has been a member from the beginning, and he has assisted in the bring-

ing out of its weekly paper *Palestine*. This book, while the responsibility for views expressed is entirely the writer's own, is an attempt to exhibit in longer perspective than is possible in a periodical journal what he understands to be the ideas of that Committee. His point of view is English, and he has striven to detach himself, as far as his personal friendships would let him, from the prepossession of a Jewish view. If he has strayed into regions where he is a stranger he has tried to follow good guides, to whose learning he takes this opportunity of acknowledging his indebtedness.

H. SIDEBOTHAM.

January 1918.

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ENGLAND AND PALESTINE

CHAPTER I

THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF THE ANCIENT JEWISH STATE [1]

THE name Palestine means the land of the Philistines, and it is one of the ironies of history that a race which came so mysteriously, and dropped out of history so completely, should have had its name imposed on the land of the "chosen people." The reason is that Southern Syria interested the Greeks not as the home of the Jews but as the way into Egypt; and that when they came to name the country they chose the name of the people who lived on the main highway of Southern Syria, in the maritime plain between Sharon and the Sinai desert. Like the Serbians, who by reason of their geographical position are the keepers of the bridge-head between the west and the east in Europe, the Philistines, too, had a corridor of their own to hold between Asia and Africa, between the rival empires, first of Assyria and Egypt and later of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies. Also, the Philistines faced the

[1] Sir George A. Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land;* MacCoun, *The Holy Land;* Masterman, *Galilee;* articles on the Hauran in *Palestine* are among the sources of this chapter.

sea, and though, unlike the Phœnicians further north, they do not seem to have been a maritime people, the Greeks, who were, found this strip of coast, harbourless as it was, the most valuable thing in the country. Thus the name of the country, inappropriate as it is to its history, is a reminder of the importance of sea power in the past as it will be in the future history of Palestine.

The Philistines came to Palestine from Egypt, and some have thought that they were planted on the coast of Southern Syria as outposts of Egypt across the desert. There is no doubt that the Egyptians fully realized the importance to the defence of their country of this ledge of land between the Judæan plateau and the sea, but the relations between the Philistines and the Egyptians were for the most part not friendly. There were Phœnician settlements in the Nile Delta and it has generally been supposed that the Philistines came to Palestine from these. But, if they were Phœnician in origin, their race character must have been much modified in their wanderings. There is evidence to connect them with Crete before they settled in Egypt and even to support the view that there may have been some admixture of Greek elements in their race. If we imagine the Philistines to have been traders who reached Crete from Phœnicia and Egypt from Crete and thence found their way to Palestine, in the course of their wanderings recruiting fresh racial elements from the countries through which they passed, we shall not be contradicting the few facts that are known about them. They seem to have left Egypt about the

same time as the Israelites and to have entered Palestine by the direct road from the south, whereas the Israelites took the circular route through the desert and entered the Promised Land from over Jordan on the east. Are we to suppose that the Hebrews went the long desert road because the Philistines had forestalled them on the coast road, or because Egypt was already in possession of Palestine and the Hebrews were anxious to avoid the sphere of her influence? All this is doubtful. What is certain is that the kings of the Hyksos dynasty in Egypt "who knew Joseph" came from Asia and might therefore be expected to favour Semitic peoples like the Philistines and the Hebrews. Their successors, anxious to restore the native Egyptian tradition, were the Pharaohs of the oppression. It is possible that the exodus alike of the Philistines and of the Hebrews from Egypt was due partly to the desire to get rid of unassimilable foreign elements in the country, partly with some idea of colonizing the southern parts of Syria in the Egyptian interest. Perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that the first Philistine settlements on the coast were made by the ancient equivalent of a modern chartered company. However that may be, the policy of the Egyptian kings toward Palestine presently became one of conquest; while the Hebrews were in the wilderness of Sinai, Egypt garrisoned and administered the greater part of Palestine and Syria; and the passage of the Hebrews across the Jordan seems to have coincided with the withdrawal of these Egyptian garrisons.

It is an interesting speculation what might have

happened if there had been no Philistines between the Israelites and the sea and the ancient Jewish kingdom had become a maritime state. There is no word for a port in Hebrew, and though Israelites once or twice during the period of their classic history touched the sea, it was only for brief periods. Despite the song of Deborah, Dan did not "remain in his ships"; perhaps she was only mocking at maritime ambitions that were never to be realized. If they had been, the history of Israel would certainly have been very different, for the sea favours the small nations and enables them to play a greater part in the history of the world than they could otherwise do. The Hebrews might have become a colonizing power and carried over the seas the political independence which, imprisoned as it was on land, was crushed out by the great military empires; she might have fought against Rome side by side with Carthage and even have turned the scale in favour of her Ally and made the Mediterranean a Semitic Lake. If Palestine is ever to have a future of secular greatness, command of the sea exercised by herself or in dependence upon a power that possesses it will be indispensable. King David understood that well when he made his alliance with Tyre.

Between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon—two spurs from the Taurus range that run from north to south—there is a district known in ancient times as Hollow Syria (Cœle Syria). The prolongation of Lebanon to the south is the central range that runs through Palestine and makes the wall from which the Hebrews overlooked the Maritime

Plain on to the waters of the Mediterranean. The prolongation of the Anti-Lebanon or Mount Hermon range is the range east of Jordan from which Israel looked out towards the Desert, and towards the country from which she came and to which she was one day sadly to return. Between these two ranges is the great Rift of the Jordan valley. The country is thus, as most geographers have observed, divided into four longitudinal sections—(1) the Maritime Plain; (2) the Central Range; (3) the Jordan Valley; and (4) the Highlands east of Jordan. On this, the full heritage of the country, the Hebrews at no period of their past history ever fully entered. What were the causes of their political failure? It is easy to say, as so many historians of the Jews do, that the message of Israel to the world might never have been delivered if she had become a great secular Power; easy but unconvincing. After all, the message of Islam was not impaired by the secular fame of the Arabs, and Christianity prevailed not only over Rome but through Rome; nor for that matter does the practice of modern Christian states recognize this essential incompatibility between the political success of a nation and its spiritual distinction. The causes must be sought elsewhere than in the religion of Jewry.

There are those who find the cause in the geographical features of the country; Sir George Adam Smith, for example, most distinguished of modern writers on the geography of Palestine, declares that Palestine, formed as it is and surrounded as it is, is emphatically a land of tribes. "The idea," he writes, "that it can ever belong to one nation,

even though this were the Jews, is contrary both to Nature and to Scripture"—a dictum which if it were true would condemn the Jews to inevitable political failure in their own country in the future as in the past. The geographical disunion of Palestine is, indeed, like nothing to be found anywhere else in the world. The strange cutting up of the country, nowhere wide, into longitudinal sections, gives a greater variety of climate and physical character than is to be found in the same distance anywhere else.

> "There are palms in Jericho and pine forests in Lebanon. In the Ghôr, in the summer, you are under a temperature of more than 100° Fahrenheit, and yet you see glistening the snowfields of Hermon. All the intermediate steps between these extremes the eye can see at one sweep from Carmel—the sands and palms of the coast; the wheat fields of Esdraelon; the oaks and sycamores of Galilee; the pines, the peaks, the snows of Mt. Lebanon. How closely these differences lie to each other!
>
> "Take a section of the country across Judæa. With its palms and shadoofs the Philistine plain might be a part of the Egyptian delta, but on the hills of the Shephelah which overlook it you are in the scenery of southern Europe; the Judæan moors which overlook them are like the barer uplands of central Germany; the shepherds wear sheepskin cloaks and live under stone roofs; sometimes the snow lies deep; a few miles further east and you are down on the desert among the Bedouin with their tents of hair and their cotton clothing; a few miles further still and you drop to the

> torrid heat in the Jordan valley; a few miles beyond that and you rise to the plateau of Belkâ, where, as the Arabs say, 'the cold is always at home.'" [1]

And yet from the sea to the hills beyond Jordan there is a distance of barely seventy miles.

These are not the ordinary gradations from sea to inland mountains that are to be found elsewhere. It is a veritable switch-back of a country, and these longitudinal sections are complicated by lateral cross-sections. The Wilderness of Judæa, the Negeb or the South, is à different country from the high plateau of Judæa of which it is the shelf; Judæa on the east and west is separated from the rest of the country by deep ravines, and on the north side is similarly separated from central Palestine, except where the plateau running from Jerusalem to Bethel between the Vale of Ajalon and Michmash forms a natural bridge between the two provinces. Samaria is also separated from Galilee by the broad plain of Esdraelon, forming the great highway between the coast region and the lands beyond Jordan. Sharon with its woods and swamps and flowery meadows is different in character from the Plain of Philistia, which is a prolongation to the north of the characteristics of the Nile Delta; and east of Jordan Hauran and Gilead present striking contrasts to each other and to the hills of Moab to the south. But these are only the main divisions of the country, and in and amongst them there are all manner of minor eddies and whirlpools in the folds of the land. Here,

[1] *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 56.

assuredly, there is no natural unity ready-made for new immigrants. And yet, from another point of view, Palestine is more happy in its frontiers than most lands. The best natural frontiers are the sea, the desert (which is a sea of land), and the mountains. Palestine has all three—the sea to the west, the desert to the east and south, the mountains to the north. The difficulty in the case of the Jewish State was that it was never strong enough to touch and maintain itself on all these natural frontiers at once. The history of the foreign policy of Israel under the Kings is in the main the history of these three failures—the failure to reach the sea frontier, the failure to find a satisfactory frontier on the north, and the failure to establish herself firmly on the edge of the desert east of Jordan. The first failure not only deprived her of the wealth and influence that comes of sea power, but uncovered the western entries into the plateau of Judæa and opened a broad highway of invasion north and south. The second failure lost the northern tribes to Israel and invited her enemy to decapitate the country by occupying Esdraelon. The third failure opened up the crossings of the Jordan, which in spite of the great depth of the valley in which it flows is in no sense a defensible frontier line.

These geographical peculiarities will be constantly in our minds, as we attempt in the next few chapters to find some clues to the history of Palestine through the centuries. In this chapter our interest is to gain some general idea of the geography of Palestine as it is illustrated by the early history of the Jewish State before the Captivity. In tracing the con-

nection between the geography of the country and the history of the Jewish State, it will be convenient to disregard chronology, and to let our history unfold itself in the longitudinal sections in which the country is divided.

The first three of the longitudinal sections into which Nature has divided the country is the Maritime Plain, connecting Egypt with Syria. Of the early inhabitants of this country something has already been said. Gaza, the first town in Palestine on the way from Egypt, always had great military importance by reason of its position, both to an army advancing from the south towards Mesopotamia and to an army advancing from the north to the conquest of Egypt. To the one it supplied a fertile base of supply on the far side of the desert; without sure possession of Gaza it was impossible for the other to think of crossing the desert to the attack on Egypt. It was also a great trade centre, and from it trade routes went in all directions to Egypt, to South Arabia and to Petra. Few towns have stood so many sieges. In the long history of wars between Egypt and Assyria, this bridgehead between Asia and Africa was repeatedly taken and retaken. The Israelites under the Kings never in their most prosperous times gained possession of it, though their raids sometimes extended up to the city gates. The same may be said of three other cities of the Philistines—Askelon, Ashdod and Ekron. Gath, on the other hand, which lay further to the north, was sometimes taken by the Israelites. These Philistine cities barred the access of the Israelites to the Maritime Plain, which geographically

speaking is an extension of Egypt and of its physical features along the coast of Syria.

Beyond Gath begins the Plain of Sharon, which extends right up to Carmel and Acre, the shoulder of Palestine. It was never in effective possession of the Israelites in classical times. When they first invaded Palestine and for centuries afterwards Sharon was covered with forest from Carmel to Ajalon—the Greek name for the district was Drumos, the oak forest. The boundary between the woods of Sharon and the level plains of Philistia is the road from Joppa to Jerusalem. It was just south of this road that the Israelites had their first sight of the Mediterranean. Here in the country between the Vale of Ajalon and the Vale of Sorek was the district first occupied by the tribe of Dan; but in spite of the valour of Samson, the hero of the tribe, the newcomers were forced steadily back and had to abandon to the Philistines the roads which hinged between the Plain of Philistia and the Plain of Esdraelon. Not only, as we shall see, did the Philistines at their strongest hold the whole of the coast from the frontiers of Egypt to Acre, but they penetrated inland and overran the Plain of Esdraelon, their idea evidently being to get control of the trade routes through Megiddo to Mesopotamia and perhaps also to weaken their hereditary enemies by dividing the northern and southern sections of the Israelites from each other. Along the Syrian coast, north of Haifa, the mountains approach nearer to the sea, and at no time did the Israelites cross them.

Overlooking the Maritime Plain from the east, there are bare, low limestone hills with bastions

projecting well forward into the plain. These hills or downs are known as the Shephelah and extend the whole of the way from the Egyptian border as far as Ajalon. It was in these low hills that most of the fighting between the Israelites and the Philistines took place, and the general configuration of the country gives them extreme military importance; for their possession is necessary for any one who wishes to attack Judæa from the west, or to reach the sea from Judæa. The plateau of Judæa rises up like a citadel over the lowlands; the passes leading down from it are few, narrow and tortuous, and, held by a vigilant army, almost impregnable except to manœuvre and surprise. The Valley of Ajalon, the most northerly of the routes across the Shephelah, has always been a favourite pass with soldiers. When the Israelites first invaded the land, it was down Ajalon that Dan sought to reach the sea; a force advancing west from the Jordan valley would strike the head of Ajalon after crossing the central range, and it was down Ajalon that Joshua drove the Canaanites in the first flush of his victories on that day when he had so much to do that he bade the sun stand still until it was accomplished; up Ajalon the Philistines came to the very heart of the Israelites' territory at Michmash, and made a crisis in Israel's history that led to the establishment of the monarchy; and in this valley David and Jonathan fought side by side. Here the Maccabees won their greatest victories, and here, too, were fought the most obstinate battles of the Crusades. Gezer, where David won a victory over the Philistines, is the Mont Gisart of the Crusades.

> "Within sight of every Egyptian and every Assyrian invasion of the land, Gezer has also seen Alexander the Great pass by, the legions of Rome in unusual flight, the armies of the Cross struggle, waver and give way, and Napoleon come and go. If all could rise who have fallen round its base—Ethiopians, Hebrews, Assyrians, Arabs, Turcomans, Greeks, Romans, Celts, Saxons and Mongols—what a rehearsal of the Judgment Day it would be! Few of the travellers who now rush across the plain realize that the first conspicuous hill that they pass is also one of the most thickly haunted, even in that narrow land where history has so crowded itself. But upon the ridge of Gezer no sign of all this now remains except in the name Tell Jezer, and in a sweet hollow to the north beside the fountain there lie the scattered Christian stones of the convent of the Rose." [1]

The Vale of Ajalon is the most northerly and the most important of the passes across the Shephelah to the Judæan plateau. A second pass is the Vale of Sorek, which now carries the new railway from Joppa to Jerusalem. It was in this valley that Samson performed his greatest exploits; here, too, is the village of Bethshemesh, whose cattle brought the ark back from Ekron, whither it had been taken by the victorious Philistines; here, too, is Ebenezer, the scene of so much hard fighting between the Israelites and the Philistines. A third valley is the Wady es Sunt, or Vale of Elah, as it is called in the Bible. This was the scene of David's fight with Goliath, and it was by this valley that Cœur de Lion at first proposed to march to Jerusalem before

[1] *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 217.

he changed his mind and went by Ajalon instead. It was to this valley, also, that David fled from the wrath of Saul and took refuge in the cave of Adullam. Other valleys are the Wady el Afranj and the Wady el Bizair running from near Hebron out on to the Philistine plain at Ashdod. In the latter of these valleys Sennacherib came to grief after defeating the Egyptians, and penetrating probably by way of the Vale of Ajalon to the investment of Jerusalem. The cause of Sennacherib's downfall was almost certainly the plague, which, endemic in the Nile Delta, is easily carried by the wind and the sand into the Maritime Plain.

The strategy of invasion through Palestine, whether from the south or from the north, is certainly difficult. Before venturing to cross the desert between Palestine and Egypt an enemy must not only make sure of his main communications along the coast of Philistia through Gaza but must also protect his flank from attacks issuing from Judæa across the Shephelah hills.

Thus it was that the Assyrians came into collision with the Israelites, who tended to look to Egypt as their natural protector. The position of the Jews on the hills commanding the roads towards Egypt was too menacing to be disregarded. The policy of the Hebrew prophets is always one of strict isolation from the quarrels of Assyria and Egypt, whereas that of the secular power usually sought the friendship and, if possible, the protection of Egypt. The position of Palestine in Asia was thus very like that of Belgium in Europe. She was the cockpit of quarrels in which she, for the

most part, had no concern; and though strict isolation as preached by the prophets would no doubt have been ideally the best course for her to adopt, it can very readily be understood that the right of way claimed through Palestine by the military empires of the north was no more pleasant to ancient Palestine than it is to modern Belgium.

We have now surveyed the territory of Palestine between the central range and the sea, and we must now follow the course of the central range of hills that continue to Lebanon. On this range and in its valleys most of Jewish history was enacted. But Jewish writers never speak of a range, but always of separate hills, as Mount Ephraim, Mount Naphtali, Mount Judah and the like, these being the high ground between the several valleys that break its continuity. The chief of these breaks is the plain of Esdraelon, which had a profound influence on the history of Palestine. It afforded free access from Assyria to the plains of the coast and it separated the country into two well-marked divisions which reproduce the political division between Israel and Judah. Later in Jewish history the country is in three divisions, Judæa, Samaria, and Galilee, but Galilee played a small part in the classic period of secular Jewish history, because Esdraelon in the hands of an enemy cut it off from the rest of the country.

After crossing the Jordan and capturing Jericho, the Israelites, according to the accepted version of their movements, divided, the larger part going north-west into Mount Ephraim, which comprised the whole district afterwards known as Samaria,

and the tribe of Judah going to the south-west, so that for a time a wide belt of Canaanitish territory separated the invaders, with Gilgal as the angle of the union between them. Judah, as will presently be seen, lost her individuality and did not recover a place amongst the tribes until the time of David; and the earliest permanent settlements of the Israelites in Palestine lay in and among the valleys of the central range between Esdraelon and the Judæan plateau. Samaria, whose inhabitants were later so bitterly despised by the Jews of Jerusalem, was the birthplace of the Jewish nation and throughout the greater part of its classical history the capital of Jewish life. The main range in Samaria breaks up into a number of hills separated from each other by narrow valleys, spread out fanwise as the hills of Derbyshire are spread out from the central spine of the Pennines. On the west the hills rise gently in bare and usually barren slopes from the Plain of Sharon, on the east they fall precipitously down to the Jordan except where the Valley of Jezreel pierces the wall. On the south Samaria is separated from Judah and Philistia by the Valley of Ajalon to the west and on the east by the valley running up from Jericho, along which the main stream of Israelitish invasion entered the country. Jericho at the end of this valley, though it lies almost due east of Jerusalem and is only fifteen miles away, was always in the possession of the northern kingdom. Between these two valleys is the Plateau of Bethel, which forms a natural bridge between the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, and all the wars between them were fought upon it, the frontier

shifting slightly north or south as one or other gained the advantage. It was here, between the Bethel Plateau and the Vale of Ajalon, where the three frontiers of Israel, Judah and Philistia met that Benjamin "ravined as a wolf." On the north side Samaria lay open to the Plain of Esdraelon; and the openness was her ruin. "Samaria, fair and facile, lavished her favours on foreigners, and the surrounding paganism poured into her ample life" (Sir George Adam Smith). Yet if she could have changed her shape she would willingly have done so; for this open frontier to the north brought her much sorrow. Judah, for all her barrenness, was more favoured by nature. Except for the narrow *coupée* which connected her with Samaria, she was an island separated from the rest of the world, not indeed by water but by deep ravines and frowning hills which made it easier for her to keep her virtue and her independence. She has had the reward of her cloistered seclusion; Samaria was exposed alike to the temptations and the more violent assaults of the outer world.

A country like Samaria, whose valleys, like crater holes, seem to have been formed by the explosion under some heavenly artillery of the Central Range, is not deficient in military positions. The strong places of Samaria were famous in the military history of Palestine, and the isolated peaks were the refuges of the Jewish civilization when the tide of invasion flooded the valleys between them. The capital which gave its name to the province was the strongest of them all. It had usually to be reduced by famine. The Assyrians besieged it

for three years before they captured it, and when the Greek Ptolemy surrendered Palestine to the Seleucids, he had its fortifications dismantled. But Samaria, though the most famous, was not the first capital of the province. The first (as it is the present) capital of the country was Shechem, between Mounts Ebal and Gerizim, on the watershed between the Wady esh Shair flowing down to the Mediterranean and the Brook Cherith, a tributary of the Jordan. But the ready accessibility from both east and west which led to its early settlement displeased the military eye of Jeroboam, who made Tirzah, tucked away in a valley towards the Jordan, the capital. It was Omri who chose Samaria.

Something has already been said of the frontiers between Samaria and Judah. More important in a military sense in the early history of Israel were the other communications between the Plain of Sharon and Esdraelon, between Samaria and Galilee, and between Samaria and the country east of Jordan.

Unlike Judæa, which besides its ravines has the Shephelah as an advance work to defend it, the western frontier of Samaria abuts directly on the Maritime Plain. The main road from Joppa to the capital of Samaria ran north, skirting the flanks of Mount Ephraim, and turned abruptly west at the Wady es Shair. The principal positions on this road are Aphek and Kakon, both near the entrance to the Wady es Shair; the first famous in the wars of the Philistines, the latter in the Crusades and in Napoleon's campaign in Syria. But the most frequented routes from the Plain of Sharon ran not

to the hills of Samaria but to the Plain of Esdraelon. There is a coast route round the west flank of Mount Carmel which is difficult and ill adapted to military movement, though the Crusaders used it. But between Carmel and the central range there is a choice of easy passes leading across the Plain of Esdraelon direct to Haifa and Phœnicia. A second pass further east leads over the hills at Megiddo and, descending into the plain, bifurcates into two roads, one leading north to Galilee, the other east to the Jordan; and yet a third pass descends into the plain at Engannim. Engannim is the junction of two roads, one going north round the west flanks of Gilboa to the head of the Vale of Jezreel, the other crossing the southern slopes of Gilboa to Bethshan, where the Vale of Jezreel opens out into the Jordan valley. Bethshan (later Scythopolis and later still Beisan) occupies an isolated position in the plain and commands the principal crossing across the Jordan from Damascus. It was on the main military route between Assyria and Egypt, and only very rarely in its history was it in the hands of the Israelites. That meant that the gateway to invasion by way of Esdraelon into Sharon and the Maritime Plain usually stood wide open. It is the most important fact in the history of the ancient Jewish state. Hardly more secure was the other gateway over the shoulder of Carmel. The reason why the Israelites wanted a king was that the Philistines were extending their trade by this gateway from Sharon into Esdraelon, thus cutting off Ephraim in Samaria from the tribes in Galilee; and Saul of the tribe of Benjamin was chosen

because that tribe, wedged in about Ajalon between Samaria, Philistia and Judæa, had had most of the fighting with the Philistines. The removal of the Tabernacle from Shechem, where it was exposed to the danger of Philistine raids, to the comparative seclusion of Shiloh was connected with the same northerly movement of the Philistines, anxious to obtain complete control of the trade over the Jordan with Damascus. How far that movement had been carried may be gathered from the fact that Saul, the first Jewish king, was killed in a battle fought on the northern slopes of Mount Gilboa, well to the eastern end of the plain. At Tabor, a few miles to the north, Napoleon, nearly 3000 years later, defeated the Turks when he invaded Palestine along the same route by which the Philistines had advanced—a notable example of the truth that military history is only geography written in a different type.

Issachar, the tribe to which the Plain of Esdraelon was allotted, is described in Jacob's blessing to his children in Genesis as a strong ass crouching down between two burdens, a graphic comparison of a valley sprawling with limbs outstretched between the hills of Samaria and Galilee. "He saw that rest was good and the land that it was pleasant, and bowed his shoulder to bear and became a servant unto tribute." No other fate than subjection was possible to a tribe living on this plain unless it held the passes at both ends, and very seldom in their history did the Israelites do that. They were exposed to raids across the Jordan by way of Bethshan, and Gideon's victory over the Midianites was won on the northern slopes of Gilboa,

not far from the ground on which Saul was defeated. A still more famous battle was Barak's defeat of Sisera. Sisera by his name should be Egyptian, and it may well be that at this time the Egyptians, who may have had possession of the Bay of Acre, were endeavouring to keep open the corridor through Sharon and Esdraelon by means of Canaanitish native auxiliaries.

When it is remembered that the Israelites won one of their most famous and early victories at the western end of Esdraelon, it is curious that Carmel and the Bay of Haifa should figure so seldom in the classical history of Palestine. The Bay was probably in the hands successively of Egypt and the Tyrian League, and the fact that the scene of the encounter between Elijah and the prophets of Baal was laid on Mount Carmel is not inconsistent with the view that the control of the coast was in the hands not of Israel but of the Phœnicians.

North of Esdraelon the general direction of the hills is not north and south but east and west, with broad valleys between. The most southerly of these ranges is the Nazareth range, and the line of the most northerly is marked by the course of the Wady Shaib, which is the boundary between Upper and Lower Galilee. Lower Galilee is part of Esdraelon and shared its political fate; the margins of the plain are not ruled straight like those of a canal, but run in and out like bays of the sea between the hill promontories. Upper Galilee is a very different country. Instead of alternating hills and plain it is high table-land of an average height of 2000 feet, rising at Jebel Jurmuk, near Safed, to

nearly 4000 feet. These hills are, as Hosea calls them, the roots of Lebanon, which overlooks Galilee from the west as Hermon overlooks it from the east. On the west side of Galilee, separating it from the Lebanon, is the deep gorge of the Leontes; on the other side the Upper Jordan, the marshes of Huleh and the Sea of Galilee. The military history of the country is very curious. The military impulse of the first invasion carried the Hebrews across the Plain of Esdraelon right up to the sources of the Jordan in Upper Galilee. Baneas, where the passage between Lebanon and Hermon is narrowest, is the ancient Dan, the true boundary between Palestine and Syria. Without Baneas the country of Galilee cannot be held against attack from the north; Baneas held, the hills of Galilee can only be turned by a march south along the east of Jordan until the opening of Esdraelon is reached. And that is what happened to the early Jewish settlers in Northern Galilee. Cut off from the rest of their countrymen by invaders through Esdraelon, they came to rely more and more on the Phœnicians of the coast, and even in David's and Solomon's time the connection was never broken. David had climbed to power as a tributary chief of the Philistines, and as his policy was one of close alliance with Tyre against Syria and he had no commercial ambitions of his own, he was content to leave these old associations between Galilee and Tyre undisturbed. Solomon went further and ceded " twenty cities " of Galilee to the Phœnicians. He certainly had a very definite commercial policy and understood the value of sea-power, for he built the port

of Ezion-Geber (Akabah) on the Red Sea, and the volume of the trade with India and the East that passed this way must have been very considerable. Unlike the Arabs, however, the Jews never seem to have had maritime ambitions, and they were content to act as the middlemen, leaving the carrying trade to the Phœnicians. The crews of the ships that sailed from Ezion-Geber to India and East Africa were not Jewish but were supplied by arrangement from Tyre. The commercial treaties between Solomon and Hiram of Tyre must have been somewhat elaborate, and probably the cession of the "cities" in Galilee was intended to secure to Tyre her trade route with the interior of Syria and the Euphrates, and the price which Solomon paid for the assistance of Tyrian artificers in the building of his Temple and of Tyrian mercenaries in the wars with Syria. Palestine by its extension to the shores of the Red Sea held the key to the maritime trade with India, and doubtless Tyre would pay a handsome rent for the lease of the wharves of Ezion-Geber. The trade from the Red Sea seems to have been carried overland to Joppa and there shipped; but this trade, as the authority of Israel over the desert routes diminished, would be diverted to Egypt. This trade rivalry between Palestine and Egypt was the principal motive for the support that Egypt gave to Jeroboam and for the invasion of Judæa that took place in the reign of Rehoboam, Solomon's successor. It was hopeless for the small and unfertile kingdom of Judæa, after the northern tribes had separated, to maintain the commercial policy of Solomon.

The importance of Galilee in Palestine is as the centre of the roads between the coast and Mesopotamia. The " way of the sea " is usually believed to have been the road which came down from Damascus round the flank of Mount Hermon and crossed the Jordan into Galilee at the Jisr Benat Y'akub, between Huleh and the Sea of Galilee. It may have had a more general significance to the whole road system of Galilee as the bridge between the coast and the interior. The value of Galilee to Palestine depended entirely on sea-power, either in her own right (which Palestine never had) or through alliance with a Power that had command of the sea. Its union with the rest of Palestine depended entirely on the strength of the northern frontier and on the relations of Palestine with the powers of the north. These conditions were never permanently secured to Palestine in Old Testament times, with the result that Galilee played little part in the national life of the old Jewish state. Under the early rule of Greek Syria Galilee acquired great commerical importance and prosperity, and under the settled rule of the Romans her people, who had never forgotten their Jewish allegiance and had by now been intensively recruiting by colonization from southern Palestine, once more took their right place in the country as the leaders of its patriotic zeal. After the destruction of Jerusalem Galilee became the centre not only of the nationalist hopes of Jewry but also of its religious life.

The great plateau of Judæa is at the southern end of the central range. Its approaches from the sea have already been described. On the north it is

connected with Samaria by a high road along the top of a narrow plateau; on the south it shelves down into the desert of Sinai by the Negeb; on the east it drops almost sheer into the pit of the Dead Sea. Judæa is responsible for the legend—accepted by Gibbon, amongst other lesser authorities—of the barrenness of Palestine. Judæa is barren—as barren, except for pockets here and there, as the tiled pavement of a chapel. It is the keep of the estate of Jewry—cut off on every side from the world and with its single drawbridge of the plateau of Bethel on the north. Never until this war was it invaded from the direction of the Negeb, and the one tolerable road from the east is that which goes through Jericho, by which Joshua entered the Promised Land. The other entries from this side are mere cracks in the limestone walls, fit only for the feet of pilgrims and outlaws.

The third of the three longitudinal sections into which Palestine is divided is the Jordan valley. The Jews wasted no sentiment on this river, and with good reason. Its principal source is at Banias, to which reference has already been made. It presently loses itself in the Lake of Huleh, a jungle of water-reeds which defies navigation as completely as the Nile above Fashoda when it is overgrown with the *sudd*. At the Jisr Benat Y'acub, the chief crossing to Damascus, the Jordan is on the level of the sea; it descends 680 feet in the next nine miles until it reaches the Sea of Galilee. From the southern end of the Sea of Galilee to the Dead Sea is some sixty-five miles, and the valley river bed for this distance is a mere rut in the bottom of

the deepest trench to be found anywhere in the world. The width of this trench varies from three miles at the confluence with the Jobbok to as much as fourteen miles at Jericho. The Jordan is a "swift, black, sullen current flowing between ugly mud-banks of refuse or an occasional bed of stones foul with ooze and slime," and "sweeps to the Dead Sea through unhealthy jungle relieved only by poisonous soil."

East of Jordan there is a belt of high land, for the most part fertile, between it and the desert. Its width varies from thirty to as much as eighty miles, and alike in its economic and its military value it is perhaps the most important region of all Palestine. The great aim of Jewish foreign policy under the kings was to secure control over this territory east of Jordan, without which Palestine had no secure frontier on the side of the desert. The one territory east of Jordan over which the hold of the Jews was fairly constant was the high bare tableland of Moab opposite Judæa and the more valuable land of Gilead between the Yarmuk and the Wady Heshbon. Gilead, perhaps by reason of its exposure to attack from the desert and its strong but isolated position, was always the most loyal and least particularist of the provinces of Palestine. Jephthah was a Gileadite. It was the men of Gilead who took down the body of Saul that was exposed in Bethshan after the defeat on Gilboa and gave it burial, and it was in the hills and woods of Gilead that David found refuge in the rebellion of Absalom. The country had many enemies. To the south of the Jabbok were the Ammonites, whom Jephthah fought

and David subdued with such barbarity. On the north was the great country of the Hauran, over which the invasions from the north came down. David conquered the Hauran and for a time was suzerain, though not in actual occupation, of Damascus itself. No wonder that Gilead was loyal to the king who had done so much to secure their frontiers on north and south. But Hauran was not kept, and even Gilead was lost again under Ahab, and except for a brief period was never again under Jewish control until the later Maccabees, who, however, did little in the country but destroy the Greek civilization that had done so much for its development.

The political geography of this exceedingly valuable country east of Jordan is very unstable throughout Old Testament history, but the physical boundaries are clear and well marked. It extends from the foothills of Hermon on the north to the Yarmok on the south, and from the Jordan to the edge of the desert. In the north near Hermon it is wild and waste, covered with volcanic rocks, and away to the east, raised some thirty feet over the level of the surrounding land, which is itself some 3000 feet high, and more than 3500 feet above the Sea of Galilee, is the district of Leja, a sea of congealed lava, 350 square miles in extent. Between the stony wastes near Hermon and this sea of lava there extends, from the rising terraces south of Damascus down to the Yarmuk, the great treeless plateau of the Hauran, covered with a red fertile soil of disintegrated lava. This is for cereals the richest ground in all Palestine, and if we had the commercial

treaties between Israel and Tyre in David's reign we should probably find one of the motives of David's campaigns in the Hauran and of the alliance with Tyre was the desire of these commercial and industrial towns of the coast for the produce of the Hauran. The secular greatness of Palestine usually depended on the possession of these lands. South of the Yarmuk, instead of the bare open plateau, we have the wooded hills of Gilead, from 3000 to 4000 feet high, with a fertile soil of crumbling limestone, beautiful scenery and climate healthier and more bracing than anywhere else in Palestine. Away to the south, opposite Judæa, is the straight ridge, blue in the distance, of the moors of Moab.

CHAPTER II

PALESTINE UNDER THE GREEKS

THE overthrow of the Mesopotamian Empires by Persia was a blessing for the ancient world. To a brutal military despotism there succeeded the milder semi-feudal organization of Persia, which left a great deal of liberty to the provinces and did not object even to an occasional war between them. The Jews shared in the general benefit. Cyrus, at any rate, seems to have had a genuine liking for them, and the Persian kings had as a rule sufficient good sense to understand the virtues of religious toleration. Not that the Jews were oppressed in Babylonia; they found the busy commercial life of the country very much to their liking and they attained to a considerable degree of comfort, wealth, and even of position. The only thing denied to them was nationhood—perhaps the most precious of human possessions. Under the Persian rule the advantages of the Jewish colony in Babylon were naturally increased, for the Persian kings had an interest in encouraging a people who were not only industrious and law-abiding but also of some political use to them as a loyal garrison in a conquered country that needed very careful watching. Nor was the influence of Persia on the Jewish life

and religion negligible. The feast of Purim was a Persian feast, a day of rejoicing held at the end of the year and celebrated by the giving of presents and banqueting. This celebration, unknown in the Jewish calendar before the captivity, became afterwards one of its most important feasts. Its profane origin was hidden under the legend of Esther, whose story makes the strangest book in the Bible—an impious and revolting book, as Renan justly calls it. The events that it describes never, in fact, took place, but its spirit sheds a curious light on the change in the Jewish national character that took place during the captivity. Denial of national rights had hardened the national character. The difficulty hitherto had been to prevent the absorption of the Jewish people into the life of the civilizations that surrounded them. They had been only too ready to welcome foreign influences, but now begins a period in which the main preoccupation of the state life seems to be to keep the religious and social ideal uncontaminated by any trace of foreign influence. The old secular ambitions of the house of David have disappeared completely and instead the rulers of the people are engrossed in keeping the religious faith pure, no matter at what sacrifice of worldly greatness.

At the head of the first captives who returned to Jerusalem from Babylon were Zerubbabel, a scion of the house of David, and Joshua, descendant of the last High Priest. The new community which set to work rebuilding the temple soon became a pure theocracy, and Zerubbabel disappears mysteriously not long after the return. So narrow and

exclusive was the new theocracy that it refused all the offers of assistance from perfectly genuine descendants of the old Jewish race who still lived in Samaria; and from this time began a feud which persisted to the final extinction of the Jewish state after the rebellion under Nero. For the historian of Jewish religion and thought this period from the return from Captivity to the foundation of the Greek Empire in Asia is one of absorbing interest. It was the period of hardening in the formalism of the Jewish religion—the period corresponding to that of the Fathers in the religious history of Christianity when the simple teaching of its founder became involved in Greek metaphysic.

The foundation of Alexander's Empire was one of the portents in the history of the world. In the short space of ten years the Persian Empire disappeared completely as though it had never been. From Macedonia to India and from Egypt to the Caucasus not only Greek generals but Greek culture and ways of thought, Greek commerce and the very adaptable Greek religion dominated the Eastern world. In this sea of Greek culture there was only one island, the Plateau of Judæa, with its temple citadel, Jerusalem. The antithesis between the Greek and the Jew was complete. The virtues of the Greek were vices to the Jew, and the Greek on his part found Jewish virtues either incomprehensible or frankly repellent. The Jew approached every question from the standpoint of the moralist. Whereas the Greek derived his moral conceptions from the ideas of beauty and of measure, the Jew referred everything to the standard of what was

morally good. Freedom of thought was an abomination to the Jew, for his life was ruled by dogma and ritual, but to the Greek it was as the breath of his life. The gods of the Greek were fair humanities reflecting the frailties and achievements of mankind and palliating its sins by imitating them. The Greek, indeed, did not know the conception of sin, a torture and a stimulus which the world owes to the Jew, for whom the sense of sin and of duty to an unseen power at once uplifted and overshadowed his whole world. To the Jew the infinite tended to be the good, the principal attribute of his divinity. The Greek, on the other hand, regarded the infinite as in its essence evil. Not until it had been moulded and reduced to form and shape could it partake of the idea of goodness, which accordingly presented itself to his mind in the terms of measure and proportion. Truth itself, which to the Jew was clothed in the sombre garments of duty, was to the Greek only another aspect of beauty. The fair shapes of his deities, the nobility of human action and conduct, the perfection of form in plastic or literary art, and even the proof of a mathematical proposition, were each of them only aspects of that excellence which the Greek called the beautiful. Never in the whole of his long history and his manifold experience has the Jew met a civilization so anti-polar to his own as he did in the centuries that followed Alexander's conquest of the east. It was like the antithesis between a sterner Scotch presbyterianism and the life, though under brighter skies and greater intellectual and moral freedom, of the Faubourg St.

Germain. Even the idea of glory, which was ever present to the mind of the Greek at this time, was abhorrent from the Jew, who hated intellectual and physical pride with the same violence with which he was apt to exhibit his own moral and religious pride.

But the Greek was not intolerant, and he had a quick eye for the practical cleverness of the Hebrew. The Jewish habit of reasoning things out from first principles, his dislike of compromise and of what was intellectually blurred, and his preference of deductive to inductive mental processes pleased the Greek; the religious faith and ritual of the Jews were mere eccentricities with which he need not trouble himself. The relations between Alexander and the Jews seem on the whole to have been reasonably friendly, and after Alexander's death Palestine, along with the rest of Syria, formed part of the kingdom of the Egyptian Ptolemies.

The first Ptolemy was a rough Greek general who was willing to leave the Jews in Palestine reasonable, civil and religious liberties. After his capture of Jerusalem (319) he could not resist the temptation of using so industrious and practical a race to help to people his new capital of Alexandria, and from this time dates the beginning of the remarkable Jewish colony of Alexandria, and the first appearance of the denationalized Jew who was afterwards to become so common in all the civilized countries of the world. The Jewish colony of Alexandria enjoyed very great privileges and attained to considerable social and intellectual eminence. The rule of the Ptolemies suited them, and though

Jerusalem was so near it seems to have exercised little fascination for them. It is a curious reflection of former history that Antiochus, the founder of the Seleucid dynasty which was to oppress Judæa so severely, should have risen to fame by way of Mesopotamia and Egypt along much the same routes that were followed by Abraham and led to the foundation of the Jewish race. Egypt, under the early Ptolemies, was a great sea power, and dominated the whole of the eastern Mediterranean. It held Syria right up to the Taurus and it was strong enough on land to keep the desert tribes in check. The results at once showed themselves in an immense economic development of the country which went on in spite of civil war. It was now that Galilee began to be famous and that those Greek cities were founded along the shores of the Sea of Galilee where Christ did so much of his teaching. Greek emigration flowed over the Jordan into Eastern Palestine. Pella and Dion, as their Macedonian names show, were Greek colonies founded soon after Alexander's death and were probably settled by soldiers. The coast which the Israelites had never reached was overrun by the Greeks, and flourishing communities sprang up along the whole length of it; the Phœnician and Philistine civilizations were frozen out or absorbed, and Ptolemais was a name given to a new seaport at Haifa in honour of the Egyptian king. Despite the devastating civil wars, Palestine had now reached a greater degree of material prosperity than it had ever done in its history, at any rate since the times of David and Solomon.

After a hundred years of Ptolemaic rule, began the campaigns of Antiochus the Great for the conquest of Syria. The rulers of Egypt had declined from the vigour of the first Ptolemy, and their feebleness gave the first impulse to the downfall of Egyptian rule in Palestine. The governor in Coele, Syria (a Greek named Theodotus), who had remarkable success in repelling an attack from the north by Antiochus, found himself recalled to Egypt by some jealous intrigue. Knowing what his return to Egypt meant, he opened negotiations with Antiochus and offered to surrender him the town of Ptolemais (Haifa). As a result, Antiochus found himself in possession of the whole coast of Syria down to Haifa. In his next campaign he crossed the passes of the Lebanon, and marching through Galilee entered the great plain of Esdraelon and made his way to the rich and prosperous Greek communities of the Jordan. At the end of the campaign of 318 the reduction of Rabbath Ammon gave him possession of the whole of the country east of Jordan, and at the same time his lieutenants had pushed south from Ptolemais and occupied the Philistine plain as far as Gaza and Raffa. The strategical movements of these campaigns were unique in the history of the country.

The northern invader had not penetrated the country by the usual routes, but had begun by occupying its outer borders, the coast along the Mediterranean and that other coast east of Jordan which has the desert for its sea. The occupying armies were thus disposed in the form of a huge crescent, the tip of one horn running

along the coast to Raffa and the tip of the other horn extending to the hills of Moab. For some reason that is not apparent the Jews seem to have favoured Antiochus, perhaps because the growing weakness of Egypt had failed to give them adequate protection against the marauding Arabs. But the war was not yet decided in favour of Antiochus. While he was overrunning the country Ptolemy, following a course of policy not unlike that of General Sir Archibald Murray in the present war, had been forming a great army at Pelusium, and in the winter of 218–217 he crossed the Sinai desert to a point near Raffa and in the battle which was joined there was completely victorious. The whole of Palestine once more reverted to Egypt. But not for long. Before the end of the second century Antiochus had won a decisive victory over the Egyptian army in the Pass of Baneas, the extreme northern limit of Palestine once held by Dan for the old Jewish state under the kings.

No military conclusions of general application are to be drawn from the failure of the Ptolemies in Palestine. Antiochus was a man of great energy and of more than ordinary political ability, whereas his opponent showed no real capacity for using the great advantages of his position. The battle of Raffa would never have been won by Egypt had Antiochus not made the mistake of giving Ptolemy time to organize an army. If he had boldly crossed the desert as he might have done he would have found Egypt in such a state of disorganization that no opposition could have been offered. But the desert, which deterred Antiochus from his bold but

perfectly safe step, has by this time lost most of its terrors for an invading army. Railways have made an enormous difference to the conduct of campaigns and to the respective values of the various kinds of frontiers, and Egypt in the future will certainly not be allowed so long to organize the means of defence as Ptolemy was in the war with Antiochus, or even Sir A. Murray in his campaign against the Turks. What happened in the present war raised no presumption as to the probabilities of any future war. The railway and the plumber between them have conquered the desert, and the Sinai Desert is no longer a reason why an invader from the north should not attack Egypt nor yet why Egypt should not establish and maintain her possession, at any rate of Southern Syria. Moreover, in those wars Egypt made singularly little use of her sea power, and it is questionable whether even Antiochus could have begun the war with any prospect of success if it had not been for the treachery of Theodotus which gave him the possession of the coast. Certainly had the Jews been pro-Egyptian and the Ptolemies known how to use their sea power, Palestine might have remained under Egypt —destiny far preferable to that which presently overtook her.

Meanwhile, the Hellenization of Palestine made great progress although there was as yet no active proselytism, still less persecution, by the Greeks. Such progress as Hellenism made was entirely due to its own attractions. The ample and spacious city life, the games and physical culture of the Greeks, their intellectual liberalism and their broad

and very tolerant morality could not but have great attractions for a people that lived under a harsh, narrow and bigoted theocracy. The cause of the persecution that began under Antiochus Epiphanes, grandson of Antiochus the Great, was not religious at all but political and military. In one of his campaigns in Egypt the false report reached Jerusalem that Antiochus was dead. The city rose against him and overthrew the Hellenistic faction which now ruled in Jerusalem. Antiochus determined to punish the Jews for what he considered to be a base act of treachery; he made up his mind that the Hasidim, the old Jewish puritans who had resisted the process of Hellenization, were intriguing against his temporal power. To all other religions of the East Greece had been able to adapt herself, but on the religion of the Jews she now—though for purely temporal reasons—declared war. The fury of the persecution was increased by the humiliation that Antiochus had had in Egypt at the hands of Rome. He had laid siege to Alexandria, and a Roman envoy appeared and ordered him to retreat. He asked for time to consider, and the envoy is said to have drawn a circle on the sand round Antiochus and to have said, "Before you leave this circle the Senate must have an answer."

Defeated at Magnesia, humiliated in Egypt, Antiochus may well have felt that his whole future depended on crushing out what he regarded as a purely factious opposition of the Jewish pietists.

Judas Maccabæus was the son of one Mattathiah, a priest. A Jewish apostate came to offer sacrifice

on a pagan altar that the king's men had erected in the Temple. An officer of the king was standing by the side of the altar, and Mattathiah, seized with ungovernable anger, threw himself on the Jew, killed him, killed also the officer of the king, and then overthrew the altar. After that there remained nothing but flight, and Mattathiah left Jerusalem for the wilderness of southern Judæa with a band of the orthodox, and there took cruel vengeance, not so much on Syrian masters as on renegade Jews.

When he died (167) his sons Simon and Judas took over his work; Judas soon showed that he possessed military abilities of a very high order. His first successes were won as a raider on isolated posts, and these raids, though of no military importance, served to equip Judas and his bands. His first considerable victory was gained over a Greek lieutenant, Seron, at Beth-Heron in the Vale of Elah, and as a result of the victory the whole of Judæa rose in insurrection. A punitive expedition was promptly launched upon the country under the command of Nicanor and Gorgias. It was now that the military genius of Judas first manifested itself. Once again, as under Saul and David, the Israelites were fighting for the possession of the low hills between the Plateau of Judæa and the Maritime Plain. The Greeks had decided to force their way into Jerusalem up the Vale of Ajalon and were encamped at Emmaus. Judas already had a reputation as a guerilla chief, and as a precaution against his surprising them the Greeks prepared to surprise him, and Gorgias was detached with a strong force

to capture the camp of Judas which lay on the south side of the valley. Informed of the design by his scouts, Judas evacuated his camp and moved out by hill paths to Emmaus, where the main body of the Greek army lay. At dawn he flung himself suddenly on the camp of the main Greek army, which, taken completely by surprise, fled in disorder down the valley towards Gezer. Gorgias was all this time wandering about the hills looking for Judas, and the first sign he had of his whereabouts was the sight of the smoke rising from the abandoned camp of his main body at Emmaus. The Jews, laden with immense quantities of booty, returned up to the plateau chanting psalms. Judas made no attempt to follow up this victory, and indeed for the present it was not necessary. He was satisfied to maintain his hold over Judæa, and he knew that he was not strong enough to advance beyond it. His next campaigns were in the countries of Judæa against the Idumæans, the Edomites of the Bible, and against the Ammonites beyond Jordan. Here his programme was the same as his father's before him. The recreant Jews were massacred with those who had in any way persecuted the orthodox.

Meanwhile, Antiochus Epiphanes had died and the policy of the new rulers was one of compromise and toleration. The Jews were given complete religious liberty in the hope that they might thereby be reconciled to the secular rule of Greece. The Greek kingdom of Syria had its own more serious difficulties with Rome, and Judas is believed to have opened negotiations with two Roman envoys

that were on their way from Alexandria to Antioch. It is doubtful whether, as is sometimes said, the Romans offered to take charge of Jewish interests at Antioch, but nothing is more likely than that the compromises proposed by the new king of Syria were dictated by a desire to give the Romans no excuse for their intervention in southern Syria. But whatever the cause, Syria undoubtedly yielded to the Jews the liberty of conscience for which they had been fighting. The settlement, however, was not of long duration, and for the new outbreak Judas was more to blame—or to be praised—than the Greeks. Not content with religious liberty, he wanted complete political independence.

He now carried his arms further afield. Simon, his brother, went with three thousand men into Galilee, and Judas and Jonathan crossed the Jordan into Gilead. It does not seem that Judas had any ambition to extend his political rule over these outlying places, for he had not the men to garrison them. His object was the simpler one of punishing those who had persecuted his compatriots and of bringing back the people of these isolated settlements into Judæa. Before there could be any hope of an extension of Jewish authority into Samaria, or into Galilee and across the Jordan, it was first necessary to recover the Maritime Plain and its continuation across Palestine by the Plain of Esdraelon from Haifa to the Jordan. Until this low land was in his hands, a new Jewish state was necessarily confined to Judæa. The northern boundaries of Judæa were, however, moved considerably to the north in the direction of Samaria, and places like

Beth Horan and Bethel, once indubitably Samaritan, were now Judæan.

The situation of Palestine at this time was indeed a curious one; Judas was in full authority at Jerusalem, and the Temple services, under the new regime of religious liberty, were now conducted in strict Jewish orthodoxy. At the same time the High Priest was a strong Hellenist in politics, and in the citadel (Akra) at Jerusalem a Syrian garrison was kept which was sometimes recognized as the lawful authority by the partisans of Judas, but more often was under a state of siege. When Judas attempted to carry the citadel, but failed to carry it, this open affront to its civil authority was more than even the Syrian court could stand, distracted though it was with foreign quarrels, and a large army under Lysias marched south from Antioch. The tactics of Lysias were curious. He made no attempt to enter Judæa by the north or north-west, where were the defiles nearest to him. Instead he seems to have marched right down through the Philistian plain with the intention of gaining access to the Judæan plateau from the south. It was a bold manœuvre. He does not seem to have deceived Judas, but the attack took him on the flank on which he was less strong.

His raids on the Arabs had set their hands against him, and he had taken the precaution of fortifying Bethsur on the edge of the Judæan plateau where it begins to fall down into the desert. But fortifications that were good enough to resist a raid by the Bedouin would hardly avail against a powerful army such as Lysias was now bringing against

him, and, besides, Judas seems to have been more than usually short of men. At any rate he was not able to offer battle to Lysias south of Beth Zakriah, which is half way to Bethlehem. Here on the comparatively level ground he was unable to employ the tactics which had served him in such good stead in the hills of the Shephelah. And the result of the battle was a disastrous defeat of the Jews. Judas himself was injured by one of the elephants which the Greeks were using. He had attacked and wounded it, and the huge beast crushed him in its fall.

Lysias used his victory with moderation. The Greeks had grown thoroughly tired of their intervention in the religious quarrels, and all they now cared about was to maintain their political hold over Judæa; besides, the dangerous rebellion at Antioch reinforced counsels of moderation. The condition of affairs at Jerusalem was much the same after the defeat of Beth Zakriah as before. The Greek garrison, of course, was maintained in the citadel of Jerusalem and the precaution was taken of destroying the fortifications of the Temple. The new High Priest, one Eliakim who Hellenized his name into Alkimus, was a Philhellene but seems to have made a moderate use of his power, and there was no attempt at a proscription of the adherents of Judas.

But no moderation could appease Judas. He was not a religious fanatic; religion interested him mainly as a manifestation of Jewish nationality; it was not the end but the means to an end, the realization of complete national independence, and

the assertion of the Jewish civilization against the subtle influence of the Greek. He was now back again on the north side of Jerusalem at Gophna, on the plateau that connects Judæa with Samaria, not far from the scene of his greatest victories. The government of Antioch had too much trouble on its hands to interfere with Judas, who in the interval between the overthrow of Lysias and the accession of Demetrius had time to reform his army. The new king of Syria, Demetrius, besieged with complaints from the Greek party in Jerusalem, sent Bacchides, an able soldier, to report on the state of affairs. His mission was followed by fresh rebellion in northern Judæa in which Judas won new laurels. The general who was sent to crush it—Nicanor—was a coarse bully and gave equal offence to all parties. He was badly defeated by Judas at Adassa, the most brilliant of his victories. Adassa is on the western edge of the bridge plateau between Judæa and Samaria, and it would seem that Nicanor had marched up the Vale of Ajalon over the scenes of Judas's former exploits. That Judas was not able to oppose him in the valley, but had to wait for him on the hills, shows that his military strength had diminished very considerably. His army, indeed, is said to have numbered only three thousand. It was, however, a victory that raised the whole country side. The army retreating down Ajalon was set upon by the peasants and massacred, and Nicanor was found dead on the battlefield; his head and the right hand with which he had threatened to destroy the temple were cut off and gibbeted on the road to Jerusalem.

The victory was short-lived, for presently Bacchides came with a large army and Judas was defeated and killed. When the battle had declared itself against him his friends advised Judas to fly; he refused. "Fly before them—never! If our time has come, let us die bravely for our brothers and leave no stain on our glory." At the head of eight hundred men, who were all that were left to him, he flung himself on the left wing of Bacchides and rolled it back. The other wing, however, came up and Judas was killed. Judas was the purest representative of the Jewish national spirit. When it is remembered that he never had more than a small portion of his countrymen actively on his side, and these not the ablest or the most intellectual, the struggle that he maintained against the power of Syria, which, though in its decadence, was by no means contemptible and was often very ably led, deserves all the eulogy that it has received. The attitude of his countrymen, who were Philhellenes, is often misunderstood, but we should not regard them simply as traitors to the national call. For the maintenance of the national religion they would probably have fought bravely, but they drew a clear distinction between the national and the religious ideal of Jewry. They were, in fact, anti-Zionists. They did not abjure their religion, but they "liberalized" and reformed it away. They were fascinated by the freer life of Greek civilization; they were impressed by its material power, and, seduced by the wealth which it brought in its train, they argued that Judaism was a sect; that all sects were but facets of the universal truth; that religion

should not be mixed up with politics, or, if it were, should adopt the politics of the secular authority. They refused to believe in the future of the Jews as a nation, and in the state of international politics they had much ground for their conviction. If the whole of Israel had failed to maintain itself against the domination of Assyria, what chance was there for the weak province of Judæa to maintain her independent nationality? Besides this, the Greeks were not harsh masters, and anything but religious fanatics. They had done much for the economic development of the country, and they were quite prepared to disinterest themselves entirely in the religious politics of Jerusalem if only their civil authority was recognized. Against any other civilization than that of Greece these arguments might have prevailed, and Judas have failed to get even the measure of support from the people that he did. But the Greek civilization was too subtle and penetrating a thing. With no wish to proselytize, it gained so many adherents amongst the Jews that the orthodox felt their religion to be in danger, not through active persecution but by peaceful penetration. There was about the Greek civilization much of the quality of the French civilization of to-day. The Frenchman, like the Greek of old, might "care for none of these things," and be content to leave the Jews to settle their own religious differences as they pleased, but his very conception of the state was in itself a form of propaganda. In Alexandria, it is true, the Ptolemies managed to reconcile Hellenism and Judaism, but only by the sacrifice of much that was valuable in the Jewish

religion and by the complete repudiation of the Jewish national idea. Such repudiation was not to be looked for at Jerusalem.

Bacchides was careful to avoid interfering in religious matters, and the only change that he made in the system of government after his victory was to put the defences of the country on a sounder footing. He fortified a series of posts all round Judæa, of which Bethel on the north and Bethsur on the south were the most important, and garrisoned them strongly. By this means he hoped to confine the turbulence of the Jews within their own borders, and to be in a position to enter into the country easily whenever it became necessary. The period that followed the death of Judas was one of considerable prosperity, and the country made rapid economic progress. The Moderates were triumphant at Jerusalem, and Bacchides showed himself a singularly adroit and tactful governor. The Nationalists, however, were by no means contented with the settlement, though their opposition had necessarily to take a very different form. The movement was kept alive by Judas's brother, Jonathan, in the desolate country of the Lower Jordan, and along the Dead Sea. Jonathan was a brigand, and maintained himself and his forces by impartial plunder. Bacchides was disposed to leave him alone, but Jewish enemies of the Maccabees having persuaded the governor that he had a chance of laying his hands on Jonathan, he made an expedition into the desert which came to grief. And now a curious thing happened. Bacchides and Jonathan made friends, and presently the ex-brigand was established at Michmash, north of Jerusalem, exercising all

the authorities of government in the name of Syrian authority. The motives of Bacchides are not easy to divine, but he may have been struck with the ability of Jonathan and decided that he was a man to be used, and he may have had his own quarrels with the Greek party amongst the Jews. At any rate from now onwards Jonathan makes rapid progress. In 152 a rival king of Syria was set up at Acre, Alexander Balas. It may be that Bacchides was aware of the intrigues that were afoot and hoped to use Jonathan against a new movement which had the active support of Ptolemy.

But Jonathan was too able a man to be used, and he sold his favours to both kings in turn, each time securing fresh access of power. Jonathan entered into Jerusalem and got himself proclaimed High Priest; two years later he made a proud figure at the marriage of Balas with Ptolemy's daughter at Acre. When a new king at Antioch began a campaign against Balas, Jonathan seized the opportunity to invade the Philistine plain which gave the Syrians their hold over Judæa, captured Jaffa and ravaged the territory as far as Gaza. Returning from this raid, he even attacked the Syrian garrison in the citadel of Jerusalem, and when Demetrius, who had now overthrown Balas, came down with an army, Jonathan met him with gold and presents and secured the annexation of three districts of Samaria. Jonathan had now become indispensable to Syria, and his army, small as it was, at this time was the best in Asia. In fact, he bought the independence of Palestine by the skill and valour of his army.

The power of the Jews in southern Syria was now

greater than it had ever been since the time of David. Jonathan had captured Joppa, and for the first time in her history Judæa had a port on the Mediterranean. His brother Simon, a few years later, was made governor of the whole coast of Syria from Tyre down to the frontier of Egypt. Jonathan was treacherously murdered in 143, but his brother Simon succeeded him. In 141 the Greek garrison in the citadel of Jerusalem were starved out and the land was rid of foreign troops.

Two years later Judæa was completely independent and had a coinage of its own. Thirty-three years later John Hyrcanus brought Samaria under Maccabean authority, and under Aristobulus Galilee was conquered and forcibly proselytized to Judaism.

The conquests of the Maccabees were not for the good of Palestine. Not only was the Greek civilization that had done so much for the econonic development of the country destroyed, but every race or civilization that was not Jewish was treated with merciless cruelty or oppression. The ideas of the Maccabean rulers, surrounded with a halo when they are fighting against an alien domination, become detestable when they are imposing their own domination on others. They were indeed justified in striving for the whole of the national inheritance, which was not limited to Judæa. But the one chance of permanence for the Jewish state of Palestine was that it should make allies of the surrounding peoples and show by a wise tolerance that it was capable of governing others. This chance they missed, and the glory of the Maccabees, if it is an inspiration, is also a warning to any future Jewish state of Palestine.

CHAPTER III

ROME AND PALESTINE

THE first invasion of Palestine by a Roman army was that of Pompey. Pompey was engaged in the settlement of the East: he had overthrown Mithradates of Pontus, and was triumphant in Armenia; Syria, Upper and Lower, he found distracted with civil war. Aristobulus and Hyrcan were fighting in Jerusalem round the precincts of the Temple. It was the same struggle between political and religious national ideals that had gone on in Judæa ever since the return from the Captivity. Pompey favoured the theocratic view of the future of Judæa. So long as they were concerned solely with the preservation of religious ideals of worship they could be of no disservice to Rome. The troubles in the East, with which Pompey had been contending, had all arisen out of the political ambitions of Eastern princes. His policy was the simple one of putting them out of the way or of reducing their power for mischief to the smallest possible dimensions. Judæa was stripped of the conquests made by the Maccabees. The whole of the coast was taken away from her, and the Greek towns, which the Jews had either destroyed or subjected, were all given their freedom. The whole of Syria became a Roman province and Palestine was reduced to the provinces of Judæa

and Galilee, separated by the hostile zone of Samaria, and fell under the rule of the High Priest, Hyrcan, who was chosen for his complete lack of ability or originality.

The settlement of Pompey was less unpopular amongst the Jews than might be supposed. He had, it is true, treated the Jewish religion with contempt or ill-bred curiosity, and, like Antiochus before him, had penetrated into the Holy of Holies. Yet the settlement pleased the great bulk of the people, to whom the "imperialism" of the later Maccabees had become offensive. They preferred a secular ruler who was completely indifferent to their religion rather than one of themselves who was always liable to interfere with them, and to challenge the supremacy of the hierarchy. Unfortunately for these calculations they reckoned without Herod. When the Wars broke out between Cæsar and Pompey, the Jews were able to render signal service to Cæsar at Alexandria. Cæsar never forgot it, and placed the Jews in the most favoured position which any community subject to Rome could hold. The land was freed from tribute, the Roman garrisons were withdrawn, the population exempted from military service, and religious liberty assured to the Jews both in Palestine and throughout the East. But it is tempting to look for other reasons than those of personal gratitude for this strongly pro-Jewish policy of the first and greatest of the Cæsars. Cæsar had thought deeply and long on the future of Roman rule in the East and the conditions under which it could be made permanent. The death of Crassus, in his campaign against the

Parthians, must have made a deep impression upon him. For to Crassus in the great conspiracy for the overthrow of the Republic had been assigned a rôle in the East very similar to that of Cæsar in Gaul. The course taken by the Civil War may well have convinced Cæsar of the difficulty of establishing the East securely to Rome, for the Greek civilization was too subtle ever to be harnessed with perfect docility to her political ambitions of Rome, and he may have seen the future division between East and West, and thought that in the Jews Rome had an instrument that would serve her political purpose. He admired, as Ptolemy of Egypt had done before him, their great natural abilities. He recognized with the eye of a soldier the immense importance of Palestine as the link between Egypt and the Mesopotamian Valley, then in the hands of the great power of the Parthians. And he may well have thought that in the Jews he had not only a counterpoise to Greek civilization but also a lever for extending the Roman domination over the East. Some such calculations as these would undoubtedly seem to have been behind the markedly pro-Jewish policy of Cæsar, which persisted as the orthodox doctrine of the Roman Foreign Office until the reign of the madman Caligula. Antony had every reason to quarrel with the Jews if he had wished, for his mistress, Cleopatra, coveted Judæa, was a violent enemy of Herod and missed no opportunity of blackening his character and his political ambitions to Antony. Yet, infatuated as he was with Cleopatra, Antony steadily resisted her intrigues against Herod, and that he should have done this for the sake of a man

like Herod (even though Herod was rich and full of bribes), would appear to show that he was following some deeply-seated political principle that had been instilled in him by Cæsar. Only thus can we explain why Antony, who was prepared to found a Roman kingdom in the East to please Cleopatra, should still, against all her entreaties, have insisted on keeping Herod in great power in Palestine.

Herod was the son of the Antipater whom Pompey had found Grand Vizier. After the death of Hyrcan he had climbed by the extreme adroitness of his policy during the civil wars of Rome into a position of great dignity. He ruled over a larger area than had ever before been in possession of a Jewish king. Neither David nor Jeroboam II had ever held the coast. Herod held the whole of it from Gaza to Mount Carmel, with the exception of a strip around Askelon. What is more, he understood the importance of sea power. At Straton's Tower, south of Acre, he made a great artificial harbour which he called Cæsarea, after the Emperor. He extended his rule into Hauran, a wealthy and prosperous territory east of the Jordan. His campaigns were uniformly successful, and though his victories were never easy he showed remarkable determination and energy. Not without a certain liberalism in his ideas of government, he believed in the complete separation of politics and religion. He sought to conciliate the Pharisees by building the magnificent Temple at Jerusalem and to win over the Nationalists by his marriage with Mariamne, the last of the Maccabees. There was very little Judaism in his own faith, which was that of the purest Hellenism.

He was ready to accept the worship of the Emperor, and at Cæsarea and elsewhere he set up two large statues, one of Augustus as Jupiter Olympius, another of Rome as Juno. He worshipped, in fact, the State as the instrument of human progress and advancement. Nor were his views about the functions of the State narrow. His buildings were both tasteful and magnificent. He was a genuine Arab in his fondness for the beautiful, and in founding fresh cities and decorating them with buildings of great magnificence he was actuated by no spirit of vulgar ostentation but genuinely tried to raise the position of his country amongst the nations of the Roman world. When everything has been said against Herod his reign, judged by all the material tests, was probably the most prosperous that Palestine ever had, and that at a time when the rest of the world was distracted by civil war. The skill with which he gained the good graces of each of the rivals for the monarchy of the Roman Empire may have led him over and over again into undignified situations, but if his chief principle was that he should be King of Judæa whatsoever Emperor reigned in Rome, it is one that certainly did his country no harm. Under a less subtle and accommodating ruler Jerusalem might easily have suffered the fate that was postponed for a hundred years, and, granted the political premises of Herod that it was his duty to promote the secular greatness of Palestine, one cannot imagine a king who would have done the work better.

Physically brave, astute, liberal-minded, public-spirited and loyal to his country according to his

rights, Herod has come down to history as the most infamous of tyrants. Yet some of the worst charges brought against him were certainly not true, and in many of his crimes Herod was the victim of malice stronger than his own. He was singularly unhappy in the women whom he allowed to influence his life. He had married Mariamne, a woman of great nobility of character with whom he became completely infatuated. Mariamne's mother was Alexandra, who was undoubtedly intriguing the whole time against the authority of her son-in-law. Between Herod's mother and sister on the one hand, and his favourite wife and his mother-in-law on the other, there raged one of those bitter feuds in which subjected womanhood in Eastern harems takes its revenge on its tyrants. Alexandra was full of the arrogance of the Maccabees, of whose lawful rights she regarded Herod as a usurper. She kept up a constant intrigue with Cleopatra, who was Herod's deadly enemy and was anxious to dismember his country. If Herod's mother and sister accused her of thinking more of a Maccabee dynasty than she did of her own country they said no more than was perfectly just. The tragedy of Herod's life was not that he killed his relatives (for this was a common thing in Eastern royal households), but that he was distracted between his political ambitions and his passion for Mariamne. Had he been the ordinary Eastern monarch he would have killed a wife whom he suspected of treacherous intrigue and thought no more about it. But Herod was not an ordinary man; he was a man with political ideas that were characteristically Western and a culture that was Greek,

and fortune had cast him in the midst of the intrigues of a decadent and effete family. Herod to the Maccabees was an upstart, he was not even a Jew, but an Arab who had been converted forcibly to Judaism. He was bitterly conscious of his position. Amongst his Roman friends he was ashamed of being a Jew, amongst his own people he was despised for not being a real Jew. He was morbidly sensitive, and his jealousy and suspiciousness worked like madness on his brain. One after the other he killed off his wife Mariamne, her mother, her brother, her relatives, and even later his own sons. Augustus said that it was far better to be Herod's pig than his son, and though many Eastern monarchs have taken the lives of their relatives in a more wholesale fashion than Herod did, none have had their lives so tortured as his by alternate rage and remorse, cruelty and fond passion. If Herod had been a pure Eastern his name would have been less infamous, but because his nature was the battle-ground of contending impulses and opposing civilizations, Herod was unhappy during his life, and death brought him not oblivion but infamy.

But it will not do to regard Herod, in spite of all his crimes, as a mere monster of cruelty. He was thoroughly loyal to the people of Palestine. He never missed an opportunity of championing the interests of the Jews all over the world; for example, when the Jews in Greece complained that they were being hindered in the exercise of their religion, Herod employed counsel to plead their case before Agrippa and secured the removal of their grievances. Any Jew in distress because he was a Jew found in

Herod a warm friend who spared neither trouble nor expense to secure him justice. If he was unpopular in Judæa, neither Samaria nor Galilee had anything to say against him; his benefactions and his magnificence were not confined to Palestine, but were to be found all over the world. His fame extended further than that of any Jew of his time or before it. He enjoyed the friendship not only of the Emperor but also of Agrippa, a man not only of remarkable energy and ability but also of singular nobility of disposition. Debauchee and tyrant Herod certainly was, but he was very much more. *Corruptio optimi pessima,* and behind all Herod's vices and crimes there must have been great originality of mind and even certain charm. Late in life he began to read Aristotle, and that he should have found so much pleasure in Greek philosophy shows how unjust is the current view which regards him as a vulgar tyrant.

The privileged position which the Jews had obtained under Julius Cæsar persisted under Augustus and Tiberius. Tiberius' conduct towards the Jews was quite remarkable for its religious toleration. The Roman soldiers were instructed when they went on service to Jerusalem to leave their standards with the effigies of the Emperor at Cæsarea. On one occasion when the Roman troops proposed to march through Jerusalem on an expedition against the Arabians, the Jews obtained another route for the march in consequence of the scruples entertained by the priests against the images on the standards. On another occasion a Roman soldier was actually executed for having accidentally torn a scroll of

the law—so anxious was the Roman Government to avoid all cause of offence against the Jewish religion. The Jewish community had by this time acquired a great deal of influence all over the Roman Empire. The remark made by Strabo, the geographer, that there was no city of the Empire which the Jews had not reached, and that it would be difficult to find a place in the whole world that has not "received this tribe and succumbed to it," is an obvious exaggeration. But there is no doubt not only that the Jews by race were by this time exceedingly numerous in all cities of the Empire, but that a great many people who were not Jews were attracted by the Jewish religion. It was a time of great unrest in religious thought. The Western world was weary of the barren legalism of Roman religion and the mythology of Greece had degenerated into a mere deification of human passions, so that religion had ceased to be a moral force at all except in so far as it was supplemented by philosophy. But the philosophy, too, of the ancients had lost all its freshness, and it was long since it had exercised any real influence over the life of the people. Under these circumstances it was natural that people should turn towards the pure monotheism and the enlightened hygiene of the Jewish religion. In Rome many people attended the Jewish synagogues who were not Jews by race. Horace, it will be remembered in the satire about the bore who was pestering him on the Appian Way, meets his friend Fuscus; he welcomes him: "I began to pluck him by the sleeve, winking and nodding to show that I wanted him to rescue me, but the silly fellow laughed

and pretended not to understand me. My heart boiled with vexation. 'Let me see,' said I, 'I think there was a little private matter you wanted to talk to me about.' Said he, 'I remember very well, but I will tell you some better day. To-day is the thirtieth sabbath. Do you want me to vex the circumcized Jews?' 'Oh,' said I, 'I have no religion.' 'But I have,' he said; 'I am one of the weaker brethren. There are many like me; you will excuse me, I will talk to you another time.'"[1] This passage is remarkable as showing that even in Horace's day a good many people in Rome kept up Jewish observances without being Jews. The Jewish religion was confused in the Roman mind with more ecstatic religions like that of Isis and Osiris, which also became very popular in Rome at this time. The Roman Government regarded them much as we regard what are now called fancy religions. Nero's wife Poppæa was one of the proselytes to Judaism, and perhaps it is not too much to say that in the early part of the first century most highly-strung people—especially women with a neurotic tendency—tended to Judaism or the worship of Isis and Osiris. These Jewish communities up and down the Empire kept in close touch with Jerusalem

[1] "Vellere cœpi
Et prensare manu lentissima brachia; nutans,
Distorquens oculos, ut me eriperet. Male salsus
Ridens dissimulare; meum jecur urere bilis.
Certe, necio quid secreto velle loqui te
Aiebas mecum. Memini bene; sed meliore
Tempore dicam, hodie tricesima sabbata: vin' tu
Curtis Judæis oppedere? Nulla mihi, inquam,
Religio est. At mi: sum paulo infirmior, unus
Multorum: ignosces; alias loquar."—*Satires*, I. ix. 63.

and periodically remitted large sums of money for the maintenance of worship in the Temple. So large were these sums that from time to time an outcry arose against the drain of the currency, and it was the popular cry in places like Antioch and Rome that these contributions to Jerusalem should be stopped. Julius Cæsar had given the Jews a very favoured position: amongst other privileges they enjoyed complete exemption from military service, and it is impossible to give privileges to one race, especially to a race like the Jews who were so distinctive from all others, without arousing a great deal of jealousy. An Anti-Semitic party arose in most of the great towns of the Empire to which the Roman Government, in spite of the tradition of favouritism established by Cæsar, had from time to time to yield. In the reign of Tiberius, according to Suetonius, a determined effort was made to check the growth of foreign religions in Rome. The attempt, however, was made not on religious grounds but on the plea of the necessity of protecting Roman citizens from the rapacity of fortune-tellers and the like. "He checked the spread of foreign rights, particularly the Egyptian and the Jewish; he compelled those who followed the former superstition to burn their ritual vestments and all their ecclesiastical apparatus. The younger Jews he transferred to provinces of rigorous climate under the pretence of assigning them to military service. All the rest of that nation, and all who observed its rights were ordered out of the city under the penalty of being permanently enslaved if they disobeyed." This passage from Suetonius is often quoted as though

it meant that there was a general expulsion of Jews and the followers of the Jewish religion from Rome. Nothing of the kind, however, seems to have happened. What does seem to have been done was to withdraw from Jews resident in Rome the exemption from military service which was conceded to them in Palestine. The principle apparently was that while Jews in their own country might have a right to these special privileges, in Rome and other cities of the Empire they could not be allowed to enjoy a better position than that of the citizens. It was an intelligible principle and one paralleled by the treatment of East End Russian Jews in London in the course of the present war. But the policy was not strictly adhered to; it was in force by fits and starts as a concession to popular agitation or at the caprice of a minister like Sejanus, but between each fresh prohibition matters went on much as before.

A great change, however, took place in the reign of Caligula. The accession of Caligula after the death of that unloved old man, Tiberius, was highly popular throughout the Empire, and his faults, gross as they were, were set down to the generous impulses of youth. Unfortunately, the new Emperor was an egomaniac. Whereas other Emperors had consented to their deification as the representative of the might of Rome, Caligula believed that he was literally god. Among his young friends was one Herod Agrippa, a grandson of Mariamne, to whom Caligula in one of his caprices gave the kingship of Judæa. Herod went out to his new kingdom of Palestine with his head full of the splendour and

magnificence of his grandfather Herod the Great. He landed at Alexandria on his way to Jerusalem, and there his grand *tenue* and the general disreputableness of his behaviour excited the resentment of the mob. Ever since the days of the first Ptolemy the Jews in Alexandria had been a powerful privileged community, and the advent of Herod Agrippa stirred up all the hooligans of the city against the Jews. They sacked the outlying Jewish Synagogues; the Ghetto itself was too well guarded for them to effect an entrance, but they did more mischief than they could have done by plunder and assault; they went to the Governor and told him that they wanted to set up images of the Emperor in all the Synagogues, and the Governor, anxious to curry favour with the new Emperor, consented. The result was the first Pogrom in the Roman Empire; passions hitherto confined to a few were now licensed by the Government. Fortunately, Caligula died too soon for the effects of his policy to show themselves in open rebellion, and his successor Claudius revived the Julian tradition of toleration. But Palestine was daily growing more restless. The story in the Bible of how the Pharisees approached Christ and asked Him whether it was lawful to pay tribute to Cæsar goes back to the days of Tiberius, but the state of mind which caused such questions was not changed but was rather inflamed as time went on. Apart from Emperor worship, the Jews had no particular religious grievance against the Roman rule, but matters had now come to such a pass that the Jews in Palestine regarded even the secular obedience to authority as an infringement

to their allegiance to Jehovah. Moreover, the Roman procurators in Judæa were frequently scandalously corrupt and extortionate; many of them were obviously influenced by the anti-Semitism of unofficial Rome. The rebellion which broke out under Nero had been inevitable for half a generation, and the only doubt was not whether it would come but when it would come.

The rebellion of the Jews is commonly regarded as an act of wild desperation, but the chances were much more favourable than is generally realized. Julius Cæsar had thought of using the Jews as an instrument for the establishment of Roman rule over the East, for he knew well that if he leaned on the Greeks the staff would pierce his hand, and what he wanted was an Oriental people who would serve his purposes. If Cæsar hoped to overthrow Parthia by their means it was not altogether unnatural that the Jews should feel themselves equal, if not to overthrowing Rome, at any rate to establishing their independence. Our chief authority for the history of the Jewish rebellion is Josephus, a renegade Jew who commanded a band of rebels in Galilee, and when captured chose to save his neck by placing himself at the service of the Romans. His whole history is an attempt to justify the policy of the Romans in Judæa, and with this object he misses no opportunity of expatiating on the hopelessness of the rebellion and on the greatness and magnanimity of Rome. But the situation was not such a simple one as Josephus made out. When the rebellion broke out Rome was in a state of civil war, and was not able to give Palestine her undivided attention.

In Mesopotamia there was a great independent power of Parthia which had resisted all the efforts of the Romans, and in Parthia, too, there were large and prosperous Jewish communities, descendants of the old Babylonian captives. In the days of Herod and Antony, the Parthians had invaded Judæa and conquered the whole country. If they had done half as much for the rebellion of 68, Palestine had an excellent chance of winning its independence. No one regards the great war of Mithradates in Sulla's day as a mere outbreak of mad fanaticism, and Mithradates had carried his arms not only all over Asia Minor but into Greece itself. Had the Parthians used their opportunity the Jewish chances of success were far better than those of Mithradates. The eastern world was waiting for an opportunity to break away from Rome, as the Jews knew very well, and if they had had a statesman at their head capable of bringing in the Parthians on their side, or had the Parthians had anything of the Roman constancy, the Jewish rebellion might well have been successful. The motive of Antony's mad scheme for an Eastern Empire was after all something more rational than his infatuation for Cleopatra. He saw a future division of the Empire into East and West, and his mistake was only that of so many original minds, that he saw too far ahead and anticipated by a few centuries the march of events. If this idea could take such a hold of the mind of a genuine Roman like Antony, sentimentalist though he was, it is not to be wondered at that it should have captivated the minds of Jewish fanatics. Their religious fervour

disturbed their judgment as did Antony's love for Cleopatra, and it supplied an even more powerful incentive to action. What ruined the rebellion was not its central idea—then, as always, the reasoning of the Jew showed wonderful insight—but its complete incapacity to adapt itself to the only means by which its ends could be realized. Political compromise is a pedestrian virtue, but there are times when it can do more to remove mountains than faith itself. The compromise with Rome attempted by Herod having been rejected, the only thing left to the Jews if their rebellion was to have any prospect of success was compromise with Parthia. This, too, they rejected, or at any rate took no steps to secure.

The immediate occasion of the rising in Jerusalem was the prohibition by Eleazar, son of the High Priest, of the sacrifices that had hitherto been allowed in the outer courts of the Temple. The custom had been to offer sacrifice daily there for the Roman Emperor on an endowment that had been left by Augustus. This prohibition raised in extreme form the issue between the religion of the Jews and their allegiance to the secular power. The Jews were divided into two factions, those who recognized allegiance to Jehovah as the only binding one but were prepared to endure secular authority until such time as it should please the Lord to come into His own, and those who believed in helping the Lord to realize His kingdom on earth. The first faction saw the danger of the new prohibition, and, convinced that if this policy were not checked it would bring down the might of Rome on the practice of their religion, sent for troops to Cæsarea and resolved to

put down the fanatics by force. The Romans sent no one; Agrippa sent a handful of horsemen which were promptly eaten up by the rebels that now thronged the city. The handful of Roman soldiers which kept garrison in the castle adjoining the Temple were overpowered and put to death, and Jerusalem was once more free of alien soldiery. All over Palestine, in the Greek cities there were Jewish pogroms; the only exceptions were Antioch, Apamea and Sidon. The Roman Governor of Syria, Cestius Gallus, recognized the gravity of the situation and promptly marched against the insurgents with a strong army which included twenty thousand Roman legionaries. He seized Joppa and marched up the Vale of Ajalon to the walls of the city. He failed, however, to win over the city to its allegiance, either by argument or by force, and was compelled to retreat. The retreat turned into a rout, and Cestius Gallus lost over six thousand men with several high officers and much war material. Nero now took a serious view of the rebellion, and Vespasian, a general of great experience and high reputation won in hard campaigning in Britain and on the German frontiers, was despatched to Syria. He landed at Haifa, and advancing by the plain of Esdraelon proceeded to reduce the revolt in Galilee. It took him the whole of the summer, thanks to the heroic resistance made by the garrison at Jotapata. The next year Vespasian spent in crushing the rebellion in Samaria and Idumæa. The methodical procedure of Vespasian is very remarkable and showed very considerable respect for the military prowess of the Jews. He refused to attack Jerusalem or to enter the

Judæan plateau until he had reduced the whole country to the south and the north and also pacified the country beyond Jordan. In the summer of 68, by which time the war had lasted two years, Vespasian was prepared to invest Jerusalem, but just at that moment the news came of the death of Nero and the outbreak of civil war. In 69 the army declared for Vespasian and he became the first of the new line of Flavian Emperors; but the withdrawal of Vespasian to Rome had taken away from Palestine the flower of the Roman army, and it was with difficulty that the Romans maintained the ground they had won. Not until 70 were offensive operations against Jerusalem renewed, and the insurgents had it entirely their own way in Jerusalem from the summer of 66 till the spring of 70. Rarely has a nation struggling for its freedom against a great Empire had such a respite as this. There had been plenty of time for the Jews, if they had had a statesman amongst them, to organize a coalition which would have been strong enough, if not to defeat Rome, to secure terms for Palestine. The opportunity was wasted. These four years were years of civil war, in which the Jewish factions fought each other in the streets of Jerusalem. There were at least three of these factions: one, composed of Galileans, headed by John of Gischala, maintained itself in the porch of the Temple; another faction under Simon, composed of patriots from the South, held the city and carried on civil war with John; and yet a third faction under Eleazar held the body of the Temple, and when it was not fighting the Romans was engaged in desperate street conflicts with its rivals in the city.

The extraordinary valour of the Jewish resistance when Titus began the siege made a deep impression on the world; it was for all that a misfortune to the Jewish nation. Josephus, our chief authority, was naturally anxious to make the resistance of the Jews appear hopelessly impossible; other historians, however, like Dio Cassius, mention facts which put a different complexion on the siege. For example, in the very middle of it there was a certain amount of desertion from the Roman camps to the Jews—an amazing fact when one remembers that the city was already in the grips of a famine. When all is said, there is reason to think that many a legionary recognized the difference between this and other risings. The official Roman world never understood the power of religion as a rival to the authority of the State until this war. But amongst the common people there must have been an undercurrent of rebellion against the theory of the omnipotent State, and to this vague feeling the fanatical resistance of the Jews at Jerusalem would make a strong appeal. But Titus was certainly not anxious to widen the breach between Rome and the Jewish theocracy. His mistress, Berenice, the sister of Agrippa, was a Jewess and fairly orthodox. She had very great influence over Titus, and even when the ferocity of the struggle had reached its height he was still anxious, if he could, to let Jerusalem remain as a centre of the national life. Josephus says that he gave orders that the Temple should be spared, and Josephus would no doubt wish the Jewish world to think that. But if Titus ever gave such orders (which is very doubtful), circumstances were too

strong for him. That he wished for a reconciliation is probable enough, for the pro-Jewish tradition of the great Julius's policy was one not lightly to be broken with. But while Rome was always extremely tolerant of the liberty of private conscience, she never tolerated anything capable of raising its head against the authority of the State. But Titus set himself against the anti-Semitism that became rampant during the war, and when the people of Antioch wished to expel the Jewish colony from their midst he refused permission, saying that the Jews had no country of their own now and must live somewhere. He would allow no persecution of the Jews as such. At the same time he was determined to break Judaism as a political force. Jerusalem and its Temple remained in ruins, and the Jews throughout the Empire no longer sent contributions to the maintenance of the Temple services at Jerusalem but paid the money as a special tax into the Roman exchequer. They might keep up their religious services if they wished, but Rome would not suffer an amalgam of religion and politics that had led to this frightful rebellion and had lost for a period of four years a province of such great military importance to the Roman Empire. The attitude of the Government was perfectly intelligible. The real religious faith of Rome was the Roman Empire itself and its mission to direct the political destinies of the civilized world. That is the explanation of the worship of the Emperors; they were worshipped not as men but as an embodiment of the majesty of Rome and its civilizing mission. Thus in spite of the tolerance which Rome extended to all religious

creeds and faith, there was almost inevitably a fundamental opposition between the Jewish ideal of a moral government of the world through laws promulgated by God and administered by His Church and the Roman ideal of the secular State as the embodiment of the law governing the destinies of mankind. No doubt, the opposition was one which could have been reconciled on the simple principle of rendering unto Cæsar those things that were Cæsar's and to God those things that are God's. The Israel of the Judges and the Kings would have had no difficulty in effecting this reconciliation; indeed, any secular power independent of the priests necessarily implies some sort of *modus vivendi* between the two. The difficulty under the Romans was that the secular power was not Jewish, or if Jewish worked in the interest of an alien Government. Thus the two forces came into violent conflict, and, with the best wish in the world, Rome found herself driven to persecute not religion itself but religion as a political force.

The complete obliteration of the Jewish State in Palestine did not, however, end the conflict between Rome and the Jews; it rather made it fiercer. The Jews, who so long as their religious ideals had a national centre had been contented and prosperous subjects of the Empire, became rebels at heart, and from time to time their passionate desire for a national existence broke out in furious and cruel rebellions. Fifty years after the destruction of Jerusalem the Jews of the Eastern Mediterranean rose against the Imperial Government. At this time Trajan was engaged in his campaign against the

Parthians. At the age of sixty he had set about realizing the ambition of annexing the territories between Syria and the Persian Gulf which ever since the time of Alexander has had such a fascination for so many great soldiers. Parthia, when Trajan attacked it, was torn asunder by civil discords. The one race in the Parthian Empire which was united was the Jews, who, descended from the captives of Nebuchadnezzar, formed a very prosperous community in Mesopotamia, and were not only tolerated but enjoyed a certain amount of Home Rule. It was these Jews from Nisibis down to Babylon who offered the only effective resistance to Trajan. In the second year of Trajan's Mesopotamian campaign the whole of the Jews in Egypt, Cyrene and Cyprus rose in revolt. In Cyrene 220,000 people, in Cyprus 240,000 men, are said to have been put to death by the rebels. In Alexandria, on the other hand, where the Jews failed to make themselves masters of the city, the Greeks retaliated by slaughtering all the Jews. Trajan at this time was marching down the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf. It was a moment of great danger to the Roman Empire, and under a less able Emperor than Trajan would probably have resulted in the splitting off of the Eastern Empire from the West. Trajan was attacked on three sides, on the upper Euphrates, in Egypt, and in Asia Minor. The struggle was long and obstinate and the atrocities of the Jews were repaid with interest, but even this terrible rising did not break the spirit of the Jews. When Hadrian, the next Emperor, founded the colony of Roman Veterans at Jerusalem, the whole of Palestine rose in a Messianic revolt, and,

as in Vespasian's time, it was not until three years' war that the rebellion was put down. All that time the insurgents were minting a silver and copper coinage in Palestine. As a consequence of this war, which was waged on both sides with terrible ferocity, the Romans changed the official name of Judæa to Syria Palæstina, and the Jews were forbidden under pain of death from setting foot in Jerusalem or even gazing on its ruins. The obstinate and prolonged character of these wars enables one to understand the motives of Julius Cæsar in the favouritism which he showed to the Jews. Had they been able to keep distinct in their policy the secular and the ecclesiastical power and made friends with the Romans, the Jews might have ousted the Greeks as the leading race in the East. The Roman Empire would have been permanently extended to the Tigris and Persian Gulf, and the chief part in its commercial development would have been played by the Jews. They might easily have anticipated by several hundred years the glories of Bagdad under the Arab Caliphs. But at no time under the Romans did a leader of the Jews arise who showed any political capacity. They never realized that a price has to be paid for everything in this world, and that as things were the best chance of their future and also of the preservation of their free religious life lay in a political alliance with Rome.

CHAPTER IV

PALESTINE AND ISLAM

FROM the time of Hadrian the Jews ceased to be a political force in the East, and the religious and civil headship of the Eastern world passed from Jewry to Islam. Both Jews and Arabs were Semites, and between the two races there was close affinity and some sympathy. The oldest of all the Jewish colonies were those in the Yemen. They were settled there seven hundred years before the death of Mohammed, and the wars between Trajan and Hadrian had increased in size by fresh immigration. Had it not been for the wholesale massacres in the risings under those emperors, the Jews were strong and numerous enough to have held the reversion over the whole district between Palestine and Mesopotamia which had been the cradle of their race. As it was, the Arabs stepped into the shoes of the dead Jews. The Jewish religion lived on, indeed through its offshoot Christianity conquered the whole Roman world, but in the East it lost its driving power. Mohammedanism began in the Yemen, swept north to Mesopotamia, ascended the rivers and came down to Syria, Palestine and Egypt by the old familiar route of the Assyrian invaders. It went west along the north coast of Africa, and crossing the Straits of Gibraltar made Spain more famous and more

prosperous than it ever was before, or has been since. It even leapt over the Pyrenees into France, until Charles Martel defeated the Saracens at Tours and drove them back. This splendid Empire, stretching from Bagdad to Cordova, shows what might have been possible to the Jews had they possessed the political wisdom of the Arabs. But in the Mohammedan religion there was usually an element of easy-going tolerance, of the practical value of which the Jewish religion, prouder and more exclusive, knew nothing. No one benefited more by this toleration than the Jews under the Arabian Caliphs. Persecuted by the Christians in Europe, the Jews found under the Arabs almost complete religious freedom. It was the heyday of Jewish philosophy and the science of the Arabians was enriched by the contribution of their Jewish subjects.

Mohammed's first idea had been to make allies of the Jewish colonies in the Yemen, and carry them with him in his crusade. The Arabs and Jews in this district were good friends and indeed were not easily distinguishable the one from the other. They were both common enemies of the Christian kings of Abyssinia who ravaged their territory from the opposite coast of the Red Sea, recognized their common descent from Abraham and observed the rite of circumcision; their languages were very closely allied, their customs and their folk-lore very similar, and Mohammed was always exceedingly respectful to the heroes and prophets of the Jews. The winged horse the Borak, in the fabled journey of the prophet to Jerusalem, stopped to do homage to Mount Sinai and at Bethlehem, the birthplace of Jesus. It was

at least as reasonable for Mohammed to hope that the Jews in the Yemen would accept Islam as that the Jews should turn Christian. For Mohammed did not pretend to be more than the last and the greatest of the prophets of God to the Semites, and Christianity very soon shed its Semitism and took its tinge from the Greek teachers. In persecuting the Jews Mohammed did no more than he did to the Arabs who refused to accept his authority. Outside Arabia there was no persecution and the Jew could always, by payment of a tribute, purchase immunity for the practise of his religion. In one respect he was less well off than under the early Roman Empire, for he had no country and no recognized religious capital. In every other respect he was better off, for the Roman of the official class, however tolerant and respectful he might be towards the Jew, was always an alien, and his religion was tinged with the Hellenism that the Jew found so unsympathetic. Moreover, the Roman always had the idea of the omnipotent State which was equally repugnant alike to the Arab and to the Jew. Finally, the civilization of the Jew was relatively more advanced. In dealing with Rome he always found the subtle and ingenious Greek, with the prestige of his great civilization, nearer to the master than himself. It was not so in his dealings with the Arabs. On the contrary, the Jew was to the Arab much what the Greek was to the Roman. Politically the Arab might treat him as an inferior, socially he was an equal, and the Jew by reason of his ability tended to acquire a very high place in the councils of his master. The period of Arab rule, when Bagdad and

Cordova were the two greatest and best-governed capitals in the world, was the golden age of the Jewish race. They attained a wealth and prosperity such as were not dreamt of in the now half mythical days of Solomon. They had the larger half of the world open as a career to their talents, and, politically subject as they were, their influence, so far from suffering a decline, was greater than it had ever been. It is not to be wondered at that the Jews, who were always liable to persecution in the ancient world, both when Greece and Rome were Pagan and still more later when they had adopted Christianity, should regard Islam rather than Christendom as their friend. In Spain this tendency was even more marked than elsewhere and had more justification. The Christian rulers of Spain had subjected the Jews to the most bitter and systematic persecution that they had ever suffered, and the coming of the Saracens, which destroyed the old civilization of Spain, was for the Jews a beneficent revolution, bringing them material prosperity, religious freedom and, except for the denial of their aspirations after nationality, spiritual content.

It is to this period that the great Jewish philosopher Maimonides belonged. Born at Cordova, Maimonides was driven out of Spain by one of the outbreaks of persecution which marked the decline of Arab greatness and found his way to Egypt, where Saladin had just founded a Fatimite empire. His reputation amongst the Arabs was as high as amongst the Jews; he was the court physician at Cairo, and on his return daily from the court his house was crowded by Jews and Arabs who came to consult him on all manner

of questions, medical, philosophical and religious. Maimonides was the best of the Jewish rationalists, and his mental kinship to the author of Ecclesiastes is manifest. But to the kindly and gently cynical philosophy of that writer he added a prodigious learning, a keen sense of affairs and a rationalistic philosophy which is in amazing contrast with the bondage under which thought in Europe was still labouring. He was probably the greatest thinker the world had had since Aristotle, and it was not until Bacon that thought in the Christian countries of Europe attained to such freedom and elasticity as it did with him.

The Jews, then, in spite of occasional persecutions, were gainers, not losers, by the great Mohammedan uprising. It is an interesting speculation what might have happened if there had been a Jewish State when the Arab conquests began. Probably it would have shared the fate of the Jewish colonies in Arabia, and in that case Western Europe might have been grateful to a nation which had acted as breakwater to the tide of Mohammedan conquest. The Jews might even have been received in Western Europe as in some sort the friends and allies of Christendom, and they might have rendered to their Christian friends some of the services which they in fact rendered to the Arabs. As it was, they suffered very bitterly over the greater part of Europe by being a race which had a family relationship with the hated Mohammedan conquerors and by not having a State which came into conflict with them. The average Christian of Western Europe made very little distinction between the Jew and the Arab; he regarded

them as natural allies of each other, and of the two the Jews were the more bitterly disliked because they were held to be recreants from the Christian faith, as well as enemies who worked not by open attack but by pacific penetration. Alarmed by the advance of the Arab arms, Western Europe liked to take revenge on the kinsfolk of the hated enemy who were within their borders. The persecution of the Jews had already begun before the Mohammedan conquests, but these gave it a great stimulus. The Jewish Pogrom became the easiest way of defeating an enemy who could not be defeated in the field. The attitude of the common people towards them was indeed not very unlike the attitude of the common people during this war to German aliens and traders in this country. They were regarded as unofficial, disguised, and therefore the more dangerous agents of the invasion from the East which threatened to submerge Christendom.

Jerusalem had fallen to the Arabs in 637. They had entered the country from the east side, had begun by capturing Bosra in the Hauran, had moved on to Damascus in the following year, 663, and in the year after the capture of Jerusalem had invaded Egypt. Their progress in Eastern Europe was stayed by the fortifications of Constantinople, which successfully withstood two sieges by the Arabs. But four years before the end of the second siege (718) they had conquered all of Spain, and three years afterwards they invaded France. In 732 Charles Martel won his great victory at Tours and drove the Saracens back to Spain. Twenty years later the Ommiad Caliphs fell, and the Arab Empire,

which had extended from the Oxus to the Atlantic, was divided into three. And already in Bagdad the real power had slipped from the hands of the Arabs into those of the Turks, whose generals played much the same part at Bagdad as the Mayors of the Palace did at Paris. All this time Western Europe maintained its communications with Jerusalem; there was a Latin Church there which the Arab conquerors tolerated, and Harun al Rashid recognized Charlemagne as protector of Jerusalem and owner of the Church of the Sepulchre. It was not until the eleventh century that the Christian Church in Jerusalem was suppressed by the Arabs, and when the Turks came south into Syria and the wars between the Fatimites in Egypt and the Abbasides of Bagdad began, reproducing in the form of a religious feud between two sections of the Mohammedans the ancient rivalry between Egypt and Assyria, Palestine and Syria once more became the battle-ground of the East and the West. Less than a generation after the Turkish conquest of Jerusalem from Egypt came the first Crusade.

The Crusades [1] form an extraordinary chapter in the history of the Christian Church, but we are here interested in them mainly as a chapter in the age-long story of the relations between the East and West. Religion generated the popular enthusiasm for the Crusades and provided the leaders of European policy with their armies; for great masses of men are always influenced by the ideal and never or very rarely by policy and self-interest. But the

[1] Prof. Barker's article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* on the Crusades handles this subject in a masterly way.

leaders both in and outside the Church had certainly very definite material objects in view when they harnessed the greatest tide of popular enthusiasm that has ever been aroused by any cause in Western Europe. For the Crusader in the rank and file it might be enough that he was going to fight for the liberation of the Holy Sepulchre from the infidel, and if he was influenced in taking up this fight by other less spiritual motives, these were rather the rewards of his pious enthusiasm, an extension into foreign affairs of the indulgences and penances of his religious life at home. But Gibbon is undoubtedly right in thinking that in the case of some of the leaders of the Crusades religious enthusiasm was not the leading principle of their action. "War and exercise were the reigning passions of the Franks or Latins; they were enjoined as a penance to gratify these passions, to visit distant lands, and to draw their swords against the nations of the East. In the petty quarrels of Europe they shed the blood of their friends and countrymen for the acquisition perhaps of a castle or village. They could march with alacrity against the distant and hostile nations who were devoted to their arms; their fancy already grasped the golden sceptres of Asia, and the conquest of Apulia by the Normans might exalt to royalty the hopes of the most private adventurer." Few amongst the Romans had fallen under the spell of the Drang nach Osten. Cæsar had felt it, and Antony and Trajan; but other Roman emperors had been driven to the East less from choice than from the necessity of defending their frontiers, and none of them, in spite of the fascination of Syria,

had ever approached the miraculous exploits of Alexander. Rome recognized herself as in the main a Mediterranean power; the heart of Asia was not for her. But now in the Crusades there set towards the East a strong current which presently gathered to itself all the ambitions, temporal as well as spiritual, of the Europe of chivalry. The beginning of the Crusades must in any case have been a frightful blow to the Jews, who still nourished secret longings for their restoration to their old country, and the weight of the blow to their sentiment was horribly increased by wholesale massacres. These massacres were particularly terrible in the Rhine towns, where the Jewish colonies were both numerous and rich, and from this time begins the migration of the Jews into Poland and Russia which still, in spite of the emigration which has taken place since, embrace perhaps one-half of the whole Jewish race. Nor were these massacres an explosion of mere ignorant passion.

Godfrey of Bouillon, one of the most accomplished and pious of the Crusade leaders, cannot be acquitted of a great measure of responsibility for these outbreaks. He is said to have declared that if he had his way no Jew would be left alive. But there was more in the Crusades than religious zeal, desire for sanctified adventure, and even than political ambition. The motives of some of those who took part in them, and especially of the Italian Republics, was the desire for commercial gain. The Venetians and Genoese, for example, were anxious for the trade with the East, for the Arabs were not a mere conquering race, but had strong commercial instincts

and were formidable trade rivals to the Italians. These commercial motives were less strong in the first Crusade than they were later after the fall of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem had deprived the Italians of their markets in the East, and for that reason, as the religious motive became less important, the objectives of the Crusades tended to shift from Palestine to Egypt. For the passage across Egypt to the Eastern seas was much shorter than over Asia, and the possession of Egypt was therefore coveted by the Italian Republics as much and for the same reasons as the possession of the Suez Canal in modern times. Without the Church there would indeed have been no Crusade, for the number of men necessary to engage with success in these distant and hazardous enterprises would never have been forthcoming. But it would be possible to write a history of the Crusade which should take count of none but secular motives, and such a history might easily be nearer to the truth than one which regarded them as merely an episode in the history of the Church.

The first Crusade was lucky in the moment of its arrival. The Seljuk Turks had captured Jerusalem twenty years before the Crusaders set out. But the Mohammedan world was divided by religious schism and Islam in Asia was weaker than it had been for a hundred years. The route taken by the Crusaders lay along the coast in order to keep in touch with the Genoese ships which brought them their supplies. Their first, almost their only difficulty in Syria was the siege of Antioch, which held out for ten months and was only captured by the help of treachery in

the city. There were times when it seemed as though the siege must be raised. Disease, unwholesome food and actual famine made havoc in the ranks of the Crusaders, and it was in Antioch that the fraud of the Holy Lance was invented by the priest Bartholemy to revive the drooping spirits of the Crusaders. So weak was their condition, even after they had captured Antioch, that they could never have advanced further but for the civil wars amongst the Mohammedans. The Turks were distracted by civil war between the four sons of Malek Shaw beyond the Tigris, and the Caliph of Egypt seized the opportunity to invade Turkish Palestine and capture Jerusalem. When the Crusaders were ready to move south from Antioch they could only muster some forty thousand men. They marched unopposed through Laodicea down the coast as far as Cæsarea, where they turned inland and reached the Plateau of Judæa by way of Lydda and Ramleh. This was an unusual course for invasion to take, but it was conditioned by the necessity under which the Crusaders were of keeping in touch with the sea for their supplies. Had the defence of Judæa been conducted with energy the Crusaders should easily have been defeated, and even had they won through to the siege the city, properly supported from Egypt, would have held its own against so small a force. But ancient and mediæval Egypt never seems to have been able to maintain itself in Palestine for long. The difficulties of supply across the desert were too great, and it was not until railways were invented that they were finally overcome. Perhaps, too, Egypt at this time was not

sorry to see a Latin Power establish itself between them and the hated Turks. Jerusalem held out for forty days of very hard fighting. But the shortness of the siege did not prevent a frightful massacre of the inhabitants after the Crusaders had entered the city. The Jews, as the chief enemies of Christ, were the worst sufferers; the slaughter was terrible, the blood of the conquered ran down the streets until men splashed in blood as they rode. At nightfall, "sobbing from excess of joy, the butchers came to the sepulchre and put their bloody hands together in prayer." The date of the capture was 1099, and a fortnight after the capture a victory over the Egyptian Saracens at Askelon definitely established the Latin kingdom in Palestine. It is significant of the difficulty that Egypt had of maintaining her hold on Palestine that in spite of the delay of the Crusaders and the protracted siege of Antioch they should still have managed to get to Jerusalem before the Egyptians.

The new Latin kingdom extended the boundaries of Palestine further than they had ever stretched before. Never before had so large an extent of territory in Syria owed allegiance to Jerusalem. The kingdom stretched from the Nahr Ibrahim, some twenty miles north of Beirut on the north, to the Gulf of Akabah on the south. East of Jordan it included the whole of the ancient Moab and Egypt and also of the Hauran, but not, curiously enough, Gilead, the district between the Hauran and the Jabbok whose political allegiance to Israel had been so loyal. But this was not the whole area of the Latin rule. There was a Latin principality of Antioch

founded by Bohemond the Norman, who from the very first had had his eye on a throne in Syria and believed that Antioch, not Jerusalem, would be the capital of the territory recovered from Islam. In this hope he was disappointed. At Antioch he was nearer the centre of the Turkish power and had to fight harder to maintain himself, nor was Antioch, in spite of its unrivalled position, a match for Jerusalem in the enthusiasm and influence which it was able to command. Baldwin, the brother of Godfrey, inspired by Bohemond's example, founded the principality of Edessa, Tancred conquered Cilicia and founded there a kingdom of Armenia, and Raymond of Provence, a third political adventurer, founded a county of Tripoli between Antioch and the kingdom of Jerusalem. When the Crusaders passed through Constantinople they had been persuaded to do homage to the Byzantine Emperor. They were to hold their conquests as the humble and loyal vassals of Constantinople. Bohemond and Raymond were bitterly against this concession, which ran counter to their political ambitions, and had actually urged the conquest of Constantinople then and there as a preliminary to the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. But Godfrey of Bouillon, true type of the devotee, was for doing anything that would assist him to win Jerusalem. In consequence he and his successors enjoyed the support of the Constantinople Empire which was always denied to the Latin princes of Antioch. It is curious to find some of the conflicts of policy that have taken place in the Eastern policy of the Allies during this war already foreshadowed in the Crusades. Our designs on

Constantinople have their counterpart in Bohemond's advice to besiege the city, advice which was acted on a hundred years later in the fourth Crusade. The kingdom of Armenia and the principality of Antioch are paralleled on the military side by the projects against Alexandretta in this war, and the principalities of Antioch and Tripolis, founded by French political adventurers in the first Crusade, are not unlikely to have French successors in the settlement after this war.

The organization of the kingdom of Jerusalem reproduced only too faithfully the feudal conditions of the countries from which the Crusaders had come. The central power was dangerously weak and the real government of the country was in the hands of a few barons. There were nearly a dozen of these baronies and seigneuries. Among the most important were the County of Jaffa which extended from Gaza to the Plain of Sharon, the County of Cæsarea which covered most of the Plain of Sharon, and the Seigneury of Naples which occupied most of Samaria. Galilee was a principality, and the Phœnician coast-line from Acre to Beirut was divided amongst half a dozen seigneuries. Ancient Moab became the Seigneury of Krak. Whereas in Western Europe the kingdom had come first, and the baronies owed their existence to the grant of land given by the king, in Palestine the baronies came first and the kingdom was established later. The rule was, that each baron kept as his own land whatever he could capture and occupy. As for the Central Government at Jerusalem, it was doubtful for some time whether it should be in lay or clerical hands;

the Norman influence, anxious to establish Antioch as the headquarters of secular power in Syria, favoured the Church party in Jerusalem. But the struggle ended in the defeat of the hierarchy, and Baldwin came from Edessa and became the second king. Bohemond, in revenge for the loss of his influence in southern Syria, went to war with the Byzantine Empire and was beaten. Of all the men who took part in the first Crusade Bohemond is perhaps the most interesting to the modern mind. His ambition was purely secular, and he realized, as no other man of his time, that the key to the secular conquest of the East lay in Constantinople. There is a curious similarity between his political ideas and those of Seleucus, the founder of the Greek Empire in Syria. He threw over Jerusalem for the chance, which seemed a good one, of founding a Latin Empire, like that of the old Greek house of Seleucus, but he reckoned without the sentiment that is the most powerful of human motives. Jerusalem, in spite of the disadvantages of its situation, not Antioch, became the head of the Latin kingdom of Syria. The ablest man of his time, Bohemond, for good and evil, was one of the first modern followers of *Realpolitik*, and, in spite of his genius and his political insight, he was beaten through his failure to take sufficient account of the ideal springs of political conduct.

The kingdom of Jerusalem reached its greatest extent about 1140. By that time the County of Tripolis and the Principality of Antioch had come under the influence of Jerusalem, and since the accession of Baldwin II, Edessa, too, had been a

fief of Jerusalem. The strength of the kingdom of Jerusalem lay in its alliance with Damascus and in its control of Edessa. The Vizier of Damascus allied himself with Jerusalem as a protection against the revived power of the Turks under Zenghi, whose headquarters were at Mosul. Zenghi stormed Edessa, and drove the Crusaders back from the Euphrates. His son, Nureddin, extended his conquests. The fall of Edessa was the chief cause of the second Crusade, which never reached Palestine proper at all but did incalculable injury to the kingdom of Jerusalem by its attack on Damascus, the one ally who might have helped the Franks of Jerusalem to hold their own. In 1154 Nureddin captured Damascus, and nothing now stood between him and the Franks. After the disappearance of the emirate of Damascus the best chance for the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem was in a close alliance with Egypt. The Latins supported the Shiah section of the Mohammedans, Nureddin, the Sunnite faction, and in the end the Sunnites won. With the triumph of the Sunnites in Egypt and the religious union of the Mohammedans, the fate of the Latin kingdom was sealed. Saladin was the nephew of the Kurdish lieutenant Shirguh who won Egypt for Nureddin. For a time the political disunion of the Mohammedans of northern Syria and Egypt persisted even after the religious feud had been healed, and Raymond of Tripolis was even able to capture Damascus, but in 1183 Saladin entered Aleppo and brought Egypt and northern Syria under one rule. The battle of Hattin, in which Saladin overthrew the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, was

fought in 1187. Hattin is west of the Sea of Galilee on the highland between the lake and the Plain of Asochis. Three months later, Jerusalem capitulated after a fortnight's siege. The only possessions left to the Latins two years later were the city of Tyre with Antioch and Tripoli to the north.

The Latin civilization was merely superimposed on Palestine, took no root and left no visible remains except in the number of monasteries and churches and ruined baronial castles. But it would not be true to say that the Latins did not regard Palestine as their home. They were genuinely devoted to the country and they carried their affection to the length of looking coldly on new immigrants. But Palestine under the Latins was in no sense a country; it was a mere feudal estate, and if any sort of distinctive civilization sprang up, it was the work not of the knights but of the bourgeoisie that lived in all the principal towns. The burgesses of the towns acquired a high position in Palestine much earlier than they did in Europe, and the reason doubtless was that, being Frankish stock and living in the face of a dangerous enemy, they had to be given special privileges to mark their superiority of race. They had their own courts not only at Jerusalem but in all the baronies. They even took part in legislation, though they never developed anything like a city government. Moreover, they had natural allies in the Italian traders, who were interested in the formation of a free class of burgesses to act as the agents of their very valuable trade with the East. Their work, therefore, though it makes very little figure in history, was an example of genuine colonization.

They adapted themselves to the East, and had the Latin kingdom lasted longer they would have formed a genuine national civilization of their own. This the barons never did. Although their business was war and politics, there is no evidence that they ever adapted their military tactics to the conditions of the country or to the nature of their enemy. The Turks were light cavalry with foot soldiers, that anticipated by two or three hundred years the special virtues of the Spanish infantry. Except physical courage, the Franks exhibited very few military virtues; they kept to their heavy armour and their lance in a country where the climatic conditions required lightness of equipment and freedom of movement. The Battle of Hattin, for example, was lost by the foolish enthusiasm which went out of its way on a broiling day in July to attack the enemy in heavy panoply. The plain fact was that so far as intelligence went the East at this time was definitely superior to the West. But while the Latins acquired none of the intellectual nimbleness of their Mohammedan enemies, they certainly lost in Syria many of their solid Western virtues. They were corrupted by the East both physically and morally. The Greek, by his subtle adaptability, had shown the only way in which Western thought could conquer the East. The Latins, like the Romans, remained complete strangers; in the country but not of it. Perhaps the moral is that while the West can influence and guide the East and teach it the art of government, it cannot colonize it in the strict sense. Genuine colonization of the East can only be done by the Easterner.

The Crusades did not cease with the destruction of the kingdom of Jerusalem. On the contrary, the secular motives for the conquest of Palestine were greatly strengthened, and the third Crusade was from the military and political point of view perhaps the most important of them all. It was a lay Crusade, in which the religious motive had almost completely disappeared. The material force that had command of the third Crusade was greater than that of the first, but it had to deal with a united Islam. It had, moreover, the opposition of the Eastern Empire which had given a great deal of assistance to the first, and the rivalries of the kings who took part in it, no longer disciplined by the Church and by the force of religious emotion, broke out in open quarrels. But the military history of this Crusade is extremely interesting. It began with the siege of Acre, which it was necessary to take in order to have a base for operations. Richard I of England within a month of his arrival at Acre (he had delayed on the way to conquer Cyprus) was able to bring the siege, which had lasted nearly two years, to a successful conclusion. After the capture of Acre, Philip Augustus of France went home and the prosecution of the war was left entirely to Richard. Richard's tactics were noteworthy; at Acre he had the choice of two routes: he might have gone East up the Plain of Esdraelon and reached the Plateau of Jerusalem through Samaria. Instead, he struck south along the coast from Carmel and fought his way along the low foothills of the Maritime Plain. He captured Cæsarea, Jaffa and Askalon. His first idea, apparently, was to place himself athwart

the communications between Egypt and Syria and to reach Jerusalem by the Vale of Elah (the Wady es Sunt), and it was only later when he found this route so difficult that he began the famous campaign in the Vale of Ajalon.

Richard undoubtedly took the most difficult course to his goal. Against a vigilant enemy the Shephelah passes are almost impregnable. He would probably have had an easier task if he had come south from the Plain of Esdraelon, but that would have involved his leaving the coast and keeping open a long line of communication exposed to constant attack. Moreover, anxious as Richard was to capture Jerusalem, the religious motive was almost extinct with him. He realized the importance of the sea in any war with the Saracens, and the capture of Cyprus is a curious anticipation of the policy of Disraeli hundreds of years later. Moreover, the interest of the Crusades tended to shift from Palestine to Egypt, and Richard had been advised in 1192 that Cairo, not Jerusalem, was the vulnerable point of Islam. From now onwards the efforts of the Crusaders were distracted in three different directions, and the main body of the military opinion favoured the attack on Egypt. The fifth Crusade opened with the siege of Damietta on the east bank of the Nile. The fourth Crusade stormed Constantinople and founded a Latin empire which lasted for nearly sixty years. Jerusalem became a goal to be won not by fighting in Palestine but by victory in Egypt or in the north or by negotiation. Richard conducted long negotiations with Saladin and even proposed that Saladin's brother

should marry his sister Johanna, a curious proof of the complete disappearance of the religious and fanatic motive of these wars. Frederick II in the sixth Crusade actually brought off the object that Richard had in mind in these negotiations. The Sultan of Egypt ceded to him, in addition to the coast towns, Nazareth, Bethlehem and Jerusalem, with a strip of territory connecting Acre and Jerusalem, and for fifteen years the Franks were again in possession of Jerusalem. But Jerusalem was lost by the dissensions between the barons and the king. The next Crusade, that of St. Louis, followed immediately on the fall of Jerusalem. But significantly enough it was again directed against Egypt. St. Louis captured Damascus and marched on to Cairo, but was later defeated, captured and ransomed for eight hundred thousand pieces of gold and the restoration of Damietta. There had been no religious fanaticism in the former dynasties that had fought with the Crusaders; but the Mameluks who defeated St. Louis were harsh religious bigots. And if the Westerners managed to maintain themselves a little while longer in Syria, it was only by an alliance with the rival Emirs of Damascus. In 1291 Acre was captured, the kingdom of Jerusalem came to an end, and the last of the Franks left Syria.

The destruction of the early Mohammedan Empires of the East was to come, not from Europe, but from far Asia. The Mongols conquered the whole of Asia, from China to Delhi and from Delhi to Asia Minor. They overflowed into Europe, covering Russia, Poland and Hungary, and even approached the shores of the Baltic. Constantinople escaped

and the Mameluks of Egypt. But everywhere else civilization, whether Mohammedan or Christian, was submerged beneath the flood of barbarism. Persia and the empire of the Caliphs in Mesopotamia suffered most of all. After the fall of the Seljuks the Arabs had recovered their old independence, but the sack of Bagdad by the Mongols not only made an end of the long line of the Arabian Caliphs but inflicted ruin on the country from which it has never recovered. Mecca and Medina were protected by the desert of Arabia, but the Mongols crossed the Tigris and Euphrates, pillaged Aleppo and Damascus, and the last of the Seljuks was driven to take refuge in Constantinople. On the ruins of the Mongol invasion arose the dynasty of the Ottomans, which founded the modern Turkish Empire, and in 1453 captured Constantinople, which it still retains. The first appearance of the Mongols inspired the Christians of the West with the hope of using them against the Mohammedans in Syria. "Prester John" was to aid in the conquest of Jerusalem and the conversion of all Asia to Christianity, and Edward I, the last of the English Princes to take any interest in the Crusades, spent most of his time at Acre in trying to negotiate with the Mongols an alliance against the Mohammedans. Yet such an alliance, had it been possible, would have been unnatural and offensive. The Semitic races were much nearer in sympathy even to Christian Europe than ever the Mongols could be, and they had better right to the possession of Palestine, Syria and the great Mesopotamia valley. There is a curious parallelism in the fate that successively overwhelmed the Jews

and the Arabs. The Mongols ruined the enlightened and tolerant Islam of the Arabs, as the Romans had ruined the political aspirations of the Jews. The Arabs stepped into the shoes of Jews slaughtered in their successive rebellions against Rome, and the modern Turks stepped into the shoes of Arabs slaughtered by the Mongol conquerors. Such, in brief, is the whole political history of the near East in the long confused period between the fall of Jerusalem and Titus and the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turk Mohammed II.

The last Crusade in which Edward I took part had no corporeal successes, but left a great many ghosts. The fall of Constantinople and the extinction of the Greek Church there made Russia, after she had recovered from the invasion of the Mongols, the natural heir to the Byzantine Empire in Europe, led to the long succession of wars between Russia and Turkey and made Turkey a great object of Russian ambition. The quarrels between the Crusaders and the Greek Empire are reflected hundreds of years later in the Crimean war, which had for its immediate cause a dispute about the custody of the Holy Places in Palestine, in which Russia represented the claims of the Empire of Constantinople and England and France those of the Crusaders on the West. The Latin kingdoms of Jerusalem and Antioch have as their lineal successor the present French claims to the reversion of Syria from Turkey, and England as the power in possession of Egypt has realized the hopes of Frederick II, St. Louis and the later Crusaders. Our sea power, moreover, has put us in the Eastern Mediterranean in the position of

the Genoese and Venetians, the great commercial republics of northern Italy. Germany, too, as well as France, took a great part in the Crusades, and her scheme of an empire stretching from the Rhine to the Tigris was faintly foreshadowed in the march of the first Crusade across Europe to Asia Minor and Syria.

CHAPTER V

NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA

NAPOLEON'S was one of those splendidly creative minds which never had an idea that was entirely sterile; he could, as it were in parenthesis between his activities, drop casually ideas which, though barely understood at the time, are even now only beginning to take root in actual politics. Napoleon was thus the first of modern statesmen to profess the ideal of Zionism or the political restoration of the Jews to Palestine. Napoleon was no sentimental admirer of the Jews; on the contrary, he may with some justice be regarded as the first of the modern Anti-Semites. He had the strongest objection to the existence within the State of a separate race which kept itself apart and refused to be absorbed in the nation. Of religious bigotry he was entirely free. It was nothing to him what religion a man professed so long as he was a good citizen. He was soaked through and through with the principles of the French Revolution, of which religious liberty was not the least important. But he did insist that there should be nothing that would divide the allegiance of the French subject from France. The root principles, in fact, of his domestic policy with regard to the Jews were not unlike those of the early Roman Empire. Religious liberty, yes; but in all



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other matters liberty was to be willing bondage to the laws and ideals of France. He summoned a great Sanhedrin to formulate the Jewish law. In the preamble to its decisions are the following words: "The divine law, that precious heritage of our ancestors, contains both religious and political dispositions. The religious dispositions are by their nature absolute and independent of circumstance or time. This is not the case with the political dispositions—that is to say, with those that constitute the Government, and were destined to rule the people of Israel in Palestine when they had their Kings, Priests and Magistrates. These political dispositions could not be applicable once the Jews ceased to form a Nation." Thus the principle of religious liberty as carried out by Napoleon had a secret sting within it. The sting was that of political absorption. The Ghetto, with all its stigma of inferiority, did the Jews the inestimable service of preserving their communal organization; liberty and admission to full political privileges threatened to undermine the separate national organization. So true is it that Liberty, by removing inequalities and breaking down barriers, is the great leveller and the great unifier.

But though Napoleon was an enemy to separate communal organization of the Jews in France, he was for all that—perhaps for that very reason—a strong supporter of the idea of Jewish nationalism, outside of France. The Revolution, by proclaiming certain fundamental rights as inalienable from the individual, thereby asserted the right of nationhood as one of the most precious a man could have.

The French Revolution preached no cosmopolitan ideals, it was intensely nationalist, but by the same right by which France asserted her claim to live a free life and to make the most of her individuality it acknowledged the same rights for other nations. There were two great nations in Napoleon's day whose national existence had been crushed out: one was Poland and the other Jewry. Napoleon was the strongest advocate of the national rights of both, and his interest in the restoration of the Jews to Palestine was the first and most youthful of his enthusiasms. As early as 1799 Napoleon inserted a proclamation in the *Moniteur Universal* inviting the Jews of Asia and Africa to gather under his leadership in order to re-establish ancient Jerusalem. Here was a modern crusader indeed, a crusader who would purge the eternal conflict between East and West of all idea of the religious supremacy of Christendom, and regarded it as the conflict purely of political forces and ideals. At this period of his life Napoleon had no idea that he would ever be regarded as the oppressor of Europe. He had no schemes of territorial aggrandizement in Europe, and had the monarchical allies been content to leave Republican France alone, France might have remained a republic, and if there had been an Empire it would have been an Empire in the East alone. Napoleon had studied very deeply the campaigns of Alexander. In the whole history of the world there was nothing to approach his conquests in their artistic ease and romantic grandeur. The whole face of the East from the Nile to the Indus was completely transformed in three years by a young man

of thirty. What had been done once could be done again, and Napoleon had already, in that amazing first Italian campaign of his, given proof that he possessed the greatest military genius of his own, perhaps of any time. His military ideas bore that stamp of elasticity and inevitableness which mark the very greatest men of the world's history. He was the peer of Cæsar and of Alexander, and all three, curiously enough, had a belief in the political capacity, or at any rate political usefulness of the Jewish people. Napoleon, too, had what neither Cæsar nor Alexander had, a theoretic belief in the rights of nationalism which he had imbibed from the Revolution.

When Napoleon left France in 1798 his intention was to found a great French Empire, which should cover the same ground as that of Alexander's conquests. He proposed to advance into Syria, raise the populations there against Turkish rule, to assemble an army of fifteen thousand Frenchmen and a hundred thousand native auxiliaries on the Euphrates, to conquer Mesopotamia, overrun Persia and attack England in India. Wellesley at this time, it should be remembered, was about to engage in his campaign against the Mahrattas, and it is curious to think that if Napoleon's plans had matured the decisive battle would have been fought upon the Indus, not in Belgium. History is always repeating itself though under different disguises, and there is a certain similarity between the early promise of the great war with Napoleon and of the greater war with Germany now. Napoleon's idea of defeating us by capturing the East is not unlike

the early idea of some members of the War Council at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, of defeating German ambition at Constantinople. Purely defensive tactics, as all the great masters of war have seen, may bring a decisive victory but never a rapid one. The victory that is both decisive and rapid, and therefore accomplished with the least suffering, is that which boldly seizes the initiative and keeps it. Napoleon in 1798 and the British in 1915 obtained the initiative by their campaigns in the East, but neither he nor the British were able to keep it. In making Egypt the base of his operations Napoleon was following the precedent which, as has been seen in the last chapter, was set in the later Crusades. He left France in May 1798, with about thirty thousand men. He reached Malta in June and bribed the Grand Master of the Order of St. John, who then held the island, to surrender the fortification, and arrived off Alexandria on the 1st of July. Alexandria was occupied the following day, and before the end of the month Napoleon had defeated the Mameluks in the battle of the Pyramids and occupied Cairo. The whole of Lower Egypt was now securely in his possession, and Napoleon was in a position to organize a campaign against the Turks. His occupation of Malta had shown that he fully realized the importance of sea power, and the necessity of maintaining his communications with France. The French fleet, moreover, was numerically stronger than the British, and had Admiral Brueys followed Napoleon's instructions, Nelson's great victory in the Battle of the Nile would never have been won, and it would certainly have been

impossible for the British to blockade the whole coast of Egypt and Syria. The Battle of the Nile made more noise in the world than any other naval victory has ever done, but in fact it seems to have had very little immediate influence on the military situation. Napoleon continued his plans in Egypt and Syria as though it had never been fought. He organized the Government of Egypt, and collected information for his projected invasion of Syria. In the Autumn of 1798 he received news that Turkey had joined England against France, and was preparing two expeditions for attacking Egypt, one in the Island of Rhodes for an overseas attack—a danger to which Admiral Brueys' defeat had exposed the French occupation—the other in Syria for an attack overland. Napoleon's reply was very characteristic. A weak man in the same circumstances might have remained in Egypt relying on the defence of the desert, but not Napoleon. He decided to invade Palestine, defeat the Turks in Syria, and then to return to Egypt to meet any invasion that came oversea. Out of the original French Army, less than fifteen thousand men were available for offensive operations, but Napoleon did not hesitate.

In December he occupied Suez and in the following month began his march across the desert. His first objective was Acre, a choice which showed the influence of the strategy of the Crusades, and Napoleon proposed to reach Acre by a march along the Maritime Plain in the reverse direction from that taken by Richard Cœur de Lion in the third Crusade.

This is not a military history, and it is not proposed to narrate the whole story of Napoleon's

campaign in Syria. The materials for a narrative of this campaign are scantier than for most of Napoleon's campaigns, and the most valuable accounts are the *Memoirs of Bourrienne*, who was Napoleon's secretary during the campaign, and Captain Sir Sidney Smith's report to the Admiralty on his share of the campaign. Apart from official dispatches and *Bourrienne's Memoirs* there is singularly little literature in English on a campaign which concerned the fortunes of this country far more than any of Napoleon's campaigns in Central Europe. A very interesting account of the expedition has appeared in the *Palestine Exploration Fund Magazine* by the late Colonel Sir C. M. Watson, and, short as it is, it is probably the best account in English.

Our main interest, then, in discussing this campaign in Palestine is to note those passages in it which bear on our own problems in this war. Setting out for Syria, Napoleon was in a position not greatly dissimilar from that of Sir Archibald Murray. In two important respects he was at an actual disadvantage; he had lost command of the sea at the battle of the Nile and he had no friends at all in the East. The British position is in this respect much more favourable, for apart from the depredations of submarines our command of the sea is undisputed. In India, moreover, we had an unrivalled base of military operations against Turkey, an immense population to draw upon both for soldiers and for the manual labour which in modern wars is no less important than the combatant force. Not only so, but we had effected a lodgment in the

Turkish Empire at the head of the Persian Gulf, and indeed by the beginning of 1916 had conquered the greater part of Mesopotamia, including its capital of Bagdad. On the other hand, it is just to add that Turkey was now enormously stronger as a military power than it was in the days of Napoleon. There were no railways a century ago, and the great difficulty for Turkey then was to concentrate her troops at the threatened point. The Turkish military headquarters then were at Damascus, and not only were her troops collected here with great slowness and difficulty, but the bodies which she had in Palestine were mere isolated garrisons which, with one exception, fell an easy prey to a general who moved with such extreme rapidity as Napoleon. Much more favourable was the position of the Turks in 1917. They had an excellent railway system in Palestine which enabled them to concentrate rapidly at the desired point, and indeed, for the first two years of the war, instead of defending their country passively well behind its frontiers they pushed beyond them, and were in actual occupation of all the territory of Egypt east of the Suez Canal. It is one of the paradoxes of war that railways, instead of making military movements more rapid, as might have been expected, seem on the whole to have diminished the freedom of military movements. The contrast between the extraordinary cautiousness of Sir Archibald Murray and the lightning rapidity of Napoleon's movements is sufficiently remarkable. Napoleon had the advantage of moving with much smaller bodies of men, but every mile of the march from Egypt to Galilee had to be walked,

and there was no mechanical transport whatever. Under these circumstances Napoleon's campaign in Palestine must be accounted one of the most remarkable achievements that even he ever accomplished. The expedition was officered almost entirely by young men. The oldest of them was Kleber, who was forty-six. Junot and Murat, who commanded the advance bodies, were twenty-eight at this time; Lannes and Bonaparte himself were thirty.

The first objective of the expedition was Acre, and to reach it Napoleon followed the old route along the coast through Gaza, past Jaffa and across the Plain of Sharon and the shoulder of Carmel into the Plain of Esdraelon. He was at El Arish on February 7, and the garrison surrendered on the 20th, about two months after the occupation of Suez. Between El Arish and Gaza, owing to the misdirection of the French troops by Arab guides, Napoleon with his escort was well in advance of the whole of his army. The Turks, mistaking Napoleon and his escort for the French army, withdrew rapidly into Gaza, and Napoleon, retiring as rapidly in the opposite direction, actually met his cavalry advance guards. Had the Turks, instead of retiring to Gaza, captured Napoleon, as they might easily have done, the history of the world would indeed have been different. Gaza surrendered without resistance at the end of February and the Turkish army retired to Jaffa, which was captured by storm on March 17. From now onwards Napoleon moved with extreme rapidity. On March 16 Kleber was at Haifa at the southern end of the Bay of Acre, and on March 18 the siege of Acre began. Napoleon's object in

wishing to capture Acre was to close the door to a British descent from the sea. He had already, in spite of the defeat at the battle of the Nile, attempted to bring up siege guns by sea from Alexandria, but they had been captured by Sir Sidney Smith off Haifa. The presence of this energetic naval officer in Syrian waters made the danger of leaving Acre upon its flank a very serious one, especially as the Turks were known to be mobilizing an overseas expedition at the Island of Rhodes. But in spite of this danger Napoleon, realizing the importance of speed, threw an army into Galilee while the siege operations at Acre were still in progress. Murat put a garrison in Safed commanding the road from Damascus on March 31. On the same day Junot occupied Nazareth, and at the beginning of April another detachment was sent to capture Tyre.

By this time the Turks had completed their preparations at Damascus and they began to move with energy. One body crossed the Jordan by the road from Damascus to Safed—the "Way of the Sea"—another occupied Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee, and pushed on an advance guard along the road from there to Nazareth. Junot was outnumbered and had to fall back to Nazareth. Safed was invested by the Turks, whose main body had entered the Plain of Esdraelon and had taken up positions at Mount Tabor. Kleber's position was one of considerable danger, for the Turks greatly outnumbered him and were not ill led. Bonaparte, leaving a small body to maintain the investment of Acre, moved up his main army to Kleber's assistance. The enemy's

force consisted mainly of cavalry, and Napoleon's attack was delivered in formation of squares. The tactics were unusual, but they were completely successful, and the Turks, heavily defeated, fell back to Damascus. Safed was relieved, Murat occupied Tiberias, and Kleber remained in Galilee with his headquarters at Nazareth. Napoleon then hurried back to the siege of Acre. By this time siege guns had been brought up by three French frigates which had eluded the vigilance of the British cruisers.

The siege of Acre is one of the famous sieges of history, for although they were on a small scale, these operations defeated one of the most grandiose projects of Imperial history. France, according to this project, now bereft of her colonies in the East and West Indies, was to find more than equal compensation in Egypt. Egypt was to be the stepping-stone to the conquest of Asiatic Turkey, Mesopotamia and India. " Thus, on the one side," writes Napoleon, " Egypt would replace San Domingo and the Antilles, on the other it would be a step towards the conquest of India." " If it had not been for Djezzar," said Napoleon later, " I should have been Emperor of the East." Djezzar was the Turkish commander at El Arish, Gaza, and later at Acre, and he undoubtedly showed great courage and resolution. But the main cause of Napoleon's defeat was the British sea power. Acre would not have mattered at all to Napoleon if he had not feared a Turkish descent from the sea which the destruction of his own fleet at the battle of the Nile made perfectly feasible. The conduct of the defence was extremely able, but for this the main credit

should perhaps go to the French Royalist Phelippeaux, an engineer colonel, rather than to Sidney Smith. On May 10, after the failure of the second general assault on Acre, Napoleon wrote to the French Directory that the capture of Acre was not worth the loss of men which it would entail, and he decided to withdraw from Palestine to Egypt in order to meet the Turkish invasion which he expected, and on which he later inflicted a most disastrous defeat at Aboukir Bay. Napoleon's retreat was most skilfully arranged, and the garrison at Acre did not find out that the French army had gone until they were already south of Mount Carmel. Gallant as the defence of Acre had been, a little more enterprise on the part of Djezzar would have prevented the French army's getting back. Sidney Smith landed part of the Rhodes army to assist in the defence of Acre, but had Jaffa been seized instead not only would the siege of Acre have been automatically raised but Napoleon would have had to fight his way back to Egypt along the coast.

The moral of Napoleon's campaign in Palestine, which is very well pointed out by Colonel Sir C. M. Watson in the article already mentioned, would seem to be that the only way of defending Egypt against attack from the side of Syria is by a bold offensive. The command of the sea in this war gave us a great advantage, the lack of which did in fact ruin Napoleon's chances in 1799. Napoleon had to depend almost entirely on his land communications, and it was this fact that made the failure to capture Acre ruin his grandiose projects for the conquest of the East. Had Napoleon won instead of losing the

battle of the Nile, nothing could have saved the Turkish Empire in Asia. In this war we were in exactly the same position as Napoleon would have been in had he won the Nile. With the lesson of this campaign before us it is strange that the strategic importance of the Syrian coast was not sooner realized. " It is difficult to understand," writes Colonel Sir C. M. Watson, " why immediate steps were not taken to occupy the seaports on the coasts of Syria and Palestine, as these would have served as bases for such military operations as were desirable, and stopped the German-Turkish preparations for the advance across the desert against Egypt. Jaffa and Haifa, which were at that time unfortified, should have been seized by the English and placed in a state of defence, and Beirut, Tripoli and Latakai should have been taken by the French, when the Allies would have got command of the railways from Jaffa to Jerusalem, from Haifa to Damascus, and from Beirut to Damascus, while the construction of the new line which it is supposed has been, or is being, made, to continue the Haifa railway to Ramleh and Gaza, would have been stopped without difficulty. There can be little doubt that such an occupation of the seaports by the Allies would have been hailed with pleasure by the majority of the inhabitants of the country, who fear but hate both the Germans and the Turks, and it would have been a far more effective way of stopping an invasion of Egypt from Palestine than sitting down in front of the long line of the Suez Canal and waiting until an attack upon it was developed. We may feel pretty sure that this would have been the course of action which Bonaparte would have adopted if he were now

in charge of the defence of Egypt, and he was well aware that attack is often the best means of defence, and never, if he could help it, allowed his adversary to get the initiative."

Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon are the three greatest names in military history, and each of them realized clearly the tremendous importance of Palestine as a bridge to the possession of the East. Alexander used Jewish colonists to confirm his hold on Egypt; Cæsar's idea was to use Palestine as the stepping-stone to the establishment of a Roman Empire on to the Euphrates, and if this view of his policy is sound he anticipated the projects of Napoleon in the campaign of 1799. The policy of all three men was markedly pro-Jewish. Each had a rich strain of sentiment in his nature, but none of them would have ever allowed his policy to be influenced by a purely sentimental regard for the virtues or the cleverness of the Jewish people. If their policy was pro-Jewish it was because they regarded the Jews and their country as the keystone of their Imperial projects. With each of them sentiment was the reinforcement of purely political considerations and not the decisive factor. But whatever substance there may have been in the view which these three men took of the military and political importance of Palestine, it holds good to an even greater degree of the conditions that govern the stability of the British Empire in the East.

With Napoleon the modern history of the East begins, and this brief consideration of the political and military motives of his campaign in Palestine brings this volume into the broad stream of its main argument.

CHAPTER VI

THE OLD BRITISH POLICY IN TURKEY

BRITISH policy towards Turkey was inspired by two motives, both descended from the wars of Napoleon. One was the new fear of Russia, and the other the old rivalry with France. The rivalry with France centred in Egypt, a hundred years ago a province of Turkey, and France, having her own claims in the East, shared our jealousy of Russia and was our ally in the Crimean war with Russia. But though in the Eastern Mediterranean we often in the last century co-operated with France, the ideas that we were combating throughout were those of Napoleon. No event in history in England ever made a deeper impression on popular opinion than Napoleon's campaign in Egypt and Palestine. That any one would challenge our sea power successfully no one in this country ever believed, but this sublime confidence in our ability to keep the seas against all rivals made us the more suspicious of a Power that might gain access overland to our Empire in the East. The only such Power was Russia. It was a cardinal principle of British policy to have no land frontier coterminous with that of any European Power. The expansion of Russia in Asia seemed to

many Englishmen to threaten that principle, and our way of meeting the danger was to erect as bastions of the north-west frontier of India a group of friendly and allied Powers. One of these Powers was Persia, another Afghanistan, and a third Turkey. Of their loyalty and allegiance to ourselves we were morbidly jealous. The enormous size of the British Legation at Teheran is a reminder of the place that Persia once held in our system of Eastern defence. With Afghanistan we fought two wars because we suspected the Amir of favouring Russia. We were unwilling that Afghanistan should have more than one window looking on the outside world, and that one window must look only towards India. In these days of alliance with Russia, it is almost impossible to imagine the psychological state which dominated English politics through the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.

The wars with Persia and Afghanistan lay apart from international rivalries in Europe, but our very similar policy with regard to Turkey had a profound effect on our European policy. Our policy at the Congress of Vienna at the close of the Napoleonic wars was vitiated throughout by its refusal to recognize the rights of nationality. The map of Europe was re-drawn, not on the lines of nationalism, as it might have been, but in accordance with the selfish ambitions of our Allies, Prussia and Russia. The whole history of the nineteenth century is a history of the undoing of the work of the Vienna Conference. Belgium had been united to the Netherlands; she presently became free under international guarantees. Italy had been left under Austria; she,

too, recovered her national freedom, thanks mainly to the assistance of the French under Napoleon III. But the main troubles of the century arose in the Turkish Empire. Elsewhere England had shown herself the friend of national rights, and she had early broken with the Holy Alliance which sought to prolong oppression and to stifle the growth of liberal ideas under the pretence of preserving Europe from the risk of another French Revolution and of another French war. But in Turkey the formula of maintaining her integrity was an obstacle to that frank sympathy with subject nations rightly struggling to be free which we had exhibited elsewhere. The one exception was our sympathy with the cause of Greek nationalism, which was the doing of that great statesman Canning. Elsewhere in Turkey we were, at any rate when the rivalries of other Powers came in, the friends of oppression and the foes of freedom.

Perhaps the most remarkable man of the nineteenth century that appeared in the Eastern Mediterranean was Mehemet Ali. Born in 1769, he succeeded to the Khedivate of Egypt six years after Napoleon's expedition into Palestine. He was assumed to be a nominee of France, and on that account the English in 1807 launched an expedition against Egypt, which proposed to put Elfi Bey, who had fought against the French, on the throne of Egypt. The expedition did not arrive until two months after Elfi had died, and the British, after suffering a not over creditable defeat, made the best of accomplished fact and recognized Mehemet. Mehemet indeed had a strong preference for the

British alliance, and he went so far in 1813 as to say so in public. Egypt was at the mercy of a Power that commanded the sea, and that was his principal reason for not relying on France. Mehemet, an Albanian born at Kavala, was a ruler of exceedingly great ability, military as well as political. He found Egypt a small and backward country, and he not only introduced order into her finances and laid the foundation of Egypt's future wealth by establishing a cotton-growing industry, but he extended the frontiers of Egypt towards Arabia and the Soudan. The revolt of the Greeks in Morea, which Turkey was quite unable to deal with, was at its height when Mehemet's armies were advancing on Khartoum, and the Sultan of Turkey decided to call in his assistance. He became Pasha of the Morea. Mehemet, who had already formed a design of supplanting the Sultan, welcomed the foothold in Europe which this new command gave him. The battle of Navarino, in which English, French and Russian fleets defeated the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, put an end to these schemes and laid the foundations of Greek independence. The policy of England in helping Greece to win her independence was an exception to her general policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire, but it did, in fact, put Turkey at the mercy of Russia. By the treaty of Adrianople, signed in the following year, Russia secured important privileges in Turkey, obtained independence for Greece and for the Danubian Principalities, as well as some territory to herself. It looked as though the end of Turkey was near. Two years after the treaty of Adrianople, Mehemet declared

war on Turkey and invaded Syria. His success was instantaneous, and the victory at Konieh threatened the downfall of the Sultan and the substitution of Mehemet on the throne at Constantinople. Russia was alarmed at the prospect of an able man, as every one now recognized Mehemet Ali to be, succeeding to the Empire of Turkey, as her policy was to keep Turkey weak so that she would fall a readier prey when the time came. France, on the other hand, sympathized with Mehemet, partly on the ground of old friendship, partly because Mehemet was doing what Napoleon had attempted to do before him—conquering the Ottoman Empire from Egypt. The attitude of England was for some time uncertain, but she finally threw in her lot with Russia. Mehemet was coerced by the joint intervention of England and Russia, and Turkey was once more saved. The motive of England in intervening was not agreement with Russia but suspicion of her. It was thought that if Russia intervened alone to save Turkey from Mehemet, Turkey would in effect become a province of Russia. England, in fact, took the side of Russia in order to defeat, if not her policy, at any rate the dangers that that policy might bring in its train. By the Treaty of London, 1840, England and Russia agreed to respect the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, closing the Dardanelles to every military flag so long as the Porte was at peace. By article III of the Treaty arrangements were made for the fleets of both Powers to enter the Straits and defend Constantinople, should Mehemet Ali attack it, but by article IV it was provided that such co-operation

" shall be considered only as a measure of exception at the express demand of the Sultan and solely for its defence in the single case above mentioned. . . . Such measures shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited for ships of war in foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and the Sultan on the one hand hereby declares that except in the contingency above mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ships of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom and of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above mentioned principle."

It is a thousand pities that this treaty was ever concluded. Its object was to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean, and in that we succeeded. Unfortunately, it also kept us out of the sea of Marmora and the Black Sea. If the British Fleet had had the right of passage in time of peace the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would have been followed up the Straits by the British Navy, which would doubtless have found it convenient not to come away, and with a strong British naval force in the Golden Horn, neutral Turkey might well have found it to her

interest to remain neutral. It follows that the tragedy of the Dardanelles expedition was directly due to our intervention against Mehemet Ali and our treaty with Turkey engaging to respect the prohibition of the Straits to ships of war. Moreover, even if we were right in preventing Mehemet Ali from occupying Constantinople, the policy of excluding him from Syria was surely a mistake. Had he been left in possession of his Syrian conquests this country, as the future protector of Egypt, would have succeeded to the whole region from Khartoum to the Taurus, and the natural solution of our quarrel with France over Egypt would have been a partition, reserving Egypt to ourselves and giving Syria to France. Writing to Henry Bulwer at Constantinople in 1838, Palmerston wrote, "The Turkish Empire, which has endured for centuries, is likely to outlive the creation of yesterday such as is Mehemet Ali's authority. To frame a system of future policy in the East upon the accidental position of men turned seventy would be to build on sand, and no one can tell what will come when Mehemet Ali goes." Earlier in the year he had written, "The Cabinet agree that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare his independence and separate Egypt from Syria. That would result in a conflict between him and the Sultan. The Turks would be defeated, the Russians would fly to their aid, and a Russian garrison occupy Constantinople in the Dardanelles, which, once in their possession, they would never quit." To France Lord Palmerston's policy was hectoring. "Tell M. Thiers," he wrote to our Ambassador at Paris, "that if France

throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; that if she begins a war she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies and commerce before she sees the end of it; that her army in Algeria will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will be justly chucked into the Nile."[1] It is all very vigorous, but surely neither subtle nor far-seeing. The objects of our Eastern policy during the war have not been very clearly defined, and though agreements have been concluded they have been provisional only, and, except in the Petrograd versions, have never been made public. There can be little doubt, however, that the settlement of the East which was contemplated in 1916 was one that gave Russia Constantinople and the Dardanelles; France, the coast of northern Syria; and England, an interest at any rate in Palestine.[2] Every one of these settlements could have been had in 1840 if we had made common cause with France, supported Mehemet Ali and left Russia to do what she liked with Turkey. There would have been no Crimean war, no Russo-Turkish war in 1878; the rivalries between the Balkan States would have been settled earlier. Russia would have been the acknowledged head of the Balkan Slavs, and perhaps even this war would never have taken place. Of all the blunders in our history, perhaps none has had such tremendous consequences as Palmerston's coalition with Russia to save Turkey from Mehemet, followed as it was

[1] D. A. Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century* (an excellent study of Mehemet).

[2] See Appendix A.

by the treaty of London in 1840. An entente with France in these years would have changed the whole future history of the world.

Palmerston's blunder of siding with Russia rather than France, with the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, was the more unfortunate because the entry of Mehemet Ali into Syria raised for the first time in our history the return of the Jews to Palestine as a question of practical politics. From 1837, for the next ten years onwards, the advocacy of Zionism as a part of our Eastern policy was exceedingly persistent. Dr. M. Russell, in a book *Palestine or the Holy Land*, published in 1837, saw in the political changes in the East a chance that a Jewish longing for Palestine might be satisfied. Lord Lindsay, in his letters, *Egypt, Edom and the Holy Land*, published at this time, wrote that, "The Jewish race, so wonderfully preserved, may yet have another stage of national existence open to them, may once more obtain possession of their native land and invest it with a greater interest than it could have under any other circumstances." In 1839 the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland sent Andrew Bonar and Robert M'Cheyne to report on the condition of the Jews in Palestine. The consequence of this report was that a British Consul was appointed in Jerusalem, and that we, as the only Power that had a Consular representative in Jerusalem, became the protectors of the Jews all through the East. In 1840 there was an anti-Jewish riot in Damascus, based on a charge of ritual murder. The British Consul at Jerusalem was a man of energy, and, thanks very largely to him, a strong feeling was roused in

this country against the atrocities which had been committed against the Jews. Palmerston took strong and decisive action; he sent instructions to all British representatives in the Levant and Syria, placing the Jews under their special protection, and informing them that, so far as non-British subjects were concerned, the Turkish Government had promised to "attend to any representation that might be made to it by the Embassy of any act of oppression practised against the Jews." The position of the British, as the protector of the Jews in Palestine, was officially recognized by the Russian Government, which, not wishing to be troubled with the affairs of its own Jews who had emigrated to Palestine, told them that when they wanted advice or assistance to apply to the British Consul.

All through 1839 and 1840 there were frequent references in the English Press to a possibility of establishing a Jewish State. On August 17, 1840, *The Times* stated that the question was becoming one of practical politics, and that it seemed that the Government was feeling its way in that direction. It further announced that a nobleman of the opposition had taken up the matter practically. The nobleman in question was Lord Shaftesbury, who was a family connection of Lord Palmerston's, and seems to have discussed the matter with his relative.

> "His verbal representations were followed up by written ones, and, in September of the same year, he addressed a formal memorandum to the Foreign Secretary on the 'Syrian Question' and suggested a 'measure, which being adopted will, I hope, promote the development

of the immense fertility of all those countries that lie between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean Sea.' In his opinion the identity of the suzerain Power was a matter of little consequence. That which was needed was 'a competent and recognised Dominion, the establishment and execution of the laws, and a Government both willing and able to maintain internal peace.' After emphasizing the great need of the land for an industrious population, Lord Shaftesbury mentioned the one people which, although scattered, felt the call in Palestine of inducements and hopes additional to any that might influence men and women of other nations. 'If the governing Power of the Syrian Provinces would promulgate equal laws and equal protection to Jew and Gentile and confirm his decrees by accepting the Four Powers as guarantees of his engagement, to be set forth and ratified in an article of the Treaty, the way would at once be opened, confidence would be revived and prevailing throughout these regions would bring with it some of the wealth and enterprise of the world at large, and, by allaying their suspicions, call forth to the full the hidden wealth and industry of the Jewish people. . . . They have ancient reminiscences and deep affection for the land; it is connected in their hearts with all that is bright in times past, and with all that is bright in those which are to come; their industry and perseverance are prodigious." [1]

One correspondent of *The Times*, in a letter of

[1] *British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews*, by Albert M. Hyamson, p. 8. Published by the British Palestine Committee.

August 26, proposed that Britain should buy Palestine for the Jews, and declared that the purchase would be an even nobler deed than the emancipation of slaves. Sir Moses Montefiore, who was keenly interested in Jewish agricultural colonization in Palestine, had several conversations with Mehemet Ali, who avowed his sympathy with the projects of Jewish colonization.

What wrecked all these schemes was our jealousy of Russia, our Ally in the present war, and our friendship with Turkey, now our enemy.

There was an interesting British campaign in Syria against Ibrahim Pasha, the son and general of Mehemet Ali, and its outlines are worth noting for their bearing on the present war. Ibrahim had an army of one hundred and thirty thousand regulars, based on Damascus, with which he had routed the Turkish troops. The strategy of the British was purely naval. A British squadron under Napier, assisted by some four thousand Turkish regulars, effected a landing on the Syrian coast near Beirut and bombarded that town. It was, however, too strongly garrisoned, and Ibrahim advanced to its relief. He was defeated by the British Marines, and later by the Turks, and the enemy then evacuated Beirut and fell back on Damascus. The British squadron sailed down the coast to Acre, which it captured after a stout resistance, and Ibrahim, afraid of retreating along the coast, marched back to Egypt along the east bank of the Jordan and round the south end of the Dead Sea. Of the eighty thousand troops who left Damascus only fifteen thousand effectives reached Cairo. Ibrahim doubt-

less could have put up a longer resistance, but the country in the north had risen against him, and Mehemet Ali recognized the impossibility of maintaining the struggle against the coalition without the assistance of France, on which he had probably counted. But the campaign, short as it was, once more illustrated the importance of naval power in any campaign for the possession of Palestine or Syria. In this war our naval power has hardly been used on the Syrian coast.

CHAPTER VII

GERMAN AMBITIONS IN THE EAST [1]

BISMARCK once said that the whole of the Balkans were not worth the bones of a Prussian grenadier, and German political interest in the East is of a very modern growth. In so far as Bismarck was interested in the East, it was not in the least for its own sake but only because territorial acquisitions by Russia in Turkey might alter the balance of power in Europe. "Our new Empire," said Treitschke in a paper on "Germany and the Oriental Question," written in December 1876, "does not consider itself called upon constantly to keep the world on the *qui vive* by raising new questions in the charlatanical fashion of Napoleon. Germany aims at a real balance of power and does not even wish to play the part of *primus inter pares*, but is ready modestly to remain in the second line so long as her interests are not immediately interfered with," Germany, unlike the English Tories, was no fanatical supporter of the integrity of Turkey. "Which ever way the die may be cast," said Treitschke, "we Germans do not swim against the stream of history.

[1] *Germany, France, Russia and Islam*, by Heinrich von Treitschke (Jarrold & Sons). *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, by D. A. Cameron. *The Short Cut to India*, by David Fraser (Blackwood & Sons). *The Quarterly Review*, October 1917.

The principle of intervention has become discredited since the Holy Alliance wantonly misused it; properly applied, however, it maintains its value in a society which is conscious of its solidarity. Turkey has trampled on all the solemn promises which guaranteed her the entrance into our State Confederation. Christian Europe must not have the right wrested from her at least to gag this barbaric Power if as yet it cannot be destroyed, so that it may no more endanger the human rights of Christian subjects." On the other hand, Treitschke was opposed to Russian territorial conquests on the Balkan Peninsula. "The famous expression, 'Constantinople c'est l'empire du monde,' appears to us practical Germans as a Napoleonic phrase, but all the same the Bosphorus remains a highly-important strategic position. To subjugate that natural heritage of the Greeks to the Russian Empire would be tantamount to substituting a new foreign domination for the Turkish. It would be tantamount to transferring the centre of gravity of Muscovite power from territories where it has healthy natural roots, thus creating morbid conditions which would be no less pernicious to Russia than to us." Thus Germany in the 'seventies occupied a position in regard to Turkish politics not very distinguishable from that of English Liberals. She was, it is true, indisposed to solve the Turkish question by letting Russia have her own way as the Liberals would have done, but she had no belief in the policy of bolstering up the Turkish Empire. She certainly had no territorial ambitions of her own in these regions.

The change in German policy with regard to

Turkey began in the 'eighties. In 1886 Dr. Aloys Sprenger published a pamphlet in which he argued that Syria and Babylonia were the most promising fields of German colonization. "The Orient is the only territory on earth which has not yet been taken possession of by some aspiring nation. It offers the finest opportunities for colonization, and if Germany, taking care not to let the opportunity slip, should act before the Cossacks come along she would, in the division of the world, get the best share. The German Kaiser, as soon as a few hundred thousand German colonials bring these promising fields into cultivation, will have in his hand the fate of Asia Minor, and he can and will then become the protector of peace for the whole of Asia." The theme that it was better for Germany to send her surplus population to Turkey, where they might hope to peg out claims for the German Empire itself, became a favourite one, though as yet it had no official backing. In the 'eighties began the German interest in Turkish railways. German engineers had already built in 1875 a railway seventy miles long, from Haidar Pasha, opposite Constantinople, to Ismit. In 1888 this railway was transferred to a German syndicate with a secured concession for an extension to Angora which was completed in 1893. Later the Germans secured the concession for a further extension to Diarbekr, on the upper reaches of the Tigris. Already it would seem that the Germans had conceived the idea of a railway connecting Constantinople with Mesopotamia. This particular scheme of an extension through Diarbekr was defeated by Russia,

who objected to a German-made railway so near to what she regarded as her own sphere of influence in Turkey. The Black Sea Basin agreement was made, by which the sole right to construct railways in the north of Asia Minor, including the route to Diarbekr, was reserved to Russia. Barred from this route of extension, the Anatolian railways were driven to take a more southerly route, and in 1896 was secured a concession for the extension to Konia. This extension was completed in 1897. It was an exceedingly important extension because it cut across the hinterland of the British railway from Smyrna to Aidin. The French railways in Asia Minor suffered in the same way. The French railway from Smyrna to Kara Hissar became a mere tributary to the Anatolian railway, though naturally it or the British line to Aidin should have had the prior right of extension to the East. German railway policy, however, was much more energetic than either the English or French. The Kaiser put himself at the head of this German railway movement in Asia Minor, and after one of his visits to Constantinople there was concluded the Bagdad Railway Convention of March 1903. The Convention provided for the extension of the Anatolian railways from Konia to the Persian Gulf via Adana, Nisibin, Mosul and Bagdad.

In 1911 the German Railway Company acquired a concession to build a new port at Alexandretta and to build a short line of railway connecting it with Osmanieh on the trunk line, and there was a further connection between the Bagdad Railway and the Hedjaz line, via Aleppo.

Just before the war the Germans had in Asiatic Turkey some three thousand miles of railways built, building or in concession. The British, who had been the first to build railways in Turkey, had still no more under their control than the short line from Smyrna to Aidin which was opened by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as long ago as 1858. From 1858 until 1888, when the Germans entered the field, we had done nothing except build a few short lines, all of which passed out of our control. For the greater part of this time we had been close allies of Turkey, we had fought the Crimean War to save her from Russia, and we were prepared to go to war again if necessary after the Balkan trouble in 1878. Turkey looked to us as her natural protector. Nearly all the Ottoman Debt was held by English and French subjects. Yet in less than twenty years Germany had acquired a position of overwhelming political influence. Turkey had been peacefully penetrated from end to end and we had nothing to show for our long advocacy of Turkish integrity. How had it all happened?

This question is answered at length by a writer in *The Quarterly Review* of October 1917. He enumerates five causes. The first was the growing disorganization of Turkish finance, which discouraged the investment of British capital in the East, especially with Canada and South America competing. The second cause was the practice of the German concession-hunters of offering loans of ready money to Turkey as an inducement to her to make the concessions they required. In 1888, for example, the Kaulla syndicate was able to offer

to Turkey a loan of $10,000,000 at a time of great financial stringency. No English railway syndicate would have done anything of the kind, not because it had moral scruples, but because it is not the English practice to mix up railways and politics in this manner. An English railway syndicate looks at the prospects of dividends; it does not think—in fact, it would conceive it as dishonest to its shareholders to think—of the by-products of the railway in the shape of political influence. The only form of British financial institution which trades in politics in this manner is a Chartered Company, which acquires and administers enormous tracts of country in the hope of creating the goodwill which will later be bought out by the Government. But in Germany conditions are different. Not only is the German system of banking entirely different from our own, but the connection between the banks and the Government is much more close. The "Quarterly" Reviewer lays particular emphasis on this cause of the German success. He writes: "Apart from political considerations in Turkey . . . the initial success of the Germans in 1888 and its subsequent development are ascribed very largely to their banking and industrial organization, to the application of that organization to the peculiar conditions of Turkish finance, to the German practice of subordinating individual to collective effort in every department, and to the consequent facility with which powerful Government support could be afforded to any given enterprise without the risk of collision with competing German enterprise in the same field. There has been the closest

co-operation between the German banks and the German Government, but it should not be overlooked that such co-operation is politically only possible if the banks are prepared to surrender some of their freedom of action."

Important as were these financial causes, the political causes were in all probability the more decisive. Had our position in Turkey been what it was in the days of Stratford de Redcliffe, the competition of Germany in bargaining for railway concessions would have been unavailing, no matter how attractive her financial offers had been, or how close the connection between the Government's policy and that of industrial finance. The moment we made up our minds that these railway concessions were politically valuable they would have been ours for the asking, and no competitor would have stood a chance. Indeed, the project of the Bagdad railway was not originally a German project, but English. Sir John MacNeill and General Chesney, as long ago as 1857, reported on the route to Alexandretta and Basra. They estimated the cost of a railway at seven and a half millions, made light of the engineering difficulties, and were confident that it would soon pay its way. The leading spirit of the enterprise was Sir William Andrew, an Indian railway official who, after twenty years advocacy, secured in 1872 the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons to examine the Euphrates Valley Railway Scheme, as it was called. Among the papers printed in the Report of the Committee is a correspondence that had taken place between the projectors of this railway and

Musurus Pasha. Musurus wrote to Sir George Jenkinson, M.P. : " You are well aware that I should like to see constructed a railway from Constantinople to Bussorah, and the Imperial Government would readily grant the same terms for making it; but as I fear that this is more than can be accomplished at present, I content myself with the line from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Whether the Valley of the Euphrates or the Tigris be preferred is immaterial to me; but it seems that by the former, which has been already surveyed, the railway would be the easiest to be made, in consequence of the flatness of the country, and therefore the cheapest. So that, you see, it is not the conditions of the Turkish Government which are wanting to any other line, but rather because the cheapness and natural advantages offered by the Euphrates Valley route, especially to England, whose assistance is requisite."

In this letter there is clearly outlined the whole idea that Germany afterwards annexed and made her own. It will be noticed that Turkey in 1871 would greatly have preferred, doubtless for military reasons, a railway connection all the way to Constantinople, and it is one of the perversities of our old Turkish policy that, interested as we were in the maintenance of her integrity, we should have taken so little practical interest in her military problems. The Germans, succeeding us later, made the most of the departments of military policy that we so neglected. To Germany these railways were tentacles by which she hoped to fasten her influence on the country. To Turkey they were strategic

railways by which the Government could better maintain its hold of outlying provinces and defend the Empire against foreign aggression. Still, had the project of the railway between Alexandretta and Basra been adopted, its extension to Constantinople would only have been a matter of time, and the Germans, when they entered the field, would have found it already occupied by us. At any rate, the only part of the enterprise that could have had any effect on our positions in Eastern power—namely, the railway south of the Taurus—would have been securely in our hands, and it would have made very little difference to us even if the extension between Constantinople and Alexandretta had fallen under German influence.

Even earlier than the Euphrates Valley Scheme there had been a British scheme for an overland route between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

Our first Consul in Egypt in the French Revolution was one George Baldwin. On one occasion Baldwin ascended the Great Pyramid with a party of friends and poured out libations from three bottles of water, from the Thames, the Ganges, and the Nile, and toasted the union of the three rivers and the expansion of British commerce through Egypt. At that time the chief trade route went overland through Aleppo to the Persian Gulf and was in the hands of the Levant Company. Baldwin's idea was afterwards taken up by Thomas Waghorn, Lieutenant of the Royal Navy, and it was through his efforts and the help of Mehemet Ali that the Indian mails, before the construction of

the Suez Canal, were brought by the overland route from Suez to Alexandria and then via Trieste and across Germany and Belgium to London. Waghorn was the staunchest of Mehemet Ali's English friends, and there is no doubt that if he could have had his way England would have allied herself with Mehemet and dropped her support of the integrity of Turkey, and the result of an agreement with France in the 'forties over Egypt would have been that these two Powers would definitely have settled between them the fate of the Turkish Empire south of the Taurus. Unfortunately, it was not to be.

Right down to the construction of the Suez Canal the British Foreign Office was prejudiced against Egypt and against anything that would increase her power. Its prejudice was based on two causes. The first was the influence of France in Egypt, which, however, might easily have been disarmed of hostility to us if we had consented to work with Mehemet. The second cause was our jealousy of Russia and our obstinate advocacy of the principle of Turkish territorial integrity for fear of the consequences if Russia acquired Constantinople. Palmerston saw very clearly that we could not oppose Russia's acquisition of Constantinople unless we also upheld Turkish sovereignty in Syria and Egypt, and that any attempt on the part of England and France to adjust their differences in Egypt and Syria must necessarily involve the acceptance of Russia's claims further north. That was why British statesmen from Canning downwards were cold to the development of British commercial enterprise in Egypt and to the construction of the Suez Canal.

They wanted Egypt to be a closed door because they thought that if it were opened it would give our enemies a new line of attack on India. This was a perfectly logical position; it secured us friendship with Turkey and the enmity of France and Russia. But it set itself to maintain artificial barriers which were sure sooner or later to be swept away. The construction of the Suez Canal necessarily involved, if we were to maintain our position in the Mediterranean at all, British political supremacy in Egypt. Palmerston should have seen that the Canal was sure to be made some day and have adapted his policy to meet that contingency. Disraeli understood how profoundly the Canal had changed the foundations of our Eastern policy. His acquisition of Cyprus, nominally as a security for the better government of the Armenians by the Turks, may really have been intended as security for our control of an overland railway to the Euphrates should it ever be made; just as his purchases of Suez Canal shares distinctly contemplated the necessity of our obtaining a predominant position in Egypt. The odd thing was that he should have imagined that this policy could be combined with the maintenance of the old principle of upholding the territorial integrity of Turkey. Directly we had made up our mind that the control of the Suez Canal route was a British interest, it followed that we had better drop the principle of Turkish integrity and make our terms with both Russia and France.

CHAPTER VIII

ENGLAND, EGYPT AND TURKEY

It was reserved to the Liberal Government of 1880 to take the final plunge and to occupy Egypt with a British Army. The diplomatic consequences of this step were exceedingly serious and crippled British diplomacy for the next twenty years. It inevitably meant the dissolution of the alliance with Turkey, for, having occupied Egypt, we could not decently oppose Russian ambitions in Turkey. Moreover, it set us for many years at odds with France and delayed the entente with her, and at the same time the ferocious denunciations of Turkish misrule served to complete the alienation of the Turks from this country. And, lastly, it put every Power in Europe in a position to put the screw on our diplomacy. Germany frequently made use of the screw. For example, when the German project of an extension of the Anatolian railway to Konia was under discussion, the British Ambassador, anxious to protect the interests of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, urged delay. Count Leyden, the German Consul-General at Cairo, thereupon threatened to withhold German consent to certain schemes of the British Government in Egypt, and in the end Germany had her way. Thus the British occupation in Egypt not only inclined the

Turkish Government to see a friend in Germany, but prevented us from offering resistance to German railway schemes in Asia Minor that prejudiced our own projects.

Conservatives had foreseen some of these complications, and in the early days of the occupation of Egypt they were the most relentless of its critics. They saw that the occupation of Egypt had destroyed the old theory of British Eastern policy that at all costs the integrity of Turkey must be maintained. But they had no constructive policy. Their idea was simply to revert back to Palmerston's policy which opposed Russia in the north and France in Egypt quite impartially. On the other hand, the Liberal Government which had brought about the occupation was equally averse from a constructive and positive policy. It pledged itself to evacuate Egypt, and although it was perfectly clear that evacuation would solve nothing unless Egypt became a strong and enlightened State capable of standing alone, it still did nothing to train the people in habits of self-government. Liberals, indeed, had then no faith in the progress of Islam, and they lost no opportunity of attacking the corruption and tyranny of the Turkish oligarchy. At the same time, they kept to our treaty of alliance with Turkey which they had themselves violated in spirit, if not in letter, by the occupation of Egypt. All this confusion, this fatal ambiguity of our diplomatic position arose out of the failure of the Palmerston policy in 1840. Had we made terms with France, recognized Mehemet Ali in Syria and abandoned our protection of Turkey's integrity, the

break-up of Egypt in 1880 would have discovered the foundation for an Anglo-French agreement already laid, and the entente with France of twenty-five years later might have been anticipated. Instead of that we went through a period of splendid and certainly inconvenient isolation. Just at the very time when if we were to guard ourselves against possible menace from the new Germanic Power in Europe it was most important that we should be on the best of terms with France and with Russia, we were at odds with both, and the real cause of that quarrel, though its subjects were various, was Egypt.

Neither political party was in a position to attack the other over our diplomatic embarrassments during these critical years. If the Conservatives objected strongly at first to the occupation of Egypt, they became later its firm supporters. The Liberals, under whose government we occupied Egypt, later changed their minds about the wisdom of this policy, and a section, numerically strong in the country though not in the Cabinet, were for the fulfilment of our promises and for evacuation. Mr. Gladstone and four other members of the Liberal Government of '92–95 were strongly in favour of evacuating Egypt on conditions, and only desisted from their negotiations, which had been tentatively opened, owing to the opposition of Lord Rosebery, who was then Foreign Secretary, and of the Liberal Imperialist wing in the Cabinet. Thus neither political party has a clear and consistent record. Both reversed their earlier policy, both were alike inconsistent with the traditional principles of

British policy in the East, and both were reluctant to accept the logic of the new position and build up a new Turkish policy in place of the old. There is no end to the paradoxes introduced by Egypt into our Foreign policy. The Liberal Premier who occupied Egypt was afterwards anxious to abandon it, the Conservatives who opposed the occupation afterwards supported it, and the Liberals who abandoned the conquests of the Khedives in the Soudan to the Mahdists afterwards were the strongest supporters of the Conservative Government's policy of reconquering the Soudan and connecting it with our possessions in East Africa. Our Eastern policy lay in a heap of ruins, but no one offered to rebuild it or even recognized the necessity for rebuilding it.

One of the consequences of this failure in Egypt has already been noted. It prevented us from opposing effectually Germany's railway schemes in Asiatic Turkey which we had been the first to conceive and had the prior right to execute. The other consequence was that we very nearly came to war over the Fashoda dispute. War was happily averted, but it is hardly possible to exaggerate the evils of our long estrangement from France. Had the entente come earlier, not only would our situation in Western Europe have been more securely based, but the agreement would have had consequences in Turkey which would for ever have closed that Empire to German political ambitions. It was through and during the estrangement between England and the Dual Alliance over Egypt that Germany was able to get the footing in Turkey

which inspired her with her Eastern ambitions and brought about this war.

All this time the materials for a new constructive policy had lain ready to hand. The projects of Shaftesbury for Turkish colonization in Palestine when Mehemet Ali was in occupation of Syria have already been noted (Chapter VI). After the expulsion of Mehemet from Syria these projects receded from practical politics, but they were none the less persistently advocated by independent writers. In 1845 Mitford proposed the establishment of the Jewish nation in Palestine under British protection. His plan was " the re-establishment of the Jewish nation in Palestine as a Protected State under the guardianship of Great Britain; secondly, their final establishment as an Independent State, whensoever the parent institutions shall have acquired sufficient force and vigour to allow of this tutelage being withdrawn, and the national character shall be sufficiently developed and the national spirit sufficiently recovered from its depression to allow of their governing themselves. This plan would be attended with political advantages of incalculable importance to Great Britain, tending to restore the balance of her power in the Levant, and giving her the command of a free and uninterrupted communication with her Eastern possessions. The establishment of the Jewish nation in Palestine under British protection would retrieve our affairs in the Levant, and place us in a position from whence to check the progress of encroachment, to overawe open enemies, and, if necessary, to repel their advance, at the same time that it would place

the management of our steam communication entirely in our own hands." Another advocate of Jewish colonization of Palestine under British protection was Colonel Gawlor, whose arguments ran on much the same lines as Mitford's, and who seems to have contemplated the supplementing of official expenditure in the development of Palestine by private subscriptions. Mr. A. J. H. Hollingworth, another English pamphleteer who wrote in the 'forties, advocated the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine partly on religious grounds as the fulfilment of prophecy which would tend to strengthen popular belief in the truth of the Bible, but also on the more practical and materialistic grounds that it was in the interests of the British Empire in order to safeguard the road to Egypt. The Crimean War diverted this current of opinion, but the outbreak of the troubles in the Turkish Empire in the 'seventies revived the old arguments. Colonel Conder, of the Palestine Exploration Fund, was a persistent speaker and writer on behalf of Jewish colonization in Palestine. Colonel Conder was the first to see that the slight tendencies to anti-Semitism that existed in England were really arguments for the establishment of the Jewish nation. The colonization of Palestine by the Jews, he said, would benefit not only Turkey but Britain, and the creation of a new centre of attraction would deflect from England a considerable portion, if not the whole, of that immigration which a party in England seemed so anxious to avoid. When the Berlin Conference began to sit with a Jew as the chief representative of England it is not surprising that

hopes for the realization of these projects began to run high. Beaconsfield had written novels in which he had shown his sympathy with Zionist aspirations. Would he be the man to yoke those ideals with British imperial interests in the East that were their natural allies? The conference ended, and nothing was done for the Jews in Palestine. Yet it would be unfair to accuse Disraeli of forgetting his compatriots. The great difficulty with Disraeli was his profound distrust of Russia. He had waged war in Afghanistan out of suspicion of her designs on India. How could he persist in his opposition to the Slav movement in the Turkish possessions in Europe and at the same time advocate an extensive system of Jewish colonization in Palestine under English auspices, which he realized must sooner or later end in a British Protectorate? The two policies could not be run at one and the same time, and unfortunately his hatred of Russia was stronger than his Jewish nationalism. Yet, on a more rational view of British interests in the East, Constantinople mattered comparatively little and the foundation of a prosperous Jewish State in Palestine a great deal. The fears that so obsessed the mind of Disraeli have all proved imaginary and unreal. We are now firm Allies of Russia, and in the Dardanelles fought a campaign which, if it had been successful, would have ended in the handing over of Constantinople to Russia. On the other hand, Syria and Palestine, which Disraeli rejected as of slight importance at the Conference of Berlin, have now become corner-stones of British Policy in the East. A few—a very few—saw even then the

importance of Palestine in an Eastern policy. On May 10, 1879, *The Spectator* published the following paragraph in its Notes of the Week—

> "*The Times* of Wednesday publishes, in a way which indicates special authority, the statement that Lord Beaconsfield has recommended that a special grant of £200 should be made towards defraying the expenses of Mr. Ginsberg's work on the *Massorah*, now publishing at Vienna. The *Massorah* is the analysis by the Jewish grammarians of the seventh century of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament. There one sees the very best side of the Premier. It is like him to care about the perfect doing of a bit of old scholarship like that, and like him, too, to dare the obvious comment that only a Jew would have selected scholarship of that particular kind for a State grant. We recommend this incident to the notice of the flunkeys who will have it that in describing the Premier as 'a Syrian' his opponents intend to insult him. No man is insulted by the acceptance of his own description of himself. Lord Beaconsfield should place a proposal for translating the Cabalistic books on the Estimates. They will never be translated without a grant, and the money would be voted without a word, and with a secret feeling that in the work his spell might be revealed. If he had freed the Holy Land and restored the Jews, as he might have done, instead of pottering about Roumelia and Afghanistan, he would have died Dictator."

That his irrational fear of Russia and not coldness towards Zionism was the cause of Disraeli's failure to do anything for the Jews at the Berlin Conference

is shown very clearly by his support of Laurence Oliphant's colonization schemes in Palestine. Oliphant proposed the formation of an Ottoman Chartered Company for the colonization of one and a half million of acres in Gilead and Eastern Palestine. His scheme was in no way directed against the integrity of Turkey; on the contrary, he advocated it on the grounds that the creation of a Jewish community in the Turkish Empire would show Turkey how she could strengthen herself by decentralization, and how, by encouraging the right kind of immigrants, she could secure her independence of foreign exploitation. Oliphant's idea was not a British protectorate, but the preservation of the *status quo* of Turkey; only, a *status quo* of prosperity, not of decay. The Government sympathized with his proposal and the Sultan was disposed to be friendly. What ruined the whole scheme, however, was the change of Government in 1880. Yet the Liberals, who had been so anxious to assist the Balkan peoples in their struggle for freedom, ought logically to have been eager to assist the Jews also, and as a measure of liberal statecraft the Jewish colonization of Palestine, even if it had been followed by a British Protectorate, would have had more to recommend it than the occupation of Egypt. It is, indeed, curious that Liberal statesmen should as yet have done so little publicly for the ideal of a Jewish State. The names of nearly all the prominent political sympathizers with a Jewish Palestine have been Conservative—Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Alfred Lyttleton and Lord Percy.

It is sometimes said that a bold policy with the Porte, even after the Revolution, might still have secured us the neutrality of Turkey. Unfortunately, we had now no Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople, but even Stratford de Redcliffe could hardly have made a cordial friendship with Turkey out of the material which he had to hand. We had, in fact, antagonized Turkey, and the only measures that would have neutralized her antagonism were those of superior force. After all, with Russia and France as our Allies the antagonism of Turkey mattered very little, so long as she was not in direct contact with Germany. In other words, the key to the East had been temporarily transferred to the keeping of the Balkan States. The great object of our alliance should have been to maintain the unity of the Balkan States which M. Venizelos had brought about. That broken, Germany and Turkey as Allies would have an opportunity of joining hands; that maintained, Turkey was an island surrounded by enemies, completely under the control of our sea power and of our system of Balkan alliances. The prime mistake of the years preceding the war was to leave Macedonia as a bone of contention between Bulgaria and Serbia. With Monastir in Serbian hands it was only a matter of time how soon Bulgaria would go over to the enemy and Serbia be crushed between the hammer and the anvil. The entry of Turkey into the war with the prospect of Bulgaria's following her example had a most profound significance both for our military and for our general policy in the East. The whole edifice of our Eastern policy was now levelled to

the ground. Our first business was now to build it up again from the foundation.

The bases of a new Eastern policy were these: (1) an entente with France, because without that our position in Egypt was insecure and a source of constant diplomatic embarrassment; (2) an understanding either with Russia or with Germany, because without that our military position in Egypt and in the East could not be safe; (3) an agreement with regard to the future of Turkey between England, France and either Germany or Russia, which ever Power we should select to make up the Triplice in Turkey, and at the beginning of the century it was not by any means certain which of the two it would be; (4) the revival of the Semitic nationalities in the East to take the place of Turkey; (5) a union of the Balkan States to prevent Germany from establishing connection by land with Turkey.

Of these bases, the first was laid by our Entente Treaty with France; the second basis was laid by Sir Edward Grey's Treaty with Russia; the third and the fourth were not attempted until after the war broke out; the fifth was achieved by M. Venizelos, broken up by the Second Balkan War, and not again achieved, though the expedition to the Dardanelles, if it had been successful, would have done it.

In the interval between the end of the Boer War and the beginning of the Protectionist agitation the Conservative Government had to face the question of whether, seeing that the opportunity of occupying the ground in advance of Germany had been missed, we should join the Bagdad railway scheme as part-

ners of Germany. Mr. Balfour clearly realized how much was at stake: while British statesmen had been worrying their heads for half a century over imaginary dangers from the side of Russia, the really dangerous rival had entered the field—dangerous not because she was as yet actively hostile but because her methods of approach were much more subtle and because she had managed to squeeze herself into the position vacated by us as protector of Turkey. The ulterior motives of Germany in Turkey were, no doubt, sinister enough, but in the meantime she appeared as a friend, and her advice to Turkey on the means of consolidating her empire was really helpful. In Turkey, as elsewhere, politicians live from hand to mouth and do not trouble themselves with the day after to-morrow. When Germany should throw off the mask, then, Turkish politicians no doubt reflected, opportunities for resisting her designs would present themselves; for the present it was well to take the good things that offered. Mr. Balfour understood all this. On April 8, he said in the House of Commons that whether we assisted or opposed the project of the Bagdad railway there was no question that it would be carried out. "Therefore the point on which His Majesty's Government will ultimately have to decide, and which the House may safely and wisely take into consideration, is whether it is or is not desirable that if this railway commanding the base of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf is to be constructed, British capital and British interests should be as largely represented in it as the capital and interest of any foreign Power."

The arrangements that were under discussion between the two Governments certainly did not, as they stood, provide for absolute equality between the two Powers such as Mr. Balfour postulated, and in the last week of April he made the following announcement in the House of Commons: "The arrangements which have lately been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government were designed to place the Bagdad railway, including the existing Anatolian railway, throughout its whole length from sea to sea, under international control, and to prevent the possibility of preferential treatment for the goods or subjects of any one country. In these arrangements it was suggested, *inter alia*, that equal powers of control, construction and management should be given to German, French and English interests. After careful consideration of these proposals, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that they do not give to this country sufficient security for the preservation of the principles above referred to; and they have therefore intimated that they are unable to give the suggested assurance with regard to the policy which they might hereafter adopt as to the conveyance of the Indian mails by the projected route, as to facilities at Koweit, or as to the appropriation of a part of the Turkish customs revenue in aid of the contemplated guarantee." The very authoritative writer in *The Quarterly Review*, who has already been quoted, thinks that if the negotiations had not been dropped there would have been no chance of an agreement between England and Germany that would have put the two Powers on

an equality with regard to this railway such as Mr. Balfour wished. He may be right, but it cannot be said that the negotiations were dropped after careful consideration of the idea of an agreement on its merits. Doubtless the original proposals were quite open to the criticisms that were made upon them, but they might have been improved had the negotiations continued, and had public opinion shown itself friendly to the agreement. It was, on the contrary, bitterly hostile to agreement, and that was why Mr. Balfour, who at the beginning of April was evidently strongly in favour of a partnership if equitable terms could be arranged, at the end of April dropped the idea of obtaining terms. He rightly declined to accept the terms offered by Germany, but to drop the negotiations altogether as he did was another and very different thing. This course of action did not meet the difficulty, which Mr. Balfour had stated with his usual candour, of what we were to do if this railway to the Persian Gulf were made and we were not partners in it. Presently there arose the fiscal agitation which quite submerged public discussion of what the future of Turkey and of our Eastern policy was likely to be.

The idea of partnership with Germany in Turkey was not, however, wholly dropped. It comes up again later, though in a somewhat different form. There is no question of partnership in the whole of the new extension, but only of a partition that should leave the end of the line from Bagdad to the Gulf under British control. When the Kaiser was at Windsor in 1908, in the course of a con-

versation with Lord Haldane on the grounds of our suspicion of the Bagdad railway project, Lord Haldane said that our objection was that the railway might be a gate for enterprises against India. "I will give you the gate," replied the Kaiser, and a scheme was drafted which was wrecked partly by Sir Edward Grey's insistence that Russia should be a party in any conference for settling the future of the railway, and partly, it would appear, through subterranean opposition in the German Foreign Office. Another attempt was made when Lord Haldane visited Berlin in 1912, and this broke down owing to Tirpitz's insistence on his new naval programme, Lord Haldane having made some modification in it a condition of a political agreement between the two countries. Finally, an agreement with regard to the terminus of the Bagdad railway was negotiated by the German Embassy in London through the Foreign Office and was initialed but not signed when war broke out. But in all these agreements this country concerned itself solely with the terminus of the line from Bagdad southwards. The last chance of our being partners in the line was lost in 1903.

How far the situation in the East influenced our agreements with France and with Russia, and how far these were our answer to the appearance of Germany's dominant power in Turkey, has never been explained responsibly, but the influence must have been very considerable. The agreement with France engaged her to support our position in Egypt but contained no further reference to Eastern affairs. The agreement with Russia, again, was

concerned with Persia and Afghanistan, not with Turkey. Sir Edward Grey declined apparently to regard the Bagdad railway as necessarily a menace to Turkish independence, and the principal reason for his taking that view was the fact that the Balkan States, Serbia and Bulgaria intervened between the system of the Central European Powers and Turkey. There were two ways in which German designs on Turkey might have been countered. One was Palmerston's way in 1840. Just as Palmerston went into partnership with Russia against Mehemet Ali so that Russia, if she did go to Constantinople, should do so with us by her side, so we might on the same principle have concluded an agreement with Germany relating to Turkey. Or, secondly, we might have made an agreement with France and Russia providing for our common action in Turkey in certain contingencies. The first course, difficult even in 1903, was still more difficult later, though not impossible even after the conclusion of the Entente Treaty with Russia. In the second course England and France were both alike hampered by desire to remain on friendly terms with Turkey. It was one of the conditions of any effective understanding between England, France and Russia with regard to Turkey that the Dardanelles should cease to be closed Straits. In December, 1911, the Russian Government raised the question in a note to the Porte claiming liberty for the Tsar's warships to pass through the Straits, while maintaining the exclusion of the warships of other foreign Powers. The demand in this form was obviously ridiculous.

The same rule would have to be applied to all Powers alike. That it should have been made in this form shows that there was still no agreement between the Entente Powers with regard to Turkey, and the reply of England and France to Turkey's inquiries on their attitude made the matter still clearer. They said that they would consent if Turkey offered no opposition to the opening of the Straits, but if Turkey did refuse they would consent to refusal too. It is clear that British Policy was even now vacillating between the old principle of protecting the integrity of Turkey and the new principle of co-operation with Russia. Yet, looking back now at the events of these years, it is almost incomprehensible that we should not have seen the necessity of taking more active steps to keep Turkey neutral in any war between the Germanic and the Entente Powers. Russia had been from time immemorial the deadliest enemy of Turkey, and England, who had protected Turkey from Russia, was now the Ally of Russia as well as of France. Moreover, she was in occupation of Egypt, which Turkey still coveted. It was perhaps natural that a strongly Nationalist Government should see in the Entente Treaties an alliance between her enemies with the point directed against herself, and should welcome Germany as a successor to the position of Protector so long occupied by England.

It was, however, not natural that Turkey should enter the war against us. That was a pure gamble, in which the inducement was the prospect of finding compensation in Egypt and in Persia and Central

Asia for her losses in Europe. When this inducement was lost—as it was by the end of 1917—the same motives that induced Turkey to enter the war should have induced her to make peace. Having lost the chance of aggrandizement, her hopes at the end of 1917 lay in keeping what was left her; and the decline of Russia's military power left Turkey face to face with Germany as the main enemy of the independence and territorial integrity of what still remained to her.

CHAPTER IX

EAST AND WEST

In its origin this is a war due to Germany's desire to have the reversion of the estate in Turkey. Serbia was not a mere pretext but, holding as she does the bridge between East and West, the veritable cause. Germany thought that the time had come when she could defeat once and for all the Russian claim to be the protector of the Slavs and thereby establish, as against Russia, her right of way to a new Empire in the East. There is no other ambition quite big enough to explain the deliberate acceptance by Germany of the risks of this war. Only the dream of a greater India in the Near East is a sufficient motive for the beginning of what Germany must have known would be a world war. Reject this motive and we are driven back to a view of German policy which, indeed, is that taken very generally, as that of a man running amuck for the Empire of the world. Accept this motive and, if we do not humanize Germany's policy, at any rate we rationalize it.

But if this were the principal motive, how came it to be so overlaid by the events of the war? Why was the East in Germany's policy, to all seeming, a kind of military afterthought? Even if the explanation should seem to take us from the main argument,

the examination of some leading clues in Germany's policy is still worth making, for it will surely bring us back to the same road by which the argument of these pages has been travelling. Even now we are in some danger, by our neglect of the East and our failure to realize its true importance, of concluding a peace which may not cover the true political causes of the frightful malady from which the world is suffering.

A whole nation is never of one mind. There are always at least two parties, and there were two parties in Germany before the war. Neither of them was a peace party, but they looked forward to a very different kind of war. Had the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had his way, it would have been a war definitely and avowedly for the succession to the East, and this limited war Germany could, in all human probability, have won with comparative ease. When Lord Haldane went to Berlin in 1912 it is quite evident in what direction the German Chancellor's mind was moving. The Chancellor then would have been quite satisfied to secure his position in the East; and if he could have made a political arrangement with England and Turkey, as he was most anxious to do, England might never have been the enemy of Germany in this war. There was no apparent reason at that time why England (outside the regions covered by our Treaty) should take the Russian side in Eastern policy rather than the German. But if there was to be a political arrangement in the East and England was to be kept out of the war, as the Chancellor and his party must have fervently desired, there were two conditions that had

to be observed. The first was that Belgium's independence should be respected; the second that France should not be attacked. It was because these conditions were not observed that what was in its origins a war for Empire in the East took on the shape of a bitter struggle for the preservation of civilization.

It would have been quite easy for Germany to have fought her war in the East without lifting a finger against France or Belgium. Had she remained on the defensive on the French frontier the French would have attacked with vigour, and all the indications are that she would have failed. Her people, not at that time enthusiastic about the war, would have been shocked at the heavy losses incurred in this unavailing offensive, and the whole attitude of the French towards this war would have been entirely different. Even grosser was the blunder of invading Belgium. Whether England would have entered the war if Belgium had not been invaded is a question that cannot be definitely decided, but it is all but certain that she would not have done so if Germany had also refrained from attacking France. The Liberal Government was not by any means unsympathetic to the German ambitions in the East, and the accounts that have appeared of Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin in 1912 show that a purely political agreement with regard to the East would not have been at all difficult to reach. It was, in fact, never reached because, already in 1912, there was a strong and rising party in Germany which was not content to defeat Russia and thereby secure itself in the East, but was also anxious to humiliate France and

expand westwards. At the head of this party was the Crown Prince, and his two chief lieutenants were Von Falkenhayn and the General Staff and Von Tirpitz. In German countries it is a recognized tradition that the heir to the throne should be in political opposition to the Kaiser. The Kaiser until he went over to the war party in 1912 or 1913 was held by this party to be much too friendly to England; at any rate he recognized that to have her as an enemy would make a very serious difference in a war, and he was anxious to keep her as a neutral. Not so the Crown Prince. A political reactionary of the worst type, he reserved his bitterest hatred for republican France and England; with Russia he might have a political quarrel, but he did not fear her nor did he dislike her system of government.[1] On the contrary, its wholesale corruption made her so little formidable as an enemy that the view of the General Staff at the outset of war was that Austria unassisted was more than Russia could manage. Von Tirpitz took the same view, though for rather different reasons. He was the representative in the councils of the Government of the jingoism of the German industrial magnates. He wanted to invade Belgium because the addition of her coast to the German Empire would enormously strengthen Germany's sea power and aggrandize Germany's commerce and industry. In 1912 Bethmann-Hollweg and Haldane had all but concluded a draft of an agreement on questions of Eastern and colonial policy. What defeated it was

[1] Mr. Gerard's estimate of the Crown Prince, though more favourable, is not really inconsistent with this view.

the refusal of Von Tirpitz to show an earnest of Germany's friendliness towards England by dropping part of her naval programme. Two or three Dreadnoughts more or less would have made no conceivable difference to Germany's sea power, as the events of this war have shown. The fleet was, however, the symbol of Germany's state of mind towards England, and the instinct which made Lord Haldane insist that a political agreement depended on an agreement with regard to the navy was, for that reason, a perfectly sound one. The same combination of parties which defeated Lord Haldane's mission in 1912 converted what Bethmann-Hollweg wanted two years later to be a political war pure and simple, for the reversion of the East, into a vastly greater war which ultimately became a war between two opposing political principles. This extension of the war was not only unnecessary in the interests of German foreign policy but actually threw away the substance for the shadow, the end for the means.

This opposition between East and West pursues us right through the war in the development alike of German and British strategy. The German mistake of concentrating on the West was bitterly punished by the Russian invasion of East Prussia, by the disastrous Austrian defeat at Lemberg, by the battle of the Marne, and by the German failures at Ypres in the first autumn of the war. Against all that, the most substantial victory that Germany could set was that of Hindenburg in the Masurian Lakes which ejected the invader from East Prussia. By the end of 1914 the original plans of the German

General Staff were completely wrecked. But in 1915 the Germans fell back on the defensive in the West and began an offensive in the East which gave them all Poland and Galicia, overran Serbia, brought Bulgaria into the war and established from Hamburg to Bagdad a coalition of Empires all under the supreme direction of Prussia. The extraordinary successes of Germany in 1915 showed what might have been accomplished had Germany in the previous year not made the colossal blunder of neglecting the East and concentrating on the West. Further, had Germany at the beginning of 1916 followed up her successes in the East, there is no doubt that she could have forced a peace on the Russian Government before the Russian Revolution.

Instead she began the attacks on Verdun, repeating the original mistake that she made at the beginning of the war; and out of the failure of these attacks arose the British success on the Somme, Brusiloff's offensive in Galicia, the Italian victories on the Carso and Rumania's entry into the war. At the end of September 1916 the German General Staff was completely discredited. Von Falkenhayn, who was the brain of the Crown Prince's clique, had to go, and Hindenburg took his place.

Throughout the first two years of the war, one persistent blunder of German strategy emerges. It is like a geological fault round which all the great disturbances in the fortunes of the war seem to cluster. The real political objects of Germany were in the East, but her permanent military centre of gravity was in the West. Had military pressure coincided with the genuine political objects

of Germany, the whole course of the war would have been different. It is conceivable that England would not have been in, that France, after her initial failure, would have been half-hearted in the war, that Italy would have remained neutral, and that Russia might have been forced to make peace at the end of the first year. We have, therefore, to thank the Crown Prince and his clique for the defeat of Germany which is now assured, though the degree of its decisiveness has still to be settled. For the last element of doubt as to the result was removed when the permanent obsession of Germany for the West led to the unrestricted submarine campaign, to the alienation of all neutral opinion, and, finally, to the entry of America on the side of the Allies.

The strange thing, however, is not that Germany should have made this mistake, but that England and France should have failed to take advantage of it. In the case of England there was, it is true, considerable excuse for this failure. Apart from Belgium we had no specific political quarrel with Germany in this war, and her Eastern policy and ambitions were not regarded by Sir Edward Grey and the British Foreign Office as necessarily inconsistent with British interests. Our entry into the war was due solely to causes which Germany might very easily have avoided without sacrificing any of her essential aims—namely, to the invasion of Belgium and to the attempt to crush France. The view of the British Foreign Office that Germany's ambitions in the East did not threaten us was wrong, but it must be remembered that all our preparations and plans for war had been made on the assumption

that our part in the war was to save France from the risk of being overwhelmed. That object was already achieved, perhaps, at the end of the fifth week of the war, when the victory on the Marne was won, or at the end of October, when the Battle of Ypres was won. By that time it seemed evident that, whatever it might cost to recover the ground that Germany had won, there was little chance of her extending her conquests in France. The true policy for France from now forward would have been to economize her men and to defer her offensive until such time as England had attained her full measure of military strength and the Allied deficiencies, notably in munitions, had been made good. The British, it is true, had a subsidiary object. They were especially interested in saving the coast of Belgium. Unfortunately this object, which, as Mr. Churchill saw, could best be safeguarded by a successful defence of Antwerp, was not achieved. We did, however, by a successful defence of Ypres, prevent the Germans from using the possession of Belgium to turn the French flank, and by the end of 1914 we, too, were in a position to fall back on the defensive and to wait until such time as we had attained our full military strength in numbers and in equipment.

Such a defensive policy on the West did not, of course, imply that the army should remain inactive, sitting and waiting until our munition works had attained their full output. Germany had committed the great mistake of putting her strength at the opposite end of Europe from where her political interests lay. The right answer to that mistake was for us to make our military offensive in the East.

Moreover, the conditions that made our military problem so difficult in the West did not hold in the East. In the West we could not make adequate use of our sea power, but an offensive in the East depended very largely for its chance of success on the right use of sea power, and we had to deal with an enemy—Turkey—who at sea was completely defenceless. On the West, again, a comparatively small army had obviously no chance of securing a decisive military result. It might suffice to hold our ground, but not to drive the Germans back and recover Belgium. The proportions of military strength necessary for a successful defensive and a successful offensive have been said to be in the proportions of three to one. But Turkey was an enemy who was particularly vulnerable to attack, even by a comparatively small army. Her communications were bad; she was at the beginning of 1915 cut off from direct military assistance from Germany, at any rate on a large scale, her supplies of munitions were small, and she could not replenish them by her own manufacture. Great as her potential military strength was it was difficult to concentrate it, whereas a power that held the sea, as we did, would have had no difficulty in concentrating a superior military force at any point that was desired. Already at the end of 1914 there was a strong party in the Cabinet Committee of Defence which favoured a vigorous offensive in the East as the best means of following up the victory on the Marne. This party got its way so far that the expedition to Gallipoli took place, but not so far as to carry that expedition through to a successful conclusion. There can be

little doubt that, had the Dardanelles expedition succeeded and Constantinople been captured, we should have been in a winning position by the end of 1915. It would have been sufficient for England and France to hold their ground in the West and sit down in Constantinople. The Russian armies would have been plentifully supplied with munitions, and the Russian *débâcle* which began at Görlitze would never have taken place. The Dardanelles expedition failed for many reasons, but the chief was that no one realized that the corollary of a vigorous offensive in the East was a strict defensive in the West. We could not at one and the same time attack in France and attack in Turkey; and the result of the attempt to conduct simultaneously two offensive campaigns was that we failed in both. Both the British and the French offensives in the West in 1915 were premature and never approached real successes; their main result was to drain France of men. But one quarter of the effort made in France, if it had been made against Turkey, would have given us everything that we wanted. The first result of the fall of Constantinople would have been to place the whole of the Turkish Empire in Asia absolutely at our mercy. The Turkish armies could never have maintained themselves if they had to depend on the military supplies available in Asia. The problem of Egyptian defence, too, would have been solved, and the conquest of Palestine and Syria would have been accomplished with forces very little larger than those which carried the arms of Napoleon from Gaza to Galilee. The scandal of remaining on the defensive along the Suez Canal, our main line

of communication to the East, would have been averted. Colonel Townshend would have occupied Bagdad and Palestine, and Syria could have been had for the marching through. The whole edifice of German Asiatic ambitions would have crashed to the ground—a just nemesis on the folly of the General Staff for invading Belgium and attacking France, and for its secret disloyalty to the real political objects of the German Foreign Office. As against these results, what we actually had to show at the end of 1915 were one or two barren and costly victories in Flanders, a French army exhausted by futile and premature offensives, Poland lost to Russia through lack of munitions, and all the great victories over the Austrians at the beginning of the war completely thrown away, Serbia invaded, Bulgaria on the side of our enemies, Turkey in direct communication with Germany and her splendid soldiers made available in the cause of the Central Powers, Armenia abandoned, and the Turks still in occupation of a portion of Egyptian territory. Never had a great victory like the Marne so amazing an anti-climax, and the cause which sterilized it was our failure to realize the immense political and military importance of the East in this war.

The view may be taken that the capture and retention of Constantinople would have been a military operation of such magnitude as to endanger the successful defence of our lines in the West. The facts are against this view. Ill supplied as the Dardanelles expedition was, it still came very near to success, and if troops had been found in time, instead of being delayed until the naval attack had given

the Turks ample notice of our intentions and then doled out in driblets, there is no doubt whatever that we could have reached Constantinople. Equally there is no doubt that the holding of the city would have given us no trouble. We had vast numbers of Russians to draw upon for garrison purposes, and, indeed, with Serbia still intact, and Bulgaria not an enemy, it is difficult to see how Germany would ever have been in a position to attack. The only way in which she could have reached Constantinople would have been either by declaring war on Bulgaria, or by invading Russia through Bessarabia and working her way across Rumania, a course of action that would have made Rumania as well as Bulgaria her enemy. Even if, as is likely, the effect of our occupation had been to draw the Germans towards Kieff, the increased supplies of munitions that Russia would have been able to draw through the Dardanelles Straits would quite have compensated for the danger of heavy German reinforcements being sent through. But even if the view be accepted that the capture of Constantinople was too ambitious a military operation, with our commitments in France what they were, there were a number of minor operations possible against the Turks against which these objections could not reasonably have been urged. The key to Syria and Mesopotamia is Cilicia. There are only two military roads connecting the Turkish capital with the outlying provinces, one along the shores of the Black Sea through Trebizond and the other followed by the Anatolian railway along the southern shores of Asia Minor past Alexandretta. In possession of

Alexandretta and the passes of Cilicia, we could have strangled the life out of all the Turkish armies south of the Taurus. Just as Constantinople is the bridge between Europe and Asia, so Alexandretta is the bridge between Asia Minor and Asia proper. This operation, which, if it had been begun early, would not have been an ambitious one, would automatically have relieved Egypt, enabled us to occupy at our leisure the whole of the Syrian coast-line, and have isolated the Turkish armies in Mesopotamia. It would not have produced such striking effects on the situation in the Balkans as might have been expected to follow the occupation of Constantinople, but it would have given us all Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, and that at a very small expenditure of military effort.

No doubt the breakdown of the Dardanelles expedition is to blame for the failure to accomplish these results. Before the naval expedition against the Gallipoli forts was decided on there had been some project of attacking the coast of Syria, presumably Alexandretta, which would have given excellent results. How far preparations for this attack had gone is not clear, nor is it known whether it was intended to use a strong landing force, or whether the idea of a purely naval attack, which did so much to ruin our chances of success in Gallipoli, was meant to govern the small operations on the Syrian coast too. In any case the plans against Syria, whatever they were, were abandoned after the Dardanelles expedition had begun. Of the two policies—namely, attacking Constantinople and attacking Syria—the first was clearly the more drastic and therefore preferable, but

both alike required the employment even in the most favourable conditions, of a small army, and if this had been withheld the Syrian expedition, too, could have come to very little, though failure here would not have had such terrible consequences. After the failure at Gallipoli it would still have been possible for us to revive our projects against Syria, but unfortunately a new competitor had now arisen in Salonica. The Salonica campaign was one of our worst mistakes in the war. It wasted troops for no military object whatever, though it may have helped to save Greece from going over to the enemy. On the other hand, the capture of Constantinople would undoubtedly have brought Greece over to our side, for what her assistance was worth; and even the capture of Alexandretta, by enabling us to menace the Turkish possessions in Asia Minor, would have put us in a position to offer a very large bribe for the military assistance of Greece. But whatever there was to be said for the Salonica expedition, had it been begun early and in time to save Serbia from being overrun, there was nothing whatever to be said for Salonica as a basis of attack against Germany's communications with the East. The army required for a successful invasion from Salonica was at least ten times the size of the army that would have sufficed if it had been employed early enough to win Constantinople for us. If Constantinople was not worth 200,000 men in August, Salonica was not worth half that number in December.

The mischief of Salonica was not ended with the overrunning of Serbia, for our failure to do anything considerable here also contributed to the downfall

of Rumania in the autumn of 1916, and this breakdown contributed more than any other cause to the fall of the Asquith Cabinet. The policy of the new Government in regard to the East was slow to declare itself, but the importance of Turkey was certainly realized by this time much more clearly than it had been before. The disgrace of the fall of Kut was redeemed, the army began the invasion of Palestine, and if it did not achieve decisive results in its first campaign the causes were not political but military. General Sir Archibald Murray had many military virtues, and if he seemed to lack energy and rapidity of movement it is necessary in justice to him to add that it is doubtful how far his legitimate demands for troops were met. The new Government, moreover, was clearly anxious to reduce its commitments in Salonica, and the main importance of the deposition of King Constantine and the return of M. Venizelos to the premiership was that it enabled us to begin to do so at less risk. The new British Government, therefore, may be claimed as a partial convert to the Eastern school of strategy. If this conversion did not express itself very decisively in action, one very important reason for that was the submarine campaign, and the resulting shortage of mercantile tonnage, which had made it far more difficult for us to employ our naval supremacy in the East than it would have been a year before. Moreover, the new Government in France may also be claimed as a convert. M. Painlevé, the new Premier, had been as strong an advocate of the Constantinople enterprise as Mr. Churchill himself had been. On August 13, 1915, the three principal

committees of the French Chamber for war, for the navy and for foreign affairs, unanimously passed the following resolution—

" Seeing that the massing of Austro-German troops on the Serbian front must be regarded not only as a preliminary attack on Serbia but also as an attempt to give assistance to the Turks and to raise the blockade of the Narrows, seeing that the Austro-Hungarian troops have in view the seizure of the Sophia-Philippopolis railway, seeing that in this event there is no ground for anticipating that Bulgaria will resist their attempt, that such an enterprise will have disastrous political consequences, and that no satisfactory steps have been taken to prevent that attempt, seeing that all delays and set-backs increase the danger, and that the issues of the war are bound up with the taking of Constantinople, we urge the Government to take the urgent measures that the circumstances demand to organize an expedition which will ensure the fall of Constantinople. These conditions and conclusions represent the attention and deliberation of two months."

It will be seen that in France political opinion, so far as it expressed itself, was strongly in favour of the Eastern solution, and that at a time when a solution could have been had at a comparatively small expenditure of forces. How came it, then, that arguments so strong and a body of opinion so respectable had so little influence on the military policy of the two Governments? The explanation for the neglect of the East in the strategy of both France and England is twofold. The first, which applies with especial force to this country, is that

the political importance of the East was not sufficiently realized. The war was regarded too exclusively as a war for Belgium and France, whereas, in fact, the invasion of Belgium and France were for Germany not ends in themselves but only means to the end, which was the establishment of an Empire in the East. There is something of the Crusaders' fervour in the way in which we piled up men in France and determined to win the war there and nowhere else. Yet this policy was not nearly so popular in France and Belgium as most people imagined. In war the principal object to all rational men is to have the issue decided as far away as possible from their own country, and, eager as the French were to clear the enemy out of their country, it is never an attractive prospect to have one's country fought over even by friends. If the war could have been settled in the East, no one had better cause to prefer that settlement than the French and the Belgians. A war for France was one thing, a war in France was another, and it would have been a better service to France and to Belgium if we had adopted the Eastern policy wholeheartedly at the beginning of 1915. It is true that a decisive victory in France would also ensure any settlement of the East on which we had set our minds, but such a victory was sure, even under the most favourable circumstances, to inflict the maximum of suffering alike on the French and on the Belgians.

But the main causes for our obstinate obsession in the West were military. Neither the English nor the French military commanders realized early enough the enormous preponderance of strength that is necessary for a successful offensive against modern

scientific defences; if they had done so they would have saved themselves the costly offensives in Artois and Champagne in 1915, and both England and France would have been better off for men. Further, in nearly all military minds there is an ingrained conservatism which is their last infirmity. In the German decision to seek a decision in the West there was an element of unintelligent conservatism; they had won their previous victories there, and having gone to that well once, they naturally went there again. The French General Staff, too, whose main thought before the war had been in the adaptation of German military ideas to French conditions, had drafted plans for offensives against Germany, and even after the early failure in Lorraine they were loath to give them up, and they went on applying ideas to conditions which had entirely changed. Nor is the preference for the West in the English army surprising. Every campaign makes its own vested interest, and no soldier who is worth anything ever thinks that any field of war approaches in importance that on which he is engaged. The British army in France, even at the beginning, was the largest army we had ever had on the continent of Europe, and as it grew its " pull " in the strategic councils of the nation grew stronger. The enormous armies which we were raising intoxicated the War Office with a sense of power. The old and very wholesome prejudice in favour of attaining their results by the smallest expenditure of energy was discarded. Instead, numbers became an end in themselves, and the problem in Flanders, because it was so difficult, showed itself capable of eating up any numbers of men.

And that was the principal reason why the partial conversion of Mr. Lloyd George's Government to the Eastern solution of our military problems had not a more decisive influence on the military policy of the country. Sir Douglas Haig, and with him Sir William Robertson, had set their minds on an offensive in Flanders in 1917, in the chances of which Mr. Lloyd George does not seem to have believed. For an attack in France he seems to have preferred the policy of close co-operation with the French then under General Nivelle, and when General Nivelle's offensive broke down he would have preferred an offensive against Austria in support of the Italians. This view was not accepted. We persisted in our offensive in Flanders, which, after winning notable victories, was in the end baulked of strategic results by an exceedingly wet autumn. In Italy, on the other hand, the weather was exceptionally dry and open, and late in the year Germany seized the opportunity to effect a sudden concentration against Italy. The Italian armies were disastrously defeated. Italy was invaded, and Venice was saved only by the arrival of French and British troops. Once more the Entente Powers had suffered a bad defeat by their neglect of the East, and this defeat was emphasized later by the conclusion of peace between Russia and the Central Powers.

The withdrawal of Russia from the war had very grave consequences for the Allies. The linch-pin of our Eastern strategy had been removed; we were saddled with new responsibilities in Italy, and though Russia was far from settled, both Germany and Austria were able to bring to France and Italy a greater part of the armies that they had been

maintaining on the Russian front. The time had gone by when it was possible to hope that the overthrow of the Central Powers could be achieved in the East. Opportunities lost in war never recur. The decisive victory, which could easily have been achieved in 1915, with much greater difficulty in 1916, and very doubtfully in 1917, was clearly not at all to be had there in 1918. There was now no way round: Germany could only be defeated in the West. Yet the withdrawal of Russia, though it destroyed our hopes of winning the war in the East, made the protection of our interests there all the more necessary to our safety. The terms of peace with Russia gave Germany a new route to the East across the Black Sea through Caucasia and into Northern Persia. Germany thus succeeded to the position in regard to India so long occupied by Russia, with this important difference, however: Turkey, instead of being our friend and Germany's enemy, as she had been Russia's, was now our enemy, and for practical purposes Germany's subject. The defeat of Turkey thus became a more important British interest than ever. We had cut ourselves adrift from our old pro-Turkish policy by our alliance with Russia, and now that Russia had failed us we were left without allies. It was more than ever necessary to create new forces to redress in our favour the balance of power in the East. To this object the capture of Jerusalem by General Allenby was the great and notable contribution. Von Falkenhayn, the ex-chief of the German General Staff, had been at Aleppo all through the autumn organizing Turkish resistance to the British advance from Egypt and from Lower Mesopotamia. He

had been completely out-manœuvred both by General Maude and by General Allenby. He had quarrelled with the Turks, and the capture of Jerusalem was a signal proof to Turkey of the impotence of Germany to do anything effectual to help to keep the outlying provinces of her empire. She had entered the war in the hope of recovering Egypt and there finding compensation for her lost provinces in Europe. She was now in a fair way to lose both Syria and Mesopotamia.

The Eastern strategy, therefore, had amply justified itself. The only room for doubt was whether our lines in the West would hold against the much heavier forces that the Germans were now able to bring against them. Clearly having failed to break the German lines in 1917, when we were in considerable numerical superiority, an offensive in the West now had no prospect of success. It would seem reasonable to hope that a German offensive would have no prospect of success either. Our policy was to fall back on the defensive in the West until such time as the arrival of American reinforcements should restore and increase our own numerical superiority and outweigh the effect of Russia's defection. If that had been our policy in 1915 and 1916 the war would probably have been won by now. Obviously there was one reply for Germany, and one only, to this strategy. It was to hazard everything on the chance of a decisive victory in the West. Willy-nilly Hindenburg had now to hark back to a policy of attack which had brought about Von Falkenhayn's fall. But there seemed no reason to doubt the results of such an issue should Germany decide to put it to the test.

CHAPTER X

BRITISH INTERESTS IN PALESTINE [1]

IT is assumed for the purpose of this chapter that we are victorious over Turkey, and by victory is understood the power to impose our will upon her in regard to those parts of her Empire in which we have especial interests, commercial, political and military. Our commercial interests are co-extensive with the whole of the Turkish Empire and are not here taken into account. Our military interests are dictated mainly by the defence of Egypt and India and our political interests include such a settlement of the provinces adjacent to Egypt and India as will secure their future and make our military burdens as light as possible. These provinces are Palestine and Mesopotamia. The ancient connection between Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia is thus revived. Mesopotamia was the cradle of the Jewish people and the place of its exile in the Captivity. From Egypt came Moses, the founder of the Jewish State. The wheel of destiny will have come full circle round if at the end of this war the extinction of the Turkish Empire in Mesopotamia and the need of securing a more defensible

[1] This chapter was written before the letter by Mr. Balfour (quoted in the Preface) adopting the principle of Zionism.

frontier in Egypt were to lead to the re-establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine.

The Turks are an alien oligarchy in almost all parts of their Empire, and even if their rule had been enlightened and progressive no violence would be done to the population in dispossessing them. Indeed the principle of nationality requires their dispossession. Nor is there any indigenous civilization in Palestine that could take the place of the Turkish except that of the Jews, who, already numbering one-seventh of the population, have given to Palestine everything that it has ever had of value to the world. How far is the ideal of a Jewish State in Palestine consistent with the interests of the British Empire? Or, rather, let us first ask what these British interests are, and only then, if they are found to be consistent with the creation of a Jewish State, to admit these ideal considerations as the allies of our military and political interests. This procedure will insure us against the undue influence of considerations that may be under the suspicion of being sentimental. At the same time it is well to recognise at the outset, that the most uncompromising *Real-Politik* will not leave out of account the emotions and ideals which are the most potent springs of human action. These ideal considerations must, therefore, have their place in any calculations of British policy. But in this chapter their place will be as reinforcements to the argument, not as its basis.

The subject falls naturally into three divisions: (1) the defence of Egypt, (2) the settlement and defence of the district east of the River Jordan, and

(3) the military and commercial frontiers of Palestine towards the north. Of these three divisions, the first is the most important and the most urgent for an authoritative settlement. Even if the war ended in the complete defeat of Turkey—which, however, should still continue to exist as a political unit—it would still be necessary to take special measures of precaution for the defence of Egypt. For the keystone of our system of defence in the East hitherto has been the benevolent neutrality of Turkey, and this removed, the whole question will have to be reviewed afresh, and our position adjusted to the new conditions. In such a case the less has often to be sacrificed to the greater, and we might under certain circumstances have to forego the prospect of advantage elsewhere for the sake of satisfying the more elementary requirements of our policy. For example, brilliantly as the future of British rule in Mesopotamia may promise, even that might have to be sacrificed in the event of a victory which came short of completeness, rather than consent to conditions on the frontiers of Egypt which compromised its security in war, or gravely increased the political difficulties of its government in peace. Egypt is our master interest in the East. And to say that, is to say that Palestine is our master interest; for Palestine, now as always, is the key to Egypt.

On its purely military side the problem of defending Egypt on the line of the Suez Canal, difficult as it was, was solved, thanks to very favourable conditions, in the first eighteen months of the present war. But it must be recognized that the Turks are

not very redoubtable antagonists in the attack, however stubborn they may be on the defence. Their attacks on the Suez Canal front were badly bungled, nor indeed were their natural resources or their preparedness in this war adequate to the task they set themselves. But there are in any case very grave drawbacks, as this war has shown, to the passive defence of a country along or in rear of its political frontier. However securely a house may be barred, the knocking at the door creates internal commotion and destroys the sense of security: damage may be done to the structure even though no permanent entry is effected. Further, Egypt is valuable to this country not only, or so much, for its own sake, as because it is the main channel of our communications with our Indian Empire. You can, it has been said, do anything with bayonets except sit on them, and communications which form the battlefront between two armies may be useful for many things but not for communicating. Nor are we, except in consequence of drastic political changes, ever likely to have such favourable conditions for the defence of Egypt as have prevailed in this war. If the next war finds our present frontiers unaltered, the enemy, whether he be the Turk or his more dangerous successor, will have behind him a country in which the communications have been well organized and enormous stocks of material accumulated for crossing the desert between Palestine and the Suez Canal. He will attack suddenly before we have had time to reinforce, and his object will be to overrun the whole of the desert between the Egyptian frontier and the Canal before we have had

time to recover from the initial surprise. It will not be necessary for him to cross the canal to accomplish his purpose, it will be sufficient for him to establish himself on one bank to destroy our communications through Egypt. We might meet these tactics by organizing the Sinai Peninsula as a great place of arms, but that would be a difficult and costly solution, for it would mean that the frontiers of Egypt would have to be manned on a scale hitherto unknown, except on the continent of Europe. Moreover, there are grave drawbacks to a campaign fought, as this campaign would have to be fought, on the far side of a desert. The existing frontier of Egypt, it must be remembered, is on the Palestine side of the desert, and whatever preparations we made, whether we held the political frontier of Egypt and fought with our backs to the desert, or whether we abandoned the political frontier and our subjects who live on it and fell back on the lines of the Canal, the objections are equally serious. Lastly, India can no longer be counted on to help to supply the demands of the garrison, for if we were in possession of Mesopotamia the defence of this now cis-Indian Empire would exhaust all the conveniently available reserve of her military strength.

It is clear that whatever happens in this war, peace will bring with it new military problems of great difficulty and complexity. They are all typified by the problem of the defence of Egypt, whose position in the British Colonial and Imperial system is as unique as it was in that of Rome. Egypt has been called the Achilles' heel of the sea-Empire of Britain. Everywhere else, with two exceptions

which are apparent rather than real, the British Empire is unconquerable except by a Power which has wrested from us the command of the sea. In Canada, it is true, we have an enormously long land frontier with the United States, but the United States is hardly as yet a great military Power, and in any case it is one of the firmest principles of our policy to cultivate its friendship by every possible means. India, too, has a great land frontier, but it is the best natural frontier that is to be found anywhere in the world, and the most easily defensible. Before any Power could get within striking distance of India we should have long notice and leisure to make all arrangements for its defence. It is not so with Egypt, where the most vital spot in our whole arterial system may be exposed to the attacks of a great military and unfriendly Power. The danger is not one that in the light of the experience of this war needs labouring now: the only wonder in most minds is that so few realized the magnitude of the danger before the war. The reason, of course, was that until within a few years ago it hardly occurred to any one to regard Turkey as an enemy. Egypt was not thought to be in any danger, nor was it generally realized what an anomaly our position there was in our whole system of Imperial defence, because Turkey was conceived rather as a buffer-state against aggression from the land side. The situation is now completely transformed. Between Turkey and Russia, our old rival in the East, there was no possibility of alliance. Between Turkey and Germany, our new rival, this alliance is an accomplished fact, and the alliance is so close that, for

military purposes, Turkey is Germany. Whatever reality there was in the old nervousness for the safety of India which made the long political feud between Great Britain and Russia, is now trebled and quadrupled in its menace. Not only has our buffer-state of Turkey been lost as an ally and turned into an enemy, but it is in a position to threaten us with a vital blow at the one joint in the armour of our sea power. The menace from Russia, no doubt, seemed real enough in the second and third quarters of last century, but by comparison with the danger from a Turkey under German influence, and backed by the enormous material resources of Germany, it is now seen to have been merely a turnip-and-candle ghost.

Germany at the outset of this war invaded Belgium to parry a danger which, even if it had been real, was not comparable to this. The danger was that Westphalia, the heart of her military strength, being on the west side of the country, was therefore exposed to attack through Belgium should the Allies use her territory as a way of approach. But whether Germany believed this to be a real danger or not, she based her whole plans for war on the theory that passive defence is bad, at any rate on her own frontiers, and is only tolerable when it is conducted on an advanced frontier well in the heart of her enemy's country. Rather than run any risk of having to fight a defensive campaign so near to the heart of things as her Westphalian front, she preferred even the certainty of having Britain's sea power against her. This same idea of fighting the war in a bastion well within the enemy's territory

has governed the whole of her strategy. Belgium and Northern France are German bastions for the defence of Westphalia, Austria for the defence of Silesia, Bulgaria and Turkey for the defence of Austrian Poland, Courland for East Prussia, and so on. No doubt this military practice has also its political side, but that only means that with Germany politics and strategy are two aspects of the same reality, as they should be. The theory underlying it is familiar to Englishmen from the naval dictum that the frontiers of England at sea are not our shores but the shores of the enemy. What Germany has done is brutally to transfer to continental land war a doctrine appropriate to sea, and recognized in the legal institution of the blockade, and the successes gained by her in this war make a powerful body of argument against merely passive defence which will have a permanent effect on the politics of the world. Applied to the defence of Egypt, the military experience of this war would counsel us against attempting to hold Egypt again in war-time by a mere passive defence of the frontier, or of any line behind that frontier.

But neither in Egypt or elsewhere is it possible, and it certainly is not desirable, for us to interpret the German doctrine that the best defence is in offence, as the Germans have interpreted it in this war. The state of preparedness to carry out an offensive on the neighbouring hostile territory before the enemy is in a position to forestall us, however natural it may be to a great military Power, is not natural to a Power like Great Britain whose whole system of defence is conditioned and based on supremacy at sea. At

sea it is the last extra knot of speed in a steamer for which one pays, and it is the day's gain in readiness for war for which one pays on land. For us to cultivate this feline promptness to spring both in land and in sea warfare would change the whole character of our defence system, and might even infect us with the plague of militarism against which we are fighting in this war. Some fresh application of the doctrine that defence is in offence must be found to suit our own case. Perhaps it may be found in the system of buffer-states which this country has developed more completely than the Continental countries. Just as the German practice has been an application to land warfare of British naval doctrine, on its political side it may be paralleled and deprived of its viciousness by the British system of buffer-states. The difference between the two is that whereas the German doctrine leads to attacks on the neutral buffers, ours has led us to undertake their defence. That is the modern form of the eighteenth century doctrine of the Balance of Power, a form, moreover, which makes for the preservation of distinctive national types, and not for their destruction and levelling down to monotonous uniformity.

Whatever the results of this war, it is likely to leave us with a land frontier such as we have never had before in our history, and whether we make great acquisitions of new territory or not, will not greatly affect the increase of our responsibilities, which is certain. Even if we do not create a new province of Mesopotamia, we must at least keep our hold on the Persian Gulf and its coast-line, which in

any case will be no light task, and for that matter might even be easier with possession of a considerable territory in the back country than without it. Similarly, the defence of Egypt is sure to be a greatly increased responsibility, even if we confine ourselves to its present frontiers. The fact has to be faced that the old formula of not increasing our military responsibilities by extension of our frontiers no longer stands in much relation to the facts. On the contrary, there is more to be said for the opposite contention, that only in an extension of our frontiers are we likely to find a relief from our increased military burdens. But that extension must be conditioned by sound political conceptions. It is common ground with all parties, whatever their views about the future size of the British Army may be, that it is to our interest to keep down the size of the army required for purely garrison duty. The most remarkable fact in the organisation of the British Empire is that though this country rules over peoples of alien race far more numerous in relation to our own population than any other country has ever attempted to rule, it does it with an army much smaller. Two advantages have prevented the Indian Empire from being a military burden proportionate to its size. The one is its incomparable natural frontier. The other is the system of buffer-states on the one frontier of India, the North West, which is exposed to attack. Of these buffers the more important is, of course, Afghanistan. Neither Egypt nor the Persian Gulf has either of these advantages. But if we extend our frontier, we may at any rate on the side of Egypt

acquire one of these advantages—a good buffer-state. A good natural frontier cannot be made by artificial means, but prescient policy may erect in front of Egypt an ideal buffer-state.

Clearly, then, on the Indian analogy what we would seem to require for the better and less burdensome defence of Egypt is a State to do for this frontier what Afghanistan has done for India. Without it our position in the south of what is now the Turkish Empire is going to be one of extraordinary difficulty, and whether regard is had to our political conditions, to the character of the British Empire as based mainly on supremacy at sea, or to the power of rapidly developing our military strength to meet a sudden emergency, it is most desirable that our happy experience in India should be repeated in the new cis-Indian region. For the buffer system has, on the whole, worked extremely well in India. There have, it is true, been conflicts in our frontier policy between the so-called "forward" school and the Lawrence school, but these have never turned on the merits of the buffer policy but on the degree of independence that the buffer-state ought to be allowed to possess. The cause of the troubles with Afghanistan which led to the two Afghan wars was whether her relations, real or suspected, with Russia were such as could properly be allowed in view of her rôle as buffer-state to India. The great war on the Indian frontier, again, in 1897, turned on whether or not it was desirable that there should be a secondary buffer between the administrative frontier of India and Afghanistan, or whether the actual frontier of India should be

extended up to the borders of the Ameer's dominion. These problems would not arise in any political arrangements that we might make in Palestine the better to secure our defence of Egypt. When we acquired responsibility for India the buffer-states of Persia and Afghanistan already existed, and the exact determination of the limits of their independence was a somewhat delicate question. But in Southern Syria the buffer-state is, at present, non-existent, and would have to be artificially created, and being our own creation there could be no doubt about its international status. It would from the outset be in close political dependence on the British Crown, in fact an integral part of the British Empire. Whatever success, therefore, that the buffer system has had in India might be expected to be repeated in Syria; on the other hand, the causes of the trouble and friction to which it has led from time to time in India would never come into being in Syria.

Another and even wider outlook can be found on this question. It is a curious fact that no other nation in Europe, either now or in the past, has known our distinction between "Colonial" and "Imperial" policy. Colonial policy in the strict sense, meaning the government of a country inhabited by people of the same origin as the people at the central seat of government, is hardly known to Europe. What Europe calls colonies are either mere "plantations," as they used to be called in England, *succursales* of the central firm, or Imperial possessions, like India. We alone among nations have known how to combine the Greek idea of a colony, a daughter state, reproducing in other

conditions the mentality of the mother state, with the Roman ideal of political unity. '*Imperium cum libertate*, elsewhere a paradox, is with us so much a truism that the boldness and originality of the conception are rarely realized. But even England has only transformed the paradox into political commonplace in countries of a temperate climate which are colonized by men of her own race. In Asia the problem is still unsolved, and it is broadly true that while an addition to the territory administered by us and not actually peopled by us is an increase of our burdens, the acquisition of a colony is ultimately an increase of strength but not of responsibility. To extend the area of British rule into Southern Syria, which is the conclusion to which our argument would seem to be leading, would, if its government were to be like that of India, be a great increase of our burdens, though one that it might be necessary to assume. On the other hand, if this extension were to be on the colonial pattern and the new territory were to be inhabited by people at the same stage of political development as ourselves, the increase of territory, so far from being a burden would be a source of added strength. Again, great as has been the assistance of the colonies to Britain, they have taken comparatively little interest in the welfare of those parts of the Empire like India which are governed and do not govern themselves. The reason is partly difference of race and political development, partly geographical remoteness. But a genuine colony or dominion in Southern Syria would associate a British dominion for the first time in the current work of Imperial organization and defence.

Nothing is more certain than that if Palestine became part of the British Empire it would never be colonized in any real sense by the sort of Englishmen who have made Canada and Australia. The only possible colonists of Palestine are the Jews. Only they can build up in the Mediterranean a new dominion associated with this country from the outset in Imperial work, at once a protection against the alien East and a mediator between it and us, a civilization distinct from ours yet imbued with our political ideas, at the same stage of political development, and beginning its second life as a nation with a debt of gratitude to this country as its second father.

So far, then, as the argument has gone, the conclusions reached are these : That on general strategetical grounds it is exceedingly desirable that the present too contracted frontiers to the East of Egypt should be extended. That the German military practice in the present war, the settled British practice in war at sea, and the use of the buffer-state system of Indian defence, all point in the same direction. That the buffer-state in Southern Syria might be expected to work with equal effectiveness as in India, and with greater smoothness. That a buffer-state in Syria would remove many of the stock objections to an extension of our military liabilities, and that if this buffer-state became a dominion or genuine colony it would be a source of great strength to us in the Eastern Mediterranean, both political and ultimately military; and, finally, that the only possible colonizers on a great and worthy scale in Palestine are the Jews. It seems desirable now to approach the question from a somewhat different

point of view, and to examine whether the geography and the history of Palestine throw any fresh light on the policy that would be best in the interests of Great Britain. In particular, if the argument for the creation of a buffer-state in Palestine holds, it is important to ascertain what general principles should govern the drawing of the new frontier.

As has already been observed, Palestine on the side of Egypt has three strongly marked natural divisions, the Maritime Plain, the Shephelah or Downs overlooking this plain from the east, and then, separated from the Shephelah by a rift, the Plateau of Judæa, the home of the Philistines who, because they lived on the easiest of the land routes between Egypt and Syria, between the civilization of the Nile and the Euphrates Valleys, and were, therefore, best known to the outer world, gave their name to the whole country of Palestine. The Jews might watch the clash of empires from their fastnesses in Judæa, but not the dwellers on the Plain. This country was the route followed by all the great invasions from Asia towards Egypt, and from Egypt into Asia. Egypt always attached very great importance to the possession, or at any rate the alliance of the cities, and especially of Gaza, whose possession was indispensable to an army marching either to or from Egypt. One principal fault of the present frontier of Egypt is that in assigning Gaza to Palestine it gives to the Turks the most famous bridge-head in history. The other end of the bridge may be put on the north side of the Vale of Ajalon where the Philistine plain ends and Samaria begins. It is one of the sorrows of their history that

owing to the Philistine possession of the Maritime Plain, the Jews never, except for one very brief moment, gained access to the sea. As a buffer-state for Egypt and in close alliance with it, Palestine might even have resisted successfully the Assyrian invasions. As it was, the conditions for successful defence against the north were never fulfilled in the ancient Jewish state, and the Prophets, being mainly anxious to maintain the spiritual purity of the people, were all for the policy of isolation from the quarrels of Egypt and Assyria. A new Jewish State in Palestine would begin with two immense advantages which history denied to the old order. It would have access to the sea and the firm friendship of Egypt.

In possession of the Shephelah, with the Plateau of Judæa as a citadel on the land side, and supported by sea supremacy, and by an army from Egypt operating in the Philistine Plain, the Jewish State, if it were revived, could make an invasion of Egypt from the north impossible.

In Judæa the interest of Egypt in Palestine ends, and if our sole object in concerning ourselves with Palestine were to make a bastion for the defence of Egypt, we might well content ourselves with the Maritime Plain, the Shephelah and Judæa. But a colony so restricted would have no future of its own. Having found it necessary to interest ourselves in Judæa for the sake of Egypt, we are compelled, in order to raise a vigorous self-supporting colony capable of rendering real help to Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean, to go beyond the bare idea of Egyptian defence. Judæa was the home of high religious thinking, but to fill a modern state, Judaism

cannot dispense with the wealthier and more fertile provinces of the north. So far the argument has concerned itself solely with the conditions of a satisfactory military defence of Egypt. It is now necessary to lay down the conditions on which we might hope to build up a great Dominion of Jews in the Eastern Mediterranean. To rest content with securing the military safety of Egypt would, so far as the Jews are concerned, be to perpetuate the tragedy of the separation of Israel and Judah. It would be to use the Jewish national spirit selfishly for our own ends, and to make the Jews no adequate return for their services to Egyptian defence.

The larger problem that now presents itself of how we may hope to form a state worthy of the Jewish people has many aspects. The practical political problem of how such a state, if established, could best be organized in its early stages, is outside the scope of this chapter, which is concerned solely with the relations of the new Palestine to its neighbours. Its relations with Egypt have already been discussed. Palestine would be under the same, or at any rate under a closely sympathetic sovereignty, and would ultimately, after passing through the intermediate stages, hope to become a self-governing Dominion, under British or under international sovereignty. The precise delimitation of the frontiers between two provinces of the Empire would present no great difficulties. The other frontiers, however, might raise some delicate problems. Should the war not make an end of the Turkish State, Palestine on the north might march with a weakened but still very formidable Turkey. The

complete success of the Allies, on the other hand, might give her a frontier with a French Syria, or even with the new Arabian State which Sir Stanley Maude's recent proclamation at Bagdad seems to envisage, should that State include Damascus. In any of these alternatives, it will be desirable that Palestine should have a good national frontier, though in so far as the new Arab State was under the influence or suzerainty of its creator, England, the frontier towards Arabia on the north might matter the less, the more Arabia extended from the desert past Damascus into Syria proper. On the east, again, Palestine would look towards Arabia, which after the extinction of Turkey would be the political, as well as the religious, headquarters of Mohammedanism. At the other end of this eastern frontier Palestine would again be in touch with the problem of the defence of Egypt, which is threatened not only from along the Mediterranean littoral but by the Hedjaz railway to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. At its northern end there might be difficulties over Damascus. Further, if the war ends in the establishment of the Lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys of a province of the new British Empire, it would obviously be of supreme importance on commercial and even possibly on military grounds too for us to retain land communications between our new possessions and the Mediterranean.

Samaria never resisted an invader, for, unlike Judæa, she lies open on every side. She was the earliest home of the Jewish spirit, and in her best days the centre of the greatest material power of the Jewish State. Her fertility is in singular contrast

with the general barrenness of Judæa, and the contrast reflects itself in the history of the people. "Judæa, earning from outsiders little but contempt, inspired the people whom she so carefully nursed in seclusion from the world with a patriotism which has survived two thousand years of separation, and still draws her exiles from the fairest countries of the world to pour their tears upon her dust, though it be amongst the most barren the world contains. Samaria, fair and facile, lavished her favours on foreigners, and was oftener the temptation than the discipline, the betrayer than the guardian of her own" (Sir George Adam Smith).

The tragedy of the history of the Kingdom of Israel is the gradual contraction of her frontiers on the north under the growing pressure of Syria. Gradually Galilee of the Gentiles—the County Palatine, as we might call it—crept southwards until by the time of Isaiah it was as far south as the Lake of Gennesaret, and in the time of the Maccabees had reached the Plain of Esdraelon. So far did foreign infiltration go in Samaria that the Jews had "no dealings with the Samaritans." But the national revival under the Maccabees extended to Galilee, leaving Samaria as a Gentile enclave within the circle of Judaism. Galilee is an indispensable part of a Jewish State and a British Colony. Without it, indeed, the State would inevitably contract to Judæa, fit home for a theocracy, but not for a modern State achieving financial independence and capable of a thriving commercial life.

The natural frontier of Galilee is the Lebanon range. Its delimitation towards the sea and the

question of how much of the Phœnician plain should be assigned to it is a question of detail rather than of political or military principle. In general, seeing that the new state would have the support of British sea power, wide access to the sea would be an advantage without any corresponding disadvantages. But the real port of Galilee would be Acre (Haifa), and if there were any prospect of the Jewish State gaining compensation on the east, she might well forego any claims to the southern end of the Phœnician plain, provided that the Bay of Haifa were secured her. Haifa is now connected by railway with Damascus. The trade of Damascus may either go to Beirut by the road built by French engineers across the Lebanon, or some of it may go along the famous " way of the sea," over Jordan, by " Galilee of the Gentiles " to Haifa, but it will hardly take a middle route to the site of ancient Tyre between Haifa and Beirut. Galilee will, therefore, not compromise its future by sacrificing possession of the old Phœnician coast north of Haifa.

On the other hand, extension, commercial if not political, in the direction of Damascus is most important. If in the event of the partition of Turkey there is to be a French Syria, it is hard to conceive of it without the city which is the port of Syria on the side of the desert.[1] On the other hand, the history of the ancient Jewish State is one of commercial and political failure largely because it was never able to establish itself firmly on the north. A Galilee in possession of Damascus would soon be the

[1] But see Appendix for text of Agreement relating to Asiatic Turkey.

main channel of trade between the Persian Gulf provinces and the Mediterranean. Haifa would revive the glories of ancient Tyre and the Jews would succeed to the commercial greatness of ancient Phœnicia. Moreover, on political grounds, there is much to be said for the view that, if we hold the valley of the Lower Euphrates, we ought also to have some political control over a city which is as much the port of Mesopotamia on the west as Basrah is on the south. Damascus, on the edge of the desert, is the meeting-place of the roads from the Mediterranean and from Bagdad and Mesopotamia. On the south side, pilgrims leave Damascus for the pilgrimage to Mecca by the railway which will emerge at the head of the Gulf of Akabah. But not only French sentiment and the natural ambition of the new Palestine will have to be considered, but also the interests of the new Arab State or States that are to be set up. The new Arabia should have an outlet towards the Mediterranean as well as towards the Persian Gulf, and Damascus would be its natural capital in the west as Bagdad on the south. In this respect the interests of the new Arabia and of Great Britain are closely allied, for the chief value of Damascus, after all, to the Power that holds it is as a stage in the communications between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and in this value Great Britain, if its projects in Mesopotamia are realized, is mainly interested. There is, therefore, at this north-eastern corner of Palestine some risk of conflicting interest between Palestine, French Syria, and the new Arabia. But after all the greatest interest, and one that all three

have in common, is peace and mutual co-operation in the immense work of developing the country. The interest of Palestine and Great Britain in Damascus is not so much political as commercial, and if Damascus becomes a "free port" and amicable arrangements can be made for the free transit of trade, the political sovereignty of Damascus is for us a question of comparatively minor importance. The Jews in Palestine will have to co-operate with the Arabs. With friendly relations between them, everything is possible to the new Palestine. Without them, nothing but failure.

Two rival schemes for the development of Asiatic Turkey may be said to have emerged in the course of this war. There is the great scheme of Germany, represented by the Bagdad railway project, of developing the trade routes of Mesopotamia and the East overland towards Asia Minor, Constantinople and the Central European political system. It was a project which before the war this country was not particularly interested to oppose—at any rate in the view of the Foreign Office—provided that certain conditions (such as the control of the head of the Persian Gulf, which is necessary to the safety of our Empire in India) were secured. But now that the war has been joined and Turkey has entered it as an ally of Germany, we can no longer view it with equanimity. It must now be defeated politically and commercially. An alternative scheme, of which a beginning has been made in the Mesopotamian campaign, would seek to divert the commercial and political gain that Germany hoped to achieve by the Bagdad scheme from Asia Minor and Northern

Syria to Southern Syria, Galilee and Egypt. The struggle is between the north-western and the western and south-western trade routes. We are interested in deflecting the trade to its southerly routes in any case, but directly interested if Palestine is to become a British Colony. The defeat of the Bagdad railway project and the assurance of a great commercial future to Palestine are thus different aspects of the one question. Haifa to the Persian Gulf is the British alternative to the German ideal of Bagdad to Berlin. That is one reason, amongst others, why Palestine is concerned so deeply with Damascus.

The just delimitation of the eastern frontier of Palestine is no less important than that of the north. The Jews themselves entered Palestine from the south-east after their long journeys in the wilderness of Sinai, and little would be gained by reviving the Jewish State and developing it into a British Dominion if the Jews were still to be left open to attack from the side by which the Jews first entered it. The hold of the Jews on the country east of Jordan was always somewhat precarious, and the only part which was definitely a part of the kingdom of Israel was Gilead between Moab and Hauran. Gilead remained part of Israel after the rest of the country east of Jordan had been lost, because, being a hilly land between two plateaux, it was more easily defended, and also because it was in its physical features an essential part of Israel. Its isolation, moreover, and its exposure to raids from Syria and Arabia made it the strongest supporter of Jewish unity, the most loyal

because the most exposed of provinces. But not only Gilead but as much of the country between Jordan and the desert as she can get without injustice to the new Arabia is an object of desire for Palestine. Nearly every traveller to Palestine has expressed his sense of the romance of the long range of hills which closes as with a straight rule the horizon to the east. On the plateau of which these hills are the sides are the best climate and some of the richest country in the whole of Western Asia. It is 150 miles from Hermon to the southern end of the Dead Sea; the average elevation is 2000 feet above the sea and more than 2000 above the Jordan valley. "Whether upon the shadeless plain of Hauran, where the ripe corn swayed like the sea before the wind, or upon the ridges of Gilead, where the oak branches rustled and their shadows swung to and fro over the cool paths, most of the twelve hours were almost as bracing as the dawn, and night fell not as in other parts of Palestine to repair but to confirm the influences of the day." "Eastern Palestine is a land of health. This was our first impression as we rose to Hauran by the steppes south of Pharpar, the wind blowing over from Hermon, and this was our last impression when we regretfully struck our tents on the pastures of Moab, where the dry herbage makes the breezes as fragrant as the heather the winds of our own Highlands" (Sir George Adam Smith). It is, moreover, a very rich agricultural country. Under the Greeks and Romans this country attained a quite remarkable degree of prosperity. The Decapolis, a league of Greek cities formed when it was the

policy of Rome to leave the country east of Jordan to her Hellenized Semitic vassals like Herod, and only union could give protection against Arab inroads from the desert, was a Greek counterpart of Jewish Galilee on the other side of Jordan, and its ruins still attest the heights of its civilization and its ancient prosperity. Even more famous were the cities of Hauran when annexation to Rome had brought this district security against foreign invasion.

Nor was this civilized belt between Jordan and the desert a narrow one. It extended eastwards to Kanatha and Bosra, a hundred miles east of Gennesaret. Mommsen gives a glowing account of the prosperity of this region after Tragan's annexation. "Bosra," he writes, quoting Wetzstein, "has the most favourable position of all the towns in Eastern Syria. Even Damascus, which owes its size to the abundance of water and to its situation protected by the eastern Trachon, will excel Bosra only under a weak government, while the latter under a wise and strong government must elevate itself in a few decades to a fabulous prosperity. It is the great market for the Syrian desert, and its long rows of booths of stone still, in their desolation, furnish evidence of the reality of an earlier and the possibility of a future greatness." Here the Jewish State might find consolation for Damascus, should that famous city be beyond its attainment, and from Hauran through Leja might run the railways connecting the new British Dominion of Palestine with the new British Empire in Mesopotamia, diverting the trade of the Turkish East from the orientation convenient to a Central European

Confederacy to one more suitable to the Power which has command of the Mediterranean, and is the reversionary of the interests of the southern parts of the Turkish Empire. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this country east of the Jordan to the future of the Jewish State. Through it runs the railway from Damascus to the Gulf of Akabah used for the pilgrimage to Mecca. It cannot remain under foreign control. Should the new Arab State come into existence and fulfil the hopes that are entertained of it, this railway will have enormous political as well as religious importance. We should have to respect the sacred character of a railway built with the pence of pilgrims to Mecca, although Turkey undoubtedly encouraged the scheme with the object of riveting her unpopular rule on the Arabians in the Hedjaz, now in full revolt. It should not, therefore, be handed over to the keeping of British Jews in Palestine. Some sort of compromise would have to be effected east of Jordan, and provided that the relations between the Jews and Arabs are as friendly as they have usually been in the past, this compromise would not be far to seek. The main point is to preserve complete freedom of commercial access between Palestine across the desert towards Mesopotamia. There is between Judaism and Mohammedanism no such antagonism as there has often been between Mohammedanism and Christianity, and the project of reviving the Arab Power side by side with the Jewish State is the strongest of arguments for compromise and adjustment of their claims where they seem to come into conflict.

Finally, at the extreme southern end of the eastern frontier at Akabah the danger that this port might be utilized as a basis for hostile submarines points to the necessity of some direct political control there, either through the Dominion of Palestine or by the creation there of an Imperial naval station.

The survey of the future Jewish State under the British Crown has now been completed. The argument began with the consideration of what was necessary in the interests of Egypt, and reached the conclusion that no sound system of defence for our communications with the East was to be found on the line of the Canal. Military prudence made it necessary to advance beyond that line and to form a bastion in front of the desert in defence of the most vital and vulnerable spot in our whole Imperial system. On the analogy of our Indian experience, however, it seemed important that we should make of this bastion a buffer-state, and the only race capable of forming such a state was the Jews. But Southern Palestine alone is not sufficient to form a modern State such as could ultimately, after a period of pupilage, form a self-sufficing State as a British Dominion, and not only become responsible for its own government and its own local defence but even, like other Dominions, tender voluntary help to the Empire in its trials. Thus, the argument was drawn insensibly into considering the conditions on which such a State might be formed with some prospect of success, and in sketching the frontiers of such a State regard has been had to the political and military failure of the old Jewish State. Its failures to secure great

political success were, it was found, due to its lack of access to the sea, to the want of a good frontier to the north and the west, and lastly to its friendlessness among the more numerous and powerful enemies who gradually encroached on the limits necessary to form a strong political and military unity. All these wants we are now in a position to supply. In return the new Jewish State may mediate between East and West, form a strong garrison of British power and sympathy in the Eastern Mediterranean and develop the communications between Palestine and our new Empire in Mesopotamia which it is hoped that this war will give us. The design is on an ample plan, for although the Jewish colonists would not for long enough be able to form a State capable of filling the frame, it is necessary, if the second Jewish State should avoid the fate of the first, that it should have room to breathe. More States, after all, have died of suffocation than of repletion, and there would be no excuse for this country if, having taken up a great ideal, it were to execute it only in miniature.

Throughout the argument has concerned itself mainly with material arguments, but it is now free, after reaching the conclusion that a *Real-Politik*, a rational British egoism, would find its satisfaction in the creation of a new Jewish State under the British Crown, to acclaim as allies those ideals which, from caution, not from conviction, the argument began by excluding from consideration. And these ideals are indeed the rods of Moses which swallow up all the other rods. We began this war on behalf of the conceptions of the international law

and injustice whose most conspicuous violation at that time was the invasion of neutral Belgium. Even if Belgium were all, there would still be amongst British people no regrets, no doubts. But great as the ideal of relieving Belgium from the invader may be, the ideal of restoring the Jewish State to Palestine is comparably greater, as a new birth is a greater thing than a recovery from a sickness. Belgium is one of the youngest and smallest of States. But the Jews are the oldest of living races, their services to the welfare of the world have lain in the highest spheres, and their literature has come closer to the human heart than that of any other nation. The Belgian captivity has lasted three years, the Jewish exile from their nationhood has lasted nearly two thousand years, never free from suffering and humiliation and the age-long pangs of deferred hope. Before the magnitude of this war, most ideals seem to shrink in size. But one ideal is the peer even of this war in magnitude and grandeur. It is the ideal of the restoration of the Jews to a country which, small and poor as it is, they made as famous as Greece and as great as Rome. And lastly, there is no ideal so grand in its scope and so wide in its appeal, so simple and so assured of ready comprehension and sympathy, nor is there any achievement that would exhibit the contrast between English and German political ideals so favourably to us, and so eloquently vindicate our own, as the establishment of a Jewish State under the British Crown.

CHAPTER XI

SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED

It is convenient to gather together some objections to the policy that has been outlined in these pages, and, even at the risk of some repetition of what has already been said, to exhibit a conspectus of the arguments advanced on the other side and of the answers to them.

It is important that this question of the re-establishment of the Jewish nation in Palestine should be dissociated completely from party and religious controversy in England. Unless the new Jewish State can be recommended to the British people on the broad grounds of national ideals or national interest, no sectional support will suffice to carry the project through, or, for that matter, would be desired by Jewish Zionists. On the other hand, if the national policy, real and ideal, favours this scheme, then no mere sectional objections ought to stand in the way of its adoption. Happily, the project comes into no opposition with any principle or theory of English politics, and all the objections that have so far been raised arise rather out of misunderstanding of the Zionist ideals or from a misapplication of political principle or theory.

These objections may be divided into four general

groups. First, there are the personal and racial, or what may be called generally the "prejudiced" objections. Secondly, there are the objections on the ground of religion. Thirdly, the objection is also made that it is against the interests of this country, weary Atlas as it is, staggering under the vast orb of its fate, to assume any fresh burdens; and that, even if the project were sound in itself, it is unfair for our own people to undertake the responsibility for it. Lastly, it is said that a British Protectorate is not the best solution of a problem of a new Jewish State, but an international status, which, it is argued, could more easily be arranged in the peace negotiations than an establishment of a Brtish Protectorate.

Let us take first what may without disrespect be called the prejudiced objections.

Objection 1. "Why should we trouble our heads to set up a nation in a country for which it is not fighting itself? Why should British soldiers die for an ideal, which, however admirable in itself, is remote and unconnected with their welfare?"

This objection, which in one form or another is very frequently made, is based upon a complete misunderstanding of this war as it affects the Jewish people. It is emphatically not true that they are holding apart from this war, watching it as disinterested spectators, and waiting for what they can pick up at the end of it. On the contrary, for the Jews this has been one of the most tragic and cruel wars in the whole of their history. For the Jews, being of all nations and of none, have in this war fought in the armies of all the nations. For them it

has been a civil war, a terrible destruction of what lies nearest to the heart of the idealistic Jews, their conception of nationality. It is a war which the Jews, as such, had no hand in making; and for these, if for no other reasons, it will be no more than justice if a war which injured them in a way in which it has injured no other people should bring them some recompense at its close. Nor is it true that the Jew, as such, has never fought for Palestine. The Zionist Mule Corps in Gallipoli was in its patriotic inspiration an army for the recovery of Palestine, and had our military policy in the first six months of the war been more wisely directed, by this time there would have been in Palestine a number of separate Jewish corps engaged in recovering for themselves their patrimony. If Jews, as such, except in the Zion Mule Corps in the new Jewish regiment, and as soldiers of the armies of the Entente, have not fought for Palestine, the fault is not in them but in the direction of the war, and in the fact that, as subjects of the various combatant Powers, they were already fighting on every battlefield of Europe.

Objection 2. "The Jews are a recalcitrant people; they were hard to manage by all the Empires to which they belonged in the past, and they will be difficult subjects as members of the British Empire."

This objection undervalues the distinction between the British Empires and all other empires. Alone among the Empires of history the British Empire has known how to reconcile the freedom of national development with beneficial union and loyalty to a

common ideal. Nor can any valid argument be drawn from past failures. The Jews of Palestine in the empires of the ancient world were a conquered people, and, however humanely the conquest is made, however tolerant the political settlement which follows, it inevitably leaves behind it much bitterness. But a Jewish State set up at the end of this war would be composed not of a conquered people bearing a grudge against the victors but of a people receiving some recompense for the cruel wrongs of history, and owing much gratitude to the nation or nations who had helped to right them. Of all the charges brought against the Jewish people that of ingratitude is the least substantiated by facts. On the contrary, they have throughout their history been the warmest of friends to those who have in any way befriended them. When Julius Cæsar was assassinated his chief mourners in Rome were the Jews. For Alexander they had the same warm admiration, and with very few exceptions they were the most loyal and useful subjects of the old Arabian Empire. It is not, therefore, true to say that even in the past the Jews have not known how to subordinate themselves to discipline or to the just claims of Imperial unity. In so far as they have shown lack of political capacity the causes have rather been religious. The Jewish State at the return from captivity was a theocracy, and between a theocracy and a secular government there is never a possibility of real and perfect reconciliation. A spiritual and secular power have never existed side by side in perfect amity unless their spheres were rigidly marked off one from the other, and that was

impossible under the old Jewish theocracy. There is no chance that these past errors will be repeated, for the inspiration of the modern Jewish Zionist movement is on its political side purely secular. This is not to say that the religious enthusiasm of the Jews is not, especially in Russia, one of the motives for desiring a return to Jerusalem, but for the modern Jew there is no chance of his ever allowing the spiritual power to obtain political predominance.

Objection 3. " Jews will not fight for their country in Palestine. They will always be quarrelling with their neighbours and expecting the protecting or suzerain Power to rescue them from their difficulties."

But surely there is no race which has done more fighting for the soil of Palestine than the Jews. There is no national type which has been more tenacious of its individuality, and unless we are to suppose that the Jews are constituted differently from every other nation in the world, or that they are physical cowards—suppositions which are contradicted by the facts of their history—love of their country would lead in their case, as it does in every other, to willingness to make sacrifices. How soon the Jews in Palestine will be able to take the responsibility for their own self-defence would depend almost entirely on the amount of emigration. There would be a period in the political development of the country when the Jews would be unequal to this task, and would require aid from others. But if the emigration went on at the pace which may be reasonably expected, this period will not last long, and the local defence of Palestine will cease to be a burden on

the military resources of the protecting power, precisely as it has been in the other subject dominions of the British Crown.

As for the non-Jewish races in Palestine, their interests will be the special care of the protecting Power or Powers; nor is there any reason to fear that the Jews would wish to repeat the errors of the past.

Objection 4. "Jews will not go to Palestine. They are too comfortable here; they are a super-civilized race, and not the stuff out of which pioneers in a new and rough country are made."

On the contrary, the Jews are one of the greatest colonizing races in the world. The fact that they can adapt themselves to a civilization without losing their identity does not negative their power to create a very distinct and definite civilization of their own. In their management of their own internal affairs the Jews have shown a genius for organization; indeed, without it they would have disappeared long ago as a separate race. But the decisive answer to this objection is the success of the Jewish colonies in Palestine. Several books have been published lately giving some account of the establishment of these colonies and of the remarkable progress, material and moral, that they have made.[1] Here it is sufficient to chronicle the fact that in the whole of the Turkish Empire there are no settlements that have so completely demonstrated the enormous waste that is going on under the present

[1] Notably *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, edited by H. Sacher (John Murray); and Nawratzki's *Die Jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas.*

regime than the transformation that has been effected by these colonies in Palestine. Mr. Tolkowsky, who knows Palestine, and has had much practical experience of the conditions of work in Palestine, has summed up the conclusions of these observations in a passage of eloquence and force—

"The general impression which emerges from the facts set forth above seems to be that the Jews, in all their activities in Palestine, have shown themselves to be conscientious and skilful administrators. With limited means and without any support from the local Government—nay, often in the face of its frank ill-will—they have succeeded within a generation in setting up a colonial organization which, for the country as a whole, is a most powerful leaven of progress. It is true that they may have derived many valuable and instructive hints from the experience of the great colonizing nations of Europe, and that the high average of intelligence and the progressive spirit shown by the farmers and other Jewish immigrants have notably lightened their task; but the grand secret of their success lies in their two-thousand-years' longing for Zion, in their passionate love for these plains and mountains which saw the growth and flowering-time of their race, in that fierce idealism which makes them cling to the soil of Palestine, ready to fertilize it with their sweat and to suffer the direst privations and the cruellest martyrdoms rather than be forced to leave it a second time."

What has been done on a small scale and in the face of great political difficulties can surely, when national pride and a Government that is actively

supporting its ideals has taken the place of the backward Ottoman Government, be accomplished on a larger and worthier scale. There is no need to fear lack of immigrants after the war; the difficulty will rather be to limit the Jewish immigration to numbers such as the country can assimilate. For the economic difficulties of Europe after the war will be very grave, and though the stimulus to political persecution will have been removed, notably in Russia, the economic stimulus will operate with at least equal strength. The fascination of a new country, starting free of debt, will hardly be resisted in a Europe overburdened with taxation and distracted with quarrels between capital and labour. How to regulate the immigration to the power of the land to support the immigrants is a question that is discussed in a later chapter.

The religious objections to the restoration of the Jews generally take one of two forms. The first turns on the difficulty of the custody of the Holy Places. This is a detailed question, and is to be solved not by argument but by political regulations. Here it is sufficient to say that the Zionists have never shown a trace of religious intolerance. Their only interest in the Holy Places is that they shall not be so many or so extreme as to limit their patrimony of Palestine which, as it is, is none too large for the immigration that may be expected in the next generation. The Holy Places will have to be scheduled by the Conference in which representatives of the religious denominations should be present, and their area will have to be circumscribed within reasonable limits. Further, the schedule would have

to be compiled once and for all, and it would need to be understood that later no additions should be made. Subject to these conditions, the Zionists are indifferent to the detailed regulations that should be made for the custody of these places. There are, of course, objections, not on the ground of religion but on the grounds of nationality to the creation of a number of enclaves of separate jurisdictions, but as the question of the Holy Places will hardly arise until the principle of Jewish nationality is recognized, and as this war itself has been a great and tragic vindication of that principle, there is no reason to suppose that a European Conference will eat up its own child, and, having given the boon of nationality, detract from it by unreasonable regulations.

But the most serious form of the religious objection is the sentimental one. It is, after all, a long time since there was a Jewish State in Palestine, and since it disappeared other religions have waged bitter wars for the possession of ground sacred not to the Jewish God but to the Jewish Son of God. The Crusades roused the widest and deepest of religious emotions that have ever swept Europe, and they take rank with this war and Napoleon's wars in the fearful toll of human life that they have exacted. The memory of that struggle still lingers, if only half consciously, in the mind of the Church. Whatever political ambitions the Church still retains their taproot is to be found in the soil of Palestine. Not only are the Christian Churches interested in this way in the political future of Palestine, but Jerusalem, next to Mecca and Medina and perhaps Cairo, is the holiest city of the Mohammedan religion.

Palestine was the first of the foreign conquests of the Mohammedan Caliphs, and the great bulk of the population in Palestine to-day is Arabian and Mohammedan. The Arab tends to feel towards the Jewish restoration in Palestine much as the Anglo-Saxon and Norman elements in England would feel to a proposal to restore the Welsh to their ancient primacy in Britain. Between these two streams of political and religious sentiment it is not easy for Jewry and for the national ideal of Jewry to find a sure foothold. It could only be obtained on the basis of absolute religious tolerance for all. It is not, however, necessary that Judaism should be the established State religion in Palestine, though as the Jewish population grew it would naturally tend to be the dominant religion. Religious freedom and equality should be one of the articles of the constitution of any Jewish State in Palestine, and there is not the least sign of any reluctance on the part of the Zionists to recognize the principle in all its implications. If that point is made perfectly clear and suitable guarantees are taken we should have no difficulty in cutting away the claims of either Christianity or Mohammedanism to influence the political future of the country. Neither Christianity nor Mohammedanism has any future as a propagandist creed; their greatness will lie in the spiritual rather than in the temporal world, in the influence they can exercise on the lives of their adherents rather than in any interference with political forces. Indeed, neither religion can afford at such a time as this to place itself in opposition with the principle of nationality fertilized with all the blood that has

been shed in this war. It is only just to add that, as far as is known, the political propagandist side of religion meets with no sympathy in any of the Foreign Offices of the Great Powers. If we are making it a condition precedent to a Jewish State in Palestine that it shall not be a theocracy, Jews on their side have a right to ask in return that there shall be no attempt to set up Christian or Mohammedan theocracies, or even to use the religious passions of these religions to thwart the purer passion of Jewish nationalism.

We now come to the second set of objections.

It is said that the French claims to Palestine are so strong that any attempt to deny them would imperil our friendly relations with that country. But are the French claims so strong? And what exactly are they based upon? The chief historical foundation is the part that France (or rather the Franks) played in the Crusades. It should be noted that the Franks of the Crusades are not by any means identical with the modern French. Godfrey of Bouillon was a descendant of Charlemagne and his country was Brabant, now a province of Belgium. Bouillon, from which he took his title, was also in Belgium, and in the army which he led there were barons of Germany and Lorraine as well as France; Stephen of Chartres, Robert of Normandy, Raymond of Provence, and Bohemond—these were all French names. But all the leaders in the Crusades were willing to enlist men in any country through which they passed. Raymond, for example, drew a part of his army from Spain and another part from Italy. But this argument, based on the nationality of the

first Crusaders, surely proves either too much or too little; too much, for if it were accepted as it stands it would give the French the right to Sicily and other Norman conquests of the Mediterranean, not to speak of this country, which was also conquered by the Normans; too little, for if the prevailing nationality of the first Crusaders is held to give France a title to all Syria and Palestine it seems hard that the later Crusaders, who did even more fighting, should have bequeathed no sort of claim to their nationals and the land where they shed their blood. In so far as the Crusades may be held to have pointed to any political solution in this war, it would rather be in the direction of internationalization (for the Crusades were an international movement), or, failing that, partition. Partition is the solution preferred in these pages, and the lines of partition suggested are certainly not unfavourable to France. Of the territories nominally subject to the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, Palestine formed rather less than a third. Antioch, Tripoli, Edessa, Armenia, and all the other countries north of the line between Sidon to the Sea of Galilee are outside Palestine, and the Jews certainly would put in no claim for them. They comprised the richest and in many respects the most famous of all the provinces of Syria. The fact, again, that Napoleon fought a brilliant campaign in Palestine can hardly be said to establish a claim. The British, too, at Acre under Sir Sydney Smith fought very well in Palestine, and in fact won. But no Englishman would dream of founding an argument for the British Protectorate of Palestine on the defence of Acre, any more than that he would claim the coast

between Egypt and Mount Carmel, the ancient land of Philistia, on the ground that Cœur de Lion fought so well there, and that his name is still used as a bogey by Turkish mothers to frighten their children.

The religious argument for French claims is more difficult, for the Turks undoubtedly recognized the French kings as the natural guardians of the Christian holy places. Yet this is an exceedingly dangerous argument for France to use, because it would bring her into opposition with the Greek Church, which has always disputed the religious claims of the Western Church in Palestine. If Russia has ceased to base political claims on the rights of her Church in Palestine, it is hardly reasonable for France, since the complete separation of Church and State, to use the Church to further its secular aims. It would be in the highest degree unfortunate to revive the old rivalry between the East and Western Churches, by giving Palestine over to the French representatives of the Western claims. The amity and union amongst Christians which is so desirable in Palestine as elsewhere would surely be best served by a political self-denying ordinance excluding both France and Russia from secular sovereignty in Palestine, and by an arrangement which should place the religious guardianship of the Holy Places in the hands of both Churches impartially. This complete religious toleration could be more easily achieved under a country professing neither the Roman Catholic faith nor that of the Greek Church. Indeed, the very fact of basing an argument for political sovereignty on ecclesiastical grounds must inevitably be the seed of future discords, for it would imply the

intention of ousting the alien Church from any sort of rivalry.

The cultural argument is stronger. Syria, says M. Nadra Moutran in his book, *La Syrie de Demain*, owes to France the schools which have given her her intellectual education, her public works which have assured her relative material well-being, and, better still, her moral protection which has kept up the courage of her emigrants, and without and within has preserved it from succumbing to the odious tryanny of the Turks.

M. Moutran is a French-speaking Arab who argues very eloquently for a French Protectorate over Syria, and it would not be easy to exaggerate the work that France has done in the Levant. The greater part of that work has been done in the north of Syria outside the boundaries of Palestine, and, so far from disputing France's claim to Syria outside Palestine, this country, even if it conquered Syria without assistance from French troops, would deem it its duty to hand over the territory (or so much as the Arabs could not justly claim) to France; and in whatever it did in Northern Syria, whether from the direction of Mesopotamia or of Alexandretta or of Palestine, it would regard itself as the trustee of French and Arab interests. But whatever France has done in Palestine would be amply safeguarded by stipulations and guarantees about religious tolerance, which would be a necessary part of any deed setting up a Jewish State in Palestine.

The discussion of our relations with France in the Levant has suffered from an absurd but none the less dangerous reticence on our part. In France

discussion has been exceedingly frank; there is a movement which has gone almost unchallenged, claiming for France *La Syrie Integrale* from the boundaries of Egypt up to the Taurus. To take refuge in silence is not fair either to ourselves or to the French, for it raises hopes in France which we ought not to encourage. Sooner or later the conflict of interests, if France had Palestine, would become apparent, and the wise course surely is to anticipate and prevent future friction by candid discussion now.

A further set of objections is based on our own domestic interest. These are put in many different ways. For example, *The Spectator* has argued that we have enough Protectorates as it is and that their number is already a serious embarrassment to those who try to think out schemes of federation or closer political union within the Empire. This argument might be valid against the annexation of Mesopotamia, or even against the annexation of Egypt itself, or against any interference in Palestinian affairs which stopped short of setting up a Jewish Dominion there. It is difficult to imagine on what terms Egypt could ever be an active party on a general Imperial Council, and in Mesopotamia the political difficulties in the way of a more unified Imperial system would be greater than they are even in India now, while Southern Palestine, held as a military work for the better defence of Egypt, would hardly acquire a definite political status at all. These objections, however, would not apply to a Jewish dominion in Palestine. Some time would elapse before this dominion was self-sup-

porting or self-defending, but that if it were once established and successful, such a community would be incapable of attaining to equality with the rest of the Empire is a proposition not to be thought of. It would, intellectually, be keenly progressive in thought. Its inhabitants might be expected to be commercially prosperous and to expand their influence throughout the neighbouring countries. Indeed, the objection as time went on would probably be that their energy was too restless and their political activity too progressive. It would certainly not be a Protectorate that would in any sense be a political handicap to this country.

Another form that these objections take is that we are undertaking military responsibilities which it would be wiser to avoid. Had this objection been raised and prevailed when our occupation in Egypt was in question, it would have been logical and intelligible enough. There have been those who have argued that it would be well for us to clear out of the Mediterranean altogether and let the Mediterranean once more become a Latin Lake as it was in the past. Gladstone, as late as 1893, had thoughts of evacuating Egypt, but by this time was in so hopeless a minority on the subject that the idea was definitely and finally dropped, and the re-conquest of the Soudan by Lord Kitchener made still more remote any idea that we should evacuate Egypt. Rightly or wrongly, we have chosen to stay in Egypt, and we have since the war began regularized our position and converted a mere occupation into something resembling a Protectorate. Further, we have made ourselves

responsible for Mesopotamia, at least as far north as Bagdad, and though the natural outlet of this country is to the Persian Gulf, it is natural that we should also wish to obtain some overland route to the Mediterranean. Here are two countries, Egypt and Mesopotamia, which all through history have been closely connected, and having acquired the one and being in a fair way to acquire the other, the arguments, commercial and military, for bridging the interval between the two become exceedingly strong. If this bridge were likely to be difficult and costly to maintain, if it held out no prospects of economic and political gain, it might be desirable to leave the building of it to others, to content ourselves with possessing the banks of the desert and leave others to maintain the communications between. It is, however, to be observed that without Palestine we should not even possess the banks, and a system which set up a British Protectorate in Mesopotamia and allowed other Powers to come between it and the Protectorate of Egypt does not carry any of the marks of permanency about it. When we see the tremendous anxiety there has been in Africa about the Cape to Cairo railway it needs little imagination to foresee similar desire for communication between Cairo and Bagdad. No doubt communication might lie across the territory of others, but whatever arrangements we make with regard to the future Arab Empire it would at any rate seem desirable that we should possess the Palestine shore of the desert.

The present frontier of Egypt is clearly unsatisfactory, and even those who oppose the project of

establishing a cis-Indian suzerainty from Cairo to the Persian Gulf are ready to admit that some extension of the Egyptian frontiers may be necessary. They are, however, anxious to restrict these changes to the smallest dimensions. The smallest change that would be of any military service whatever would be to extend our frontier so as to include the Plateau of Judæa. But in political as in other matters the small alterations may be the most expensive. In extending our rule over Judæa we should have to face quite as many political difficulties as we should by a bold plan of reconstructing Palestine on broad and generous lines. More important still, we should not acquire by this means any fresh reserves of strength. Judæa is too narrow and confined and economically too unproductive ever to be able to stand alone as a State or to support a large and prosperous population capable of defending itself and acting as an advance-garrison to the defence of Egypt. It would be a mere Protectorate of the type of which we already have too many representatives in the British Empire. The great advantage of the larger scheme is that by setting up a new and prosperous community at a stage of political civilization already not far behind our own, we should acquire not a Protectorate but a Dominion capable of protecting itself and assisting in our protection; not a country which would have to be garrisoned permanently by British troops but one that would garrison itself by its own patriotism.

The argument against further extending British military responsibility is an exceedingly strong one

and deserving of the greatest respect, but it is one that needs to be applied with caution and discrimination. Looking back on British Colonial history in the nineteenth century we are constantly struck by the extreme costliness of the reluctance once common to both political parties to extend the area of British sovereignty. South Africa is a notorious example. Here British policy for the better part of a generation was obsessed by the fear of the responsibilities that an extension of boundaries would bring. There was a time when we might have extended our rule over the Orange Free State, not merely without opposition but at the actual invitation of the people. We might even by the grant of representative institutions have reconciled the South African Republic to our first annexation. It is curious that Liberals, who did such a great work in extension of self-government to the colonies, should not have seen that by that very act they were cutting away the ground from beneath their objections to the increase of the area of British sovereignty. Had it trusted the colonists, English and Dutch, of South Africa and given self-government freely and early, this country need have had no fears of enlarging the bounds of British sovereignty to its present extent. Instead, by contracting the area of British sovereignty they made and deepened divisions against Nature and geography—divisions that had to be removed later at the cost of a terrible war. The chief cause of these blunders was our refusal to distinguish between the principles applicable for Imperial system of government under which the burden and responsibility falls on

the Home Government, and a colonial system under which the burden is shared from the first by the colonists and later entirely taken over by them. It makes all the difference whether the political state of the people is such as to encourage the hope that they will soon be capable of governing themselves, and as a corollary of defending themselves. If there is ground to think that, then the increase of territory is an increase not of responsibility but of power. If there is no ground the objection to increasing the responsibility may be serious, and in any case has to be carefully considered. There is no such ground in Egypt, in India, or in Mesopotamia, and to these places the objection applies. But it need never have applied in Canada or in South Africa, nor will it apply in Palestine, provided it is peopled with colonists who are patriotic and fit to govern themselves and on occasion to fight for themselves. It is curious and even perverse that the objection should be raised in the case of Palestine where it does not apply, and not heard of as an objection to a political acquisition in Mesopotamia where, for what it is worth, it certainly does apply. Mesopotamia will undoubtedly involve serious increase of our military responsibilities, though that is not to say that it should not be undertaken, but the annexation of Palestine will bring us not further responsibility but a fresh source of power.

If we had cramped the development of Canada and Australia we should have been in far greater difficulties in this war than we have been. Cramp the natural development of Palestine as a Jewish

State and you increase your responsibilities. Give it full scope and you will not only not increase them but actually lessen them.

Look at the matter from another point of view. If one had to single out the cause which has inflicted most constant embarrassment on our foreign policy for the last hundred years and more one would say without hesitation it is our failure in Ireland. The Irish emigrants to America have been a persistent source of estrangement between the two countries and have done far more than the intrinsic merits of the political disputes between us to prevent an entente between the two great branches of the English-speaking people. Supposing that the Irishman who left his own country for one of our colonies had gone out not with feelings of estrangement and the sense that he was a member of a conquered country denied its national rights, but as an equal partner and as a missionary of Empire which no longer stood for the denial of his nationalism but for its realization as in Canada, Australia and in South Africa, can it be doubted that the ties between us and the colonies, strong as they are, would have been stronger still without the Irish in permanent opposition, and that by this time we might have been much nearer to a closer political union than we are? And if Irishmen in America, instead of misinterpreting British policy to their new country, with the rancour of an old and unremedied grievance, had been the supporters of that policy, and had carried with them the devotion to their old country which had given Ireland self-government, can it be doubted that the entente between America and

England, which the present world tragedy has established, would have been a powerful force for freedom in the world long before this war began? If this is true of the Irish it is true of the Jews, too. The fact that Jerusalem, the capital of Judaism, was also a capital of a Dominion of the British Empire, and won by British arms, would give this country a great and beneficial influence in every country of the world where there is a community of Jews. They would owe everything to England—the end of their long exile, their restoration to the full rights of nationhood, and their possession of a State centre which a political man must have if he is to attain to his full dignity. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this influence in the international politics of the world, and it argues a strange lack of political imagination to balance the increased military responsibility of the acquisition of Palestine—responsibilities that will in any case have to be incurred in Egypt if we go without Palestine—against an accession of power so enormous as has been indicated.

The last objection that is sometimes heard is that the best solution of the problem of a new Jewish State will not be a British Protectorate but an internationalized State, or at any rate a State under international guarantee. Another form this objection sometimes takes is the suggestion that the United States of America should assume the Protectorate, and yet another form is the suggestion of an Anglo-French Condominium. Of all these alternatives the condominium is undoubtedly the worst. The unvarying experience of all con-

dominiums is that they are a period of rivalry between the joint rulers. Both are preparing for the inevitable break-up of the joint rule and are trying to hasten it by every means in their power. For the country as a whole nothing is done because neither ruler is certain which part of the country will fall to him. Each feels himself a tenant who is unwilling to improve the property until he has the freehold. Moreover, the usual end of a condominium is partition, and of all things that a Jewish State would fear coming into existence after nearly two thousand years of waiting, partition is the worst, for it would restore the disunion which had such disastrous results in the early history of the Jewish State. Internationalization is a less serious evil. There are those who fear that under any international system the dominant race in Palestine would be the Arabs, but it is not easy to understand on what ground that fear is based. There is no reason whatever why an international authority should not set itself out to restore the Jewish State as it formed, to compare small things with great, the principality of Albania before the war, or set out at the Berlin Conference to found the Congo State. But even if the Jewish State were placed under international guarantees, some one Power would have to act as policeman. The Power that is in possession in Egypt is the natural authority to undertake this work, but many of the advantages claimed in these pages for a British protectorate in Palestine would be secured by an American Protectorate, supposing the United States cared to undertake responsibility

so far from her own shores. The Jews and Americans get on well together; American politics are wide and tolerant, and by reason of her very remoteness America would have no conceivable interest except to promote a strong, healthy Jewish State in Palestine. On the other hand, America in Palestine could never be a danger to Egypt, and there is something to be said for keeping the new Jewish State out of the swirl of political rivalry. Whether America would think this great service to humanity worth the heavy cost and anxiety that the Protectorate in its early stages might cause her, before the young community had grown strong, is a question that only she can answer. A few months ago most people would have answered the question in the negative, not through any lack of faith in American idealism but because they thought the principle of isolating herself from European politics was too firmly rooted ever to be disturbed. That principle, however, had already been greatly modified by the events of the war, which had shown how great the shrinkage in the size of the world has been. In another generation New York will be nearer in time to Berlin than Manchester was to London a century ago, and London nearer to New York than San Francisco is now. Mr. Wilson's suggestion of a League of Peace, and later his entry into the war, were acknowledgments of these physical facts no less than an expression of his political idealism and his conviction that the United States could no longer live in isolation but might have to be her European brother's keeper. But if the United States is to be a member of a League of Peace it

may be well not only that she should have a hand in the writing and making of the peace, but also that she should give some help in the administration of the peace. She would in any case be one of the trustees of the settlement, and in Palestine she might be a managing trustee.

Further, it is clear that whoever acquired the sovereignty of Palestine would do so not in her self interest—the arguments advanced in these pages for a British Protectorate over Palestine avowedly exclude any idea of the selfish exploitation of the country—but as a trustee for a ward in international Chancery. There is no reason whatever why the idea of a Chancery ward should not find complete expression in some international areopagus to which disputes could be referred, in which it was alleged that the natural interests of the country were being subordinated to those of the protecting Power—in which, in a word, an action would lie for a breach of trust. Neighbouring Powers, too, might conceivably be given the right of action in the same court if they can establish that the protecting Power is abusing its position as trustee to oppose their natural development.

There is really no essential opposition between the kind of Protectorate contemplated in these pages and a system of international guarantees, but the advantage of a British Protectorate would be that the whole British Imperial theory negatives the idea that a Dominion exists for the selfish advantage of the so-called Mother Country, and recognizes its right to realize its own individuality to the fullest extent. Thus Palestine under a British Protectorate

would in the natural scheme of things be in the position of a ward, and if it were desired to erect additional guarantees of an international character, that could be done with less embarrassment to a British Protectorate than to a Protectorate by any other country.

CHAPTER XII

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESTORATION

THE first object of any political settlement of Palestine must be the establishment of a State whose civilization shall be predominantly Jewish and its ultimate self-government. A predominantly Jewish civilization under Turkish rule would not satisfy the Zionist ideal, and reasons have been advanced in these pages for thinking that it would not satisfy British interests either. Such a State would be a prey to international intrigues, and built on a shifting foundation, for every one is agreed that sooner or later Turkish rule must disappear. If it were merely a question of waiting, the Jews, who have waited so long, could wait a little longer, but it is not merely that; the intrigues that would begin in a large and growing community under the political rule of the Turks would be fatal to the future unity and would make of a great national ideal a mere chess-board of the Chancelleries. From this fate both Palestine and Jewry wish to be spared, and for that reason the rock foundation of any stable Palestine must be the abolition of Turkish rule. Again, the new Palestine would embody not merely a cultural or religious ideal but a political ideal. To establish Jews in Palestine and not to provide them with a political future of their own is merely to

change their climate and not the grievance against which Zionism is a protest. They are a community as it is in all countries of the world, and though a great Jewish community in Palestine would have the satisfaction of living in its old home, so long as it had no separate political existence it would merely be a change of scenery, not the satisfaction of the Jewish craving for a home of their own. For they live in a lodging, not a home, who cannot make it what they wish. The prospect of self-government is, therefore, essential to a settlement.

It is because self-government is easier of approach within the British Empire than in any other that the Jews, and not English Jews only, have looked forward to inclusion within the British Empire. But Zionism is an international, not a national movement, and British allegiance is for them not an end in itself but the means to an end. If the great object of political freedom could be obtained in any other way Zionists would certainly raise no objection. They are, therefore, not committed to any definite form of international status, and while they have a strong preference, provided it satisfies the two essential conditions that are indicated, Jews have an open mind with regard to the exact form of their international status. The whole burden of the argument of these pages has been that a British Protectorate of Palestine is highly desirable in our Imperial interests. But should objections against a British Protectorate prevail, then of all other possible settlements the one most desirable in British interests is a Protectorate by the United States.

This war has thrown back the material progress of

Palestine very considerably, and it will take time to repair the injury. But even if there had been no war it is obvious that to throw a country so small and economically so backward open to unregulated immigration of Jews would be to invite a disastrous failure. The re-peopling of Palestine by the Jews must be a gradual process, it must be regulated in accordance with the needs of the country and with its power to provide a tolerable existence for the immigrants. There should be a clearly-thought-out programme of economic and industrial development and the stream of immigration should be turned on and off and directed into channels that are desirable in the interests of the country. In a sentence, the problem is not unlike that of military and labour recruitment for the purposes of war. It is no metaphor to regard it as one of national service. National service in this war, whether in the army proper or in the army of labour, was a failure so long as it was governed by enthusiasm alone or by merely general appeals for labour volunteers. The national service of re-peopling Palestine would, under the same conditions, be a failure too, and the failure might be disastrous, for it would involve the credit of Zionism as a practical idea and postpone the national aspirations of the Jews indefinitely. Of all the problems that the new Jewish State will have to face, by far the most important is the formation of a definite economic programme for the development of the country and the ordering of immigration in accordance with it to fit their programme.

So clearly has this truth been seen that the problem

has presented itself to many minds on its practical side as one of business pure and simple. Here is an estate to be developed, how best can it be done? The formation of a company has naturally suggested itself, and the idea of a company in the political sphere has naturally suggested a Chartered Company on the analogy of the East India Company and of the South African Chartered Company. But there is no analogy between the conditions of Palestine and those of India and South Africa. In India there was no question of encouraging British colonization but only of administering a population which must always to the end of time be predominantly un-English. All that the East India Company was concerned with in India was high politics and trade. In South Africa, again, though the intention of the Company from the first was to encourage British immigration, working to a political ideal was the very last thing the Company thought of. A Limited Company has no political conscience, the shareholders of a Chartered Company are not the people who settle in the country and still less are they the original inhabitants of the country, and for that reason amongst others its native policy is with few exceptions persistently bad. Its business is to make money, and while the art of money making and the art of building a state may coincide at some points, they are apt to come into violent conflict on others. The tendency of a Chartered Company is to regard the original inhabitants as mere chattels without political rights of any kind, and indeed without any claim to exist except in so far as their labour is necessary to the business of making dividends for

the Company. This sort of solution is wholly impracticable in Palestine. From the very first the policy must be to work to the pattern of a political idea, and to have the financial centre of gravity of Palestine outside the country would be fatal to political peace and progress. Moreover, there is a healthy and genuine democratic prejudice in England against Chartered Companies as instruments of government, and if England is to be the protecting Power it would be unwise for the new Jewish State to antagonize popular opinion here by a form of government associated in the past with some of the worst scandals of British Imperial expansion.

The objection, however, is not to a Chartered Company as such but to Chartered Companies as instruments of government. The peculiar nature of the problem that will confront the founders of the new Palestine makes it very desirable that the settlement of the country should be tackled on the practical lines of business.

The assistance of a Chartered Company under conditions that will be suggested later will be very necessary, but it must not for a moment be allowed to usurp the functions of government, or rather, while it may take over the work of government departments, it must be strictly subordinated to the general government of the country, and that general government must not only be of the country but in it. There must be no running of Palestine by a Committee resident in London, which would be to reproduce the colonial objections to Downing Street government in an exaggerated form. Downing Street government, when all is said, was not selfish

government, but government according to ideas, especially of native policy, that the colonists did not share. Government from abroad in which there was any taint of finance, and even of philanthropic finance, would soon come to grief. So long as the Jews in Palestine were aliens living under an alien Government there is something to be said for the system of direction from abroad, but the moment you establish a State, however rudimentary it may be at first, your central government must be in the country, and it must not be in the nature of financial control exercised from outside.

It is not easy to suggest forms of government until one knows exactly what the future international status of the country will be, but in any case there will be at first something analogous to what is known in the British Empire as Crown Colony government, whether Palestine is a colony of the British Crown or a colony of some international body. In a Crown Colony the government is in the hands of an Executive Council presided over by a Governor. Neither the Council nor, of course, the Governor are elected; they are officials responsible, not to the people of the country but to the sovereign Power. If Palestine were an English colony they would be English officials, preferably Jews. The work of a new State would be mapped out in various departments, and there would be an official representing each department on the Executive Council. In every new colony the department of Public Works and Immigration is exceedingly important, and in Palestine, which is for the most part still a virgin soil, so long has its neglect been continued, this department of

Public Works will be very much more important than in most colonies. In most colonies the future population is uncertain and indeterminate; in Palestine the future population is at hand waiting to be admitted, and the Government, therefore, would have the strongest incentive to push as rapidly as possible the economic development of the country so that as many as possible of the applicants can be admitted. This is work which might well be in the hands of the Chartered Company, and this Chartered Company should have one or more representatives on the Executive Council. It would not be the Government, but it would have an exceedingly important voice in the Government. Backed as it would be by capital, most of it philanthropically subscribed, it would relieve the strain on the slender official resources of the new colony. Development need never be held up as it is in colonies founded under ordinary circumstances by lack of internal resources or by the limits of the demands that can legitimately be made on the protecting Power. The protecting Power would certainly not wish to make the Government pay in the narrower sense, but its idea of the rate at which the development of the country could push forward would naturally be less generous than that of Jews inspired by the generous idea of furnishing their national home in the earliest possible time. Thus the partnership between Jewish philanthropy and patriotism outside and the political experience of the protecting Power would be a very natural and desirable one. Moreover, when the problem is, as it will be in Palestine, one of developing a neglected estate, an organization on a commercial basis is

better adapted for securing speedy results than one that is purely official. But whatever help the Chartered Company and outside philanthropy may give, it should be clearly understood that it must be at all times subordinate to the political interests of the country. To have two governments existing side by side, one an official and the other a philanthropic concern, would be to repeat in another form the mistake of a theocracy existing side by side with a secular government.

Another great department of government in the new Palestine will be that which is concerned in protecting the interests of the non-Jewish population. The problem is a peculiar and difficult one; it is desired to establish a predominantly Jewish civilization in the country without doing injustice to the large Arab population which is already there. The population of Palestine at present is about 700,000; it has supported a population of ten times that number in the past, and if the boundaries of the country are drawn with sufficient generosity it will do so again in the future. It is desired to encourage Jewish immigration by every means and at the same time to discourage the immigration of Arabs, and this double result is to be accomplished without unfair racial discrimination and certainly without a suspicion of tyranny or oppression. Too often in the past the entry of a new civilization into a country where another civilization already exists has been followed by the complete wiping out of the lower or weaker race. Such a solution is unthinkable in Palestine. Moreover, it seems likely that the foundation of the Jewish State will be simultaneous

with the foundation of an Arab Empire. Ill-treatment or oppression of the Arabs in Palestine would have immediate effects on the external relations between Palestine and its great neighbour on the East. These relations must be friendly, and a liberal and enlightened policy towards the Arabs of Palestine is, therefore, the first condition of peaceful progress. The protection of non-Jewish races will naturally be the principal concern of the protecting Power, and the member of the Executive Council who is responsible for this work should be a non-Jew. This is the more important because the avowed policy of the new Palestine will be to make it into a Jewish State, and the least excess of zeal might very easily cause the gravest injustice and compromise the relations of Palestine to Arabia. As the protecting Power would in the first instance have to bear the responsibility of the trouble that ensued, it is only just that it should take most careful precautions for the protection of its interests.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PROSPECT

THE prospect in the East, if our military policy is prescient and our statesmanship wise, is one to attract the coldest and least sympathetic. It matters very little whether the new Jewish State is under the sovereignty of Great Britain or under international sovereignty administered by Great Britain; in either case the same result should follow both to ourselves and to the Jews. The British Empire will have in time a powerful buffer-state between itself and possible enemies. On the north side of Palestine there will be a French Protectorate in Syria which will act as a secondary buffer, will ensure us an ally in the event of troubles, and by the community of interests that it will set up in the Near East will confirm the friendship between the two countries. On the East we shall have a new and, it is to be hoped, liberalizing Arabian Empire, the natural enemy of Turkey, the militarist Power in the East; and Persia, no longer dominated by the ambition of the Russian regime, will revive some of its former glory alike in politics, letters and in the arts. Our Indian Empire will thus be protected on its own strong front by a group of Powers friendly to each other and to us, and indeed some of them

owing their very existence to us. Behind this protecting wall there will be complete security for the growth of new and liberal ideas and for the bold experiment of the reconcilement of Western and Eastern ideas. We shall have solved the problem of garrisoning Egypt, and the main objection to the popularization of the government of Egypt—namely, that there are dangerous elements in the country which have powerful foreign allies—will have disappeared.

Further, for the first time in modern history a colony in the true sense of the word will have appeared in the Eastern Mediterranean. The appearance of a self-governing dominion in the Mediterranean will exercise an influence on the structure of the British Empire the importance of which it is hardly possible to exaggerate. The East has hitherto been the home of the Imperial as distinguished from its Colonial System of Great Britain. A new Jewish State arising in Palestine will break down this distinction; it will clothe the hard structure of an Empire proper with the softer lineaments of a free commonwealth. The Eastern Mediterranean will be endowed with a new racial and political type. The Semitic Empires in which the world's civilization was cradled will find their modern counterpart, but free from the vices and dangers which ruined them in their former existence. A new Mediterranean will appear between Syria and the Euphrates—a Mediterranean of the desert—and its shores will be inhabited by a prosperous people engaged in the development of their long-neglected patrimony. It will be the ancient Eastern world

come to life again, as though the Assyrian had never been and the Turk had never left Central Asia.

In this new Eastern world the political and the commercial Jew will be the chief fact, and the possession of a State of his own will break the fetters that have hitherto cramped his genius. Hitherto the condition of his material success has been the power of assimilating himself to a civilization not his own. Mere assimilation will no longer be a duty, and the equation between himself and the rest of the world in which he is living, never completely solved in the past, will now work out in a new, more stirring, but more harmonious life. The qualities that have made him enemies when he lived in an alien civilization will, in a new Eastern civilization, become his distinguishing virtues. After the Japanese war reams were written on the supposed mission of Japan to act as the leaven in China. It was forgotten that the Chinese civilization was much older and the character of her people in many of the most important departments of life much finer. But in the East the Jew is marked out as the dominating influence. His long exile, throughout which he has still maintained his connection with the East, will give him just the experience which will enable him to do the work to which he is called of adapting the thought of the West to the ways of the East.

Moreover, he will be a force that makes for peace in the world. He will owe his political existence, if not to an international Congress, at any rate to the action of many countries. The colonists of Palestine, though most of them no doubt will come from

Russia, will be drawn in a greater or lesser degree from all the nations of the world. It is impossible to image a nation so constituted ever becoming a disturber of the peace, a mere pushing candidate for the material blessings of the world, an intriguer in the quarrels of Europe, or an aggressor on the rights of his neighbours. It will necessarily be a pacific and international force. In some way, the new Jewish State as it grows in power may perform for Europe the same service as the United States has performed for the New World. Not, of course, that it will be a dominant Power by wealth or numbers, as the United States is in America, but it will be a Power that has important representatives in every State of Europe. Its influence will make for peace and unity, and beneath the political divisions of Europe there will exist this unifying organization of the Jewish State. For it is not to be supposed that the new Jewish State in Palestine will be a State disconnected from the countries out of which its population is drawn. On the contrary, the connection will be exceedingly close, as it was in the Roman world. Jewry with a State centre of its own in Palestine will be a kind of international and political *Volapuk*, a language knowing no words but those of peace and amity.

A Jewish State that is a dominion of the British Empire or is under international guarantee would be saved from the dangers that ruined it in the past. Of these its powerful foreign enemies were not perhaps the most fatal to its welfare. It is a hard thing to say, but had the Jewish State under the Romans been faithful to the policy of Herod there

is no reason whatever why it should have been destroyed by Rome. The chief cause of the quarrel between Rome and Palestine was the rivalry between the interests of the Church and the interests of the State. The Jewish nation in Palestine began as a theocracy, continued as a kingdom, and after the return from the Captivity became once more a theocracy, though a theocracy more bigoted than the old, surrounded by still more powerful enemies, and in consequence narrower and more intolerant. The period of the Maccabees in which the Jewish State attained its greatest military glory was politically the most unprogressive. Its numerical weakness and its internal dissensions between the Hellenizing and the Nationalist parties drove it into a policy of religious persecution and bigotry. The treatment of its Arab neighbours by the revived Jewish State was possessed by a cruelty only possible to religious bigots. The same spirit of fanaticism, the same clerical hatred of compromise, ruined the chances of a second restoration under the Roman Empire. In this respect there is not the smallest chance of history repeating itself. The attitude of the Jews on the question of the relation of Church and State is now definitely Erastian, and that in spite of the fact that the possession of a common religion has been the chief bond of union between the Jews of various countries. That the Jewish Church will be a great power in the land is certain, but its sphere will be the lives of the people, educational and cultural, not political. There will be no Nehemiah in the new restoration to usurp the functions of the House of David. And this will necessarily be so, for no

protecting Power, especially a Power which has interests in the neighbouring lands and responsibilities to the neighbouring peoples, would tolerate a policy of Church domination.

The religious settlement of the new State will then remove the chief cause of the Jewish failure. The prowess of the Maccabees and the marked friendliness of the founder of the Roman Empire to the Jews gave them the best chance that they have ever had in their history of doing something—a chance which they unfortunately threw away. The other two causes of the failure in the past were military and economic. These hold not so much of the period under Rome as of the earlier period when Palestine was an independent State tending to lean from time to time on Egypt. They would be fatal even now to any attempt on the part of the Jewish State to stand alone. Without a protecting Power a Jewish Palestine would not be strong enough to resist its powerful neighbours; it would engage in diplomatic intrigues with one or other of them, and, like a Balkan State, would be a pawn in the diplomatic games of European Chancellors. Nor could Palestine as an independent State establish the conditions of a sound economic life. Under a strong Protectorate, on the other hand, whether it were a Protectorate of Great Britain or of some international body, Palestine would be free from these drawbacks. The great danger is that the establishment of a Jewish State will be experimental merely, a concession to sentiment, not a piece of political design on a bold and generous scale. But this danger surmounted, it is not easy to overdraw the

picture of the future greatness to which it might attain. With a strong frontier towards the north and on the side of the desert, Palestine would become a Belgium of the East—a Belgium, let us hope, without its terrible and tragic history. She holds the doors between two continents. The German idea of connecting a new Empire of the East with a Central European block is really the successor of the old trading system which gave Venice and the Italian Republics their fame and their wealth. The natural design of the Entente Powers would be to divert the commercial outlets of the East towards the sea. Instead of being a mere tributary to the great land highways of commerce and empire stretching from Hamburg to Bagdad, Palestine would become the main outlet for the new East that is to arise. The way of the sea through Galilee will once more become one of the great highways of the world's commerce, and the centre of gravity in the Eastern Mediterranean will tend to shift away from Constantinople towards Antioch and Haifa. Some of the gain will be shared with Syria, but there would still be an abundance left over for Palestine, and the adoption of a bold and enlightened commercial policy would tend to enlarge this share beyond the natural advantages of the country. Nor would Palestine be merely an *entrepôt*, a clearing-house for the trade of the East; if it were that and no more the most cherished idea of Zionism would be disappointed. For an international trade tends to create a merely international civilization; Palestine might become a *colluvies gentium* like Antioch of old. The best safeguard against that danger is to establish

in Palestine a numerous and prosperous peasantry. Outside a few favoured districts like the Hauran, Palestine is not adapted to the cultivation of cereals and will never be the world's granary, but it may well become one of the great market gardens of the world. No soil is better adapted to the culture of fruit trees and vines. The success of the Jewish colonies already established in Palestine shows what is possible, and it will be the country par excellence of intensive agriculture. There is no reason why Palestine, then, on the mainly agricultural basis, should not support a population of several millions, especially if its boundaries on the north and the west are drawn with the necessary amplitude, and we may reasonably expect the growth of the population to be as rapid as that of Canada. But the political boundaries of Palestine will not necessarily be the boundaries of the energies of the people who live in it. On every side there is a wide field for economic expansion of which the Jews, if any race, will know how to make the fullest use. This will be no struggling State, no artificial experiment in nation-making, but a re-making of what was anciently the wealthiest and the most powerful part of the East, the redemption of one of the fairest estates of the world from the blight of the Turkish mortgage. The attitude of the various Powers to the project of a Jewish State, when it is analyzed, betrays no distrust of its material or cultural success, but rather a jealousy of the increment of power that will accrue to the protecting State. England's position in Egypt makes her the ideal protector of the new Palestine, but she would take up this task, if she is

wise, in no selfish spirit, but as the mandatory of a new European League of Peace. As protector of Palestine, she could wish for no higher privilege than that of keeper of the world's conscience to a great and sorely tried people.

APPENDIX I

THE "SECRET" TREATIES RELATING TO TURKEY

THE following account of the agreements between the Powers relating to Turkey appeared in the *Isvestia*, the organ of the Petrograd Soviet, on November 24, 1917. The translation is that of the *Manchester Guardian* (March 6, 1917)—

SYRIA AND PALESTINE

As a result of negotiations which took place in London and Petrograd in the spring of 1916, the allied British, French, and Russian Governments came to an agreement as regards the future delimitation of their respective zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, as well as the formation in Arabia of an independent Arab State, or a federation of Arab States. The general principles of the agreement are as follows—

Russia obtains the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, as well as territory in the southern part of Kurdistan along the line Mush-Sert-Ibn-Omar-Amadjie-Persian frontier. The limit of Russian acquisitions on the Black Sea coast would be fixed later on at a point lying west of Trebizond.

France obtains the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and a territory bounded on the south by a line Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the north by a line Ala-Dagh-Zara-Egin-Kharput.

Great Britain obtains the southern part of Mesopotamia, with Bagdad, and stipulates for herself in Syria the ports of Haifa and Akka.

By agreement between France and England the zone between the French and British territories forms a confederation of Arab States, or one independent Arab

State, the zones of influence in which are determined at the same time,

Alexandria is proclaimed a free port.

With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the holy places, is separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France, and England.

As a general rule the contracting Powers undertake mutually to recognize the concessions and privileges existing in the territories now acquired by them which have existed before the war.

They agree to assume such portions of the Ottoman Debt as corresponds to their respective acquisitions.

The Dardanelles and Persia

Confidential telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Paris (? London), March 7, 1915. No. 1265—

Referring to the memorandum of the British Government (? Embassy) here of March 12, will you please express to Grey the profound gratitude of the Imperial Government for the complete and final assent of Great Britain to the solution of the question of the Straits and Constantinople, in accordance with Russia's desires. The Imperial Government fully appreciates the sentiments of the British Government, and feels certain that a sincere recognition of mutual interests will secure for ever the firm friendship between Russia and Great Britain.

Having already given its promise respecting the conditions of trade in the Straits and Constantinople, the Imperial Government sees no objection to confirming its assent to the establishment (1) of free transit through Constantinople for all goods not proceeding from or proceeding to Russia, and (2) free passage through the Straits for merchant vessels.

In order to facilitate the breaking through of the Dardanelles undertaken by the Allies, the Imperial Government is prepared to co-operate in inducing those States whose help is considered useful by Great Britain

and France to join in the undertaking on reasonable terms.

The Imperial Government completely shares the view of the British Government that the holy Moslem places must also in future remain under an independent Moslem rule. It is desirable to elucidate at once whether it is contemplated to leave those places under the rule of Turkey, the Sultan retaining the title of Caliph, or to create new independent States, since the Imperial Government would only be able to formulate its desires in accordance with one or other of these assumptions. On its part the Imperial Government would regard the separation of the Caliphate from Turkey as very desirable. Of course the freedom of pilgrimage must be completely secured.

The Imperial Government confirms its assent to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia in the British sphere of influence. At the same time, however, it regards it as just to stipulate that the districts adjoining the cities of Ispahan and Yezd, forming with them one inseparable whole, should be secured for Russia in view of the Russian interests which have arisen there. The neutral zone now forms a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and comes up to the very frontier line of Russia at Sulfager. Hence a portion of this wedge will have to be annexed to the Russian sphere of influence. Of essential importance to the Imperial Government is the question of railway construction in the neutral zone, which will require further amicable discussion.

The Imperial Government expects that in future its full liberty of action will be recognized in the sphere of influence allotted to it, coupled in particular with the right of preferentially developing in that sphere its financial and economic policies.

Lastly, the Imperial Government considers it desirable simultaneously to solve also the problems in Northern Afghanistan adjoining Russia in the sense of the wishes expressed on the subject by the Imperial Ministry in the course of the negotiations last year.

(Signed) SAZONOFF.

APPENDIX II

THE PALESTINE DESPATCHES

[THE following criticism of the Palestine despatches is taken from *Palestine*, the organ of the British Palestine Committee, of February 2, 1918. It gives within a short compass a conspectus of the military operations leading to the capture of Jerusalem.]

With the publication this week of General Allenby's despatch on the operations that led to the capture of Jerusalem we have now a complete official account of our campaign in Palestine. Read with General Murray's account of the crossing of the Sinai Desert and the first two Battles of Gaza, the new despatch enables us to form a very much clearer idea of our military policy in this part of the world than has hitherto been possible, and if full details could be given of the forces engaged on either side the conclusions to be drawn from these despatches as they stand would be strongly reinforced. Broadly, however, it is permissible to say that the forces engaged on either side have been very much exaggerated. To judge by the extreme jealousy shown by Colonel Repington and other fanatical Westerners towards the Palestine Campaign, one might suppose that an army of half a million had been engaged. In fact, even when the original army of invasion had received the reinforcements, denied to General Murray but given to General Allenby, the war in Palestine is still a small war judged by the standard in France. A few divisions, which would be a mere drop in the bucket in France, in Palestine have made all the difference between victory and defeat there in the past, and in the future will make all the difference between stalemate and a decisive political triumph.

General Murray has been unjustly criticized. When he took the command in Egypt his army was a heterogeneous and untrained force. Not the slightest attention had been given to the military problems of

Egyptian defence, which, in spite of warnings, was still based on the theory that Turkey was a friend. General Murray's position, with both frontiers of Egypt attacked, was not an enviable one. On neither side has Egypt a good defensive frontier. The western, or Tripoli, front is exposed to raids by the Senoussis, whose passions have been inflamed by the Italian conquest of the Tripoli coast line, and the rising of the Senoussis, probably the strongest native power in North Africa, was a really serious business, and caused General Murray great anxiety. On the other hand, no arrangements had ever been made for holding Egyptian territory in Sinai, and a comparatively small force of Turks was sufficient to force us back to the line of the Suez Canal. If there is one lesson that comes out clearly from these early operations, it is the folly of holding territory in peace which you are not in a position to defend in war time. The invasion of Palestine was in its origin no more than a necessary measure for the protection of Egypt. If there were no Jews and Arabs in the world it would be necessary, if we were to hold Egypt, to advance our frontier at least as far as the Wady Ghuzze, and as even this line can easily be turned from the mountains of Judæa, the recovery of Jerusalem is a natural appendix to this rectification of the Egyptian frontier. Yet, when General Murray began his campaign in Southern Palestine, there is no evidence that our military directors at home had any clear idea of what they intended to do. Unless they meant to conquer the Maritime Plain there was not much sense in invading Palestine at all, but how reasonable men can have expected to conquer with three divisions one of the strongest natural positions in the world, and one of the holiest of Mohammedan cities (for Jerusalem is a holy city for Mohammedans as well as for Christians and Jews), passes comprehension.

It has been said that after our recovery of the Sinai Peninsula Djemal Pasha proposed to evacuate Gaza, and to retire on Jerusalem, or even on Nablus, and that the decision to defend Gaza was forced on him by the German Von Kressenstein. If there is any truth in this

story it is an ample justification for General Murray's first attack on Gaza. Resolutely held, the Gaza position could be made impregnable against such small forces as General Murray had under him, but if he could catch the Turks in two minds, the place might be carried by a *coup de main.* This is what General Murray proposed to do, and, what is more, he nearly did it. The first Battle of Gaza was very well planned, and with a little more luck the town would have been ours. The criticism that the difficulties of water supply, which in fact proved fatal to our success, should have been foreseen, is really beside the mark. There was abundance of water in Gaza, but he knew that unless he got there on the first day there was nothing for it but to fall back on the Wady Ghuzze. It was a legitimate gamble. On the other hand, for the second Battle of Gaza there was nothing at all to be said. There was a rudimentary turning movement attempted on the right, but it never came to anything, and the battle degenerated into a series of frontal attacks, which we never in the least looked like winning. General Dobell deserved supersession, and almost the only criticism which is not just was that of General Murray, that he ought to have thrown in his reserve division. There is no reason to think that it would have made any difference to the result except to increase our losses. The plain fact is that the battle ought never to have been fought at all. Having failed in the *coup de main,* which was quite rightly attempted in the first battle, we ought then to have waited until we had a clear policy in Palestine, and got the army of that policy. Even if Gaza had been carried in the second battle, we should have been very little better off for doing anything that mattered.

General Allenby, therefore, was quite right in insisting on his reinforcements, and presumably also on knowledge of exactly what the Government wanted in Palestine. By the end of the year the Government's ideas on the political future of Palestine had greatly clarified, and clearness of political thinking is just as necessary for victory as strong armies. General Allenby,

therefore, started with great advantages denied to his predecessor. His despatch throws a great deal of light on a clever and ingenious set of operations. The correspondents in Palestine were in front of Gaza, where they thought our main attack was going to be delivered; the critics at home fastened on the turning movement by Beersheba as the crux of the matter. They were both of them wrong. General Allenby's main attack was on the Turkish centre at Hareira and Sheria. The turning movement at Beersheba was designed not as an ambitious project for enveloping the Turks, but simply to assist what would otherwise have been a mere frontal attack on the Turkish centre. In fact, what happened was something rather different. The loss of Beersheba and the advance of the British on this wing alarmed Von Kressenstein so much that he put all his reserves there. General Allenby takes credit for not allowing himself to be diverted by this movement into abandoning his plans and involving himself in fighting in the difficult country north of Beersheba, and there is no doubt about the soundness of his decision. At the same time the Turkish centre, which might have been annihilated if the turning movement at Beersheba had made further progress, managed to get away. Von Kressenstein did not save his lines, but he did keep a hinge on which his army was able to wheel back on to the high lands of Judæa. And oddly enough, the advance along the coast by Gaza, which was not intended to be our chief line of advance, did, in fact, become so, for as the Turks wheeled back on Beersheba our army conformed, and the Gaza wing, having more open country, made the most marked progress. The other critical moment of the pursuit was at the capture of the junction station between the line at Jerusalem and the trunk line at Beersheba. Faithful to his policy of breaking the Turkish centre, General Allenby disregarded the menace to his flank from the Judæan Hills, and by capturing the station cut the Turkish armies in Palestine into two, one of which retreated north to the Plain of Sharon and the other retired to the Judæan Plateau. The forcing of an entry from the Maritime

Plains to the Judæan Hills was again extremely skilful in its timing. These narrow limestone gorges leading from the plains to the plateau are, as the history of Palestine has repeatedly shown, impregnable except to surprise, and it is clear that the advance up the Beth Horen took the enemy completely by surprise. Von Kressenstein was out-manœuvred by General Allenby, who played very skilfully on his obvious anxiety for the safety of his left. The surprise was not complete enough, or the country was too difficult to let us get astride the Nablus Road before the enemy could recover, but General Allenby got far enough forward to convince the Turks that it was hopeless to hold Jerusalem, and the fall of the city was only a matter of time. Attention in this country has been directed perhaps too exclusively to the forcing of the Gaza lines, which was indeed a creditable piece of work, but it was the sudden wheeling round across the Surar Valley and the march on Beth Horen that revealed the master.

English people do not appreciate at its true value the achievement of conquering the Judæan Plateau, which, after General Maude's campaign for Bagdad, is tactically perhaps the best thing the British Army has done in this war. Considering the very slight numerical superiority our army had over the enemy, and the enormous strength of the enemy's positions, it is an achievement of which any army might well be proud. It was a deadly blow at Von Falkenhayn's plans, which were, it is to be supposed, to hold the British at Gaza while the Turkish main army attacked the British at Bagdad. The result of the campaign to all seeming has been to draw all the Turkish strength into Palestine, and incidentally to relieve General Marshall in Mesopotamia from what, thanks to the defection of the Russians, would have been a difficult if not dangerous situation. General Allenby, having drawn the lightning to himself, must be properly supported. If he is, he will do at Nablus what he has done at Jerusalem, and the result may be a separate peace with Turkey. Without reinforcements he will be in as difficult a position as General Murray was when he first went up to Gaza.

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